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Preface
With this work we are having the possibility to follow an important approach
of the recent evolution of our world in a very unique moment of the mankind
history. In reality it’s difficult to find a period of such change in quality, as well as
in its speed and global output
The author, Luis Tomé, an university teacher of International Relations in
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, gives us a deep study on the world situation
at the begining of the second millennium putting together all the elements that
are important for an interpretation of this period and a forecast for the future and
developing a reaction between them, either in a multilateral or in a bilateral basis.
Since 1989/91 we are living in a world with a different paradigma of the past
or even without any kind of parameters for framework. For the US realist school
of political thought, which has been overstressed by the Bush neocons, the military
force is the only way of giving order, peace and stability to the world and freedom
to all the peoples. It looks like the ideals of the French Revolution followed by the
Napoleonic expansion.
For his analysis the author recognises the characteristics and elements of the
global disorder, elects the most important political units (USA-the only super
power-, EU-a unique idea and successful construction-, RUSSIA-still in disarray
but always a big power which can become a big problem- and CHINA-the current
rising power),which he mixes with the new powers without territorial base, such
as the economic, the finance corporations, the media, the return of the religions,
the trans-nationals of the crime and terror, the weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), the ciber war, the regional and internal problems in several communities,
sometimes very violent and looking endless. The UNO is not forgotten and the
relationship of the others players of the game with it.
As a consequence the author considers the existence of a new system which
he calls the “uni-multipolar order” since he does not accept the possibility of an
easier explanation. The so-called imperial power of the USA is not a total true;
that is a reality in the military, aero-space and scientific fields, but not in the
economics, cultural and religious activities nor in the political influence and human
intelligence (humint).This situation gives birth to a process of tensions which he
calls a game of “mutual and multiple contentions” among everybody being the
US the leading actor.
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All the different possibilities, evolution and reactions have been studied and
developed in this work by its author and we are witnesses of a very thorough and
useful tool. Nevertheless, I am convinced that, with this basis, it is possible to try
to go a little bit further, opening a broader space for discussion. It is a kind of
food for thought.
Although the system introduced and explained in detail is very complex I
believe the reality, today, is even more complex and very difficult to put inside a
model and to frame it. All the experts in political science know this and it’s hard
to understand why the neocons are trying to simplify everything trough the military
option. In this regard this work has the merit of opening a wide range of
perspectives.
There are several subjects raised in the book which should be underlined,
such as:
- The states are not anymore the only political actors; although they still are
the first ones, there are much more in the arena;
- Even limiting the rationale only among states, the western countries are
loosing ground for new emerging powers, such as China, India, Brazil,
South Africa, Nigeria, etc;
- At the same time the globalization has been expanded through all the
activities with obvious consequences for the states which are loosing control;
considering all the international, multinational, trans-national activities,
organizations and corporations ,as well as the magnitude of some problems,
the national states have lost  capabilities and power. But, as a kind of
contradiction and burden they still get responsibility for solving the social
and security issues. The EU has been the best answer for these kind of
new challenges, but is facing now a lot of huge problems to solve; some
other countries and regions are trying to follow this example and the EU
is looked as a point of attraction;
- Overlapping with tensions among states and communities we have the
“new war” of the multinationals and trans-nationals of finances, economy,
crime and terror against the states; this is totally new in the History. It is
more than a network, this is a complex web of different and inter-connected
systems. To survive in this new atmosphere each one needs prospective
studies and solid intelligence services;
- The question of raw materials, sources of energy and oil should maintain
their importance as a reason for conflicts and a struggle for the control of
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some parts of land and the sea lanes of communications which are
indispensable for the normal flow of those goods to the industries around
the world.
The XX century could be defined as the century of the most violent shock
among ideologies (democracies, fascisms and comunisms), a period of hecatombs
(I and II world wars followed by the european decolonisations, the rise and fall of
the Soviet Empire), the only part of History in which mankind got the possibility
of producing and inventing almost everything and at the same time has the power
and the temptation to destroy all, including the globe and all the humankind. At
the dawn of this new century, the blind faith and the assumed only true of each
religion have returned rising the danger of foolish violence spread around the
globe and including all the population as a target to be destroyed .At the same
time the difference between the very rich and the very poor is huge with millions
of people starving, which is a situation without precedents in human history.
The rationale and goals to solve this equation might be three: to understand
that the planet is very fragile, that it is the home for all mankind (without any
exception) and that the resources and wealthy ought to be better divided and
with more justice. Not very difficult, in principle!
This book opens a window to all the problems that we are facing today and
deserves a complete and detailed reading. The author has no power to solve the
world problems but he does his best opening some ways.
Lisboa, January 24th 2005
GARCIA LEANDRO
LIEUT-GENERAL
UNIVERSITY TEACHER
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Thesis and aims of the study
This book follows to a long reflection about the actual status of international
relations and in particular about the world’s new power architecture. It is an
extended and enhanced version of an article published in the Volume 106 of the
prestigious Nação e Defesa (Nation and Defence) magazine of the Instituto de
Defesa National (Portuguese National Defence Institute)1. A few friends have
suggested me to complete this article into a monograph format, due to the good
reception of the analysis and the polemics around these issues. I decided to develop
this work due to its importance and actuality and also to take the opportunity to
assemble in one publication a jigsaw of other reflections about international
relations specific topics previously written. I would like to inform that this book
is not about Iraq. It is only another contribution about the “new world’s order”
in a geopolitics perspective that intends to be updated, serious, rigorous and
justified. This is not about arguing “for” or “against”, “pro” or “anti” – the
complexity of these questions makes it impossible to reduce it to the “black” or
“white” used in many analysis. This study is based on several questions and facts
that produced reflections, thesis and conclusions duly grounded.
The world’s geopolitics and the international relations’ actual system have
definitely entered a new stage. Analysts have been prolific in multiplying visions,
which try to understand the meaning of the “new world’s order” and describe the
post cold war paradigm – end of history, clash of civilization, geopolitical “chaos”,
new empire, benevolent hegemony, world American pax, new cold war, imperial
age, unipolar order, are descriptions found among many other classifications.
Each of these perspectives captures aspects of the emerging reality although some
are driven by political motivations and/or intentions; others evaluate new facts
based on passed paradigms and concepts; others develop with the only purpose to
oppose another; and others try to describe the new order as they wished it would
be and not as it actually is.
1 TOMÉ, Luis L., Novo Recorte Geopolítico Mundial: uma ordem uni-multipolar, uma grande
guerra e o jogo de “contenções múltiplas”,  in Nação e Defesa, n. 106 – 2º Série (“A nova carta do
poder mundial”), IDN, Autumn-Winter 2003, pp 77-119.
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My thesis does not intend to create, deny or follow any paradigm, but only
to describe the actual international relations’ status using a geopolitical and
geostrategical perspective. To sum up and simplify, I consider that a hybrid,
complex and original model of world power structure, which we might call uni-
multipolar, characterizes the new order, and coexists with two wide geopolitical
and geostrategical movements: on the one hand, “a great war” against terrorism,
weapons of massive destruction proliferation and “Rogue States” and, on the
other, the game of “multiple containment” played by the USA’s hegemonic
pressure and opposing powers which strive to contain or even invert its
pretension. This order derives mainly from the strategic impact rouse by three
great events - the end of bipolar confrontation, the September 11th and Iraq’s
recent military intervention – and, in a context characterized by the emergence of
asymmetric threats and new strategies attempting to face them.
This study is divided in three parts that analyze these topics. The first part
makes an attempt to draw the new world’s geopolitical order profile in terms of
hierarchy and power distribution on the international relations, characterized as
uni-multipolar. Here included is the North American hegemony analysis, the
actual uni-multipolarization characterization, the uni-multipolarity limitations,
the conditions of maintenance of this mixed order, positive effects, risks and
dilemmas associated with uni-multipolarity, and the game of “mutual and multiple
containment”. The second part makes a reflection about the relations between
the USA and each one of the other great world and regional powers – European
Union, Russia and China – in the scope of the multiple containment game and
accounting the impacts coming from the end of cold war, the September 11th and
Iraq crisis. The third part analyses the “new world war”, starting with the
description of Al Qaeda’s war declaration and following the declaration of war to
terrorism after the September 11th. It also characterizes the new asymmetric threats,
in particular the “new type of terrorism” as well as the strategies implemented to
face it, specially, the dilemmas and controversies about preventive and preemptive
actions and North American “floating coalitions” or “will coalitions”. Finally, it
analyses the UNO-USA relation in what concerns Iraq, considering the unilateral
and multilateral questions. Conclusions will sum up the main topics stated in this
work, uttering important ideas and thesis.
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Introduction
With Westphalia Peace in 1648 emerged the modern international system
whose basic principles shaped the international relations until the present days.
The Westphalia order is based on the sovereignty of the States, which represents
both the principle founder of the political society domestically, or, that supports
the supreme authority of a political power (“the sovereign does not have an equal
power in the internal order…”) and the international order regulator for the absolute
State independence, that is to say, that a sovereign State is not submitted to any
authority or power (“...or superior power on the external order”). The sovereignty
established that internal policy and State institutions ought to be out of other
States interference and, that in the international order, relations between recognized
sovereign States should be “inter pares”. The fact that formal “equality” is not
compatible with differences in power and strength showed that principles alone
cannot establish behavior guidelines and conditioned the creation of a restrictions
mechanism working through a balance that should avoid dominance from any
powerful country – that is the concept of power balance, mainly between great
powers.
These notions are clearly written in the most considered international
regulator organ since the end of the 2nd World War – the United Nations
Organization (UNO). On the first paragraph of article 2 of UN Charter we
read, “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
its Members.” At the same time the sovereign States have formally obliged
themselves to refrain the use of force to solve differences, as stated on the fourth
paragraph of the same article: “All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.” However, there were two exceptional situations accepted:
when there is a collective action organized by the Security Council against an
aggressor State and the right to self-defense.  In those days - 1945, when the
United Nations Charter was written and signed, and especially on article 51,
which establishes the right to self-defense - it is obvious that the idea was protection
from aggressions coming from other States.
Maybe it is also convenient to remind that in 1945 the United Nations were
founded by around 50 States (today we have 191) almost all Western; that USSR
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was an ally in sequence to a war against the same enemy (Germany and Japan);
that China was equally allied and still dominated by Chiang Kay-Sheck (People’s
Republic of China, with communist regime was only proclaimed in 1949, and its
participation in the UN in replacement of the former would only occur in 1971);
that decolonization processes were not yet in motion, etc.  This is to emphasize
that back on those days the international order and the presuppositions were
substantially different from nowadays. To guarantee the power balance and
responsibilities sharing was created the figure of the UN Security Council
permanent member with veto power only accessible to the five war winners,
USA, USSR, China, United Kingdom and France. The defeated countries -
Germany and Japan were still enemies and of course excluded. Thus, on behalf of
balance an inequality of fact between States was legally achieved.
Exceeded Paradigms
Despite the principles and rules established and formally accepted by the
States which have continuously joined the United Nations, the mechanism
regulator of the international order came mainly from the effects caused by the
confrontation between the two superpowers – USA and USSR. Therefore, the
international order quickly became bipolar. The international relations became
hostage of the ideological, geopolitical and geostrategic superpower’s considerations.
The game of power had only two fundamental poles. Also, the development of
nuclear weapons made less probable the war between those who possessed them.
That developed the paradigm of the improbability of war consisting of a direct
military conflict between the superpowers. The paradox in the nuclear era consisted
of the growing nuclear capacity and the reduced will to use it. The nuclear parity
and the dissuasion by the “mutual destruction guarantee” imposed a new logic
to the superpowers. The world’s political bipolarization lived with the “cold
war” and the balance of terror, and pushed the “hot” confrontation to peripheral
areas. Still, respecting the principle that “invented weapons end up being used”
and suspecting their logic not to be valid for all countries, particularly those who
have different considerations towards the human life value or those less informed
about true apocalyptic effects of those weapons, both superpowers agreed and
managed the creation of mechanisms to regulate the nuclear weapons
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proliferation – once again on behalf of the international security the inequality
between “equal” sovereign States was legally achieved.
These were the paradigms that lasted for four decades and a half on the
international system. The Westphalia order principles remained basically valid
– respect for sovereignty of States remained usually the international relations
corner stone and the threats came from other States or coalitions.
Mutation of the international system and Westphalia order
The end of USA-USSR confrontation, the fall of Berlin wall and the USSR’s
implosion fifteen years ago, has dismantled the bipolar international relations
system leaving the redefinition of a new world’s power architecture and new
international order open. Without balance of powers or strategic rival, the USA
have positioned has “hyper power”, turning many paradigms, concepts and
even expectations obsolete (essentially of those who anticipated or expected a
multipolar order). Today we can say that the USA are the only totally sovereign
power. This new world’s order characterization deserves all attention and will be
analyzed in the first chapter, but the truth is that actually the Westphalia order is
at stake. Its principles are clearly in danger although there are no obvious
alternatives. The traditional sovereign State face powerful pressures acting
“beneath”, “below” and “inside”. As a consequence of globalization in its multiple
dimensions, regional integration processes and new prominence of other
international actors, the States are loosing their relevance in the international
stage – following to a long period when the international relations were mainly
and almost exclusively relations between States and their agents – and now face
the progressive erosion of formerly exclusive competences2.
To this true phenomenon, nor bad or good, we should add others also relevant:
the national State concept is going through a metamorphosis and, territory as
an element of national power has long lost it’s meaning. These facts may be
associated with another, even more compromising of the traditional Westphalia
2 For more detailed information about this topic: TOMÉ, Luis L., O Estado e a Nova Ordem
International – entre  a fragmaentação e a globalização, EdiUAL and Instituto Internacional de
Macau, Lisboa, 2003
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order: the non-interference in other States’ internal affairs principle has been
abandoned in favor of humanitarian interference consolidation and even world
jurisdiction. This is not only used by the USA but also by other Western countries,
the North Atlantic Treaty and even the United Nations. In the 2000 UN
Millennium summit the principle of humanitarian interference was approved by
a large number of “non Western” States. During the 90’s decade, the USA has
undertaken humanitarian operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo; other
countries have taken initiatives in East Timor (leaded by Australia) and in Sierra
Leone (leaded by the United Kingdom). Except in Kosovo, all initiatives have
been supported by the United Nations; in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO has leaded
the interventions with the agreement and participation of European and North
American allies.
On the other hand, a State no longer withholds the monopoly of the use of
strength and war as established in the Westphalia order. This makes that threats
to security and defense happen many times from non-State groups, such as terrorist
organizations. Never like today “terrorism” has been such a dangerous threat to
the international security – thus representing a fact that changes most of the
usual concepts regarding threats, defense, security, strategy, politics and
international relations. Besides, it is obvious that dangers proceeding from terrorism
are actually linked to the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (WMD).
The conjunction of these two threats: terrorism and WMD exponentially increase
the danger.  Anyway, the main responsibility of eliminating, reducing or attenuating
those threats and risks belongs to each State individually and above all depends of
the collective and concerted action of States.
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PART I
THE UNI-MULTIPOLAR ORDER
All analysis describing the “new world’s order” inevitably depend on the
interpretation of the international power structure and on the perception that
each one has of the trail followed by the “hyper power” - USA as hegemonic
power.
THE USA’S HEGEMONY
The North American hegemony is an unquestionable and undeniable fact
resulting from more than its military power. The USA is a superpower in all
power domains, summing military, political and strategic, economic, technological
and scientific and cultural power. The skilful articulation of these fields creates an
increase of power in each area individually and in the absolute power of the USA.
Its political-strategical power depends and promotes the economic, which depends
and projects its scientific-technological power, thus allowing expanding its culture
and ethical values, which will again reflect its power in other spheres. All power
domains articulate successively conditioning more power and influence
accumulation. Today, the USA are omnipresent military, politically, strategically
and also economical and culturally. Its hegemony does not depend only of
power to impose and coerce but also have its great influential and attraction
ability. Inevitably, the soviet empire’s collapse (collapsed from inside by its own
contradictions) has brought a substantial increase of power to the USA, supported
by strength, political, ideological and economical patterns, which have won the
former confrontation.
Economical power
The North American economic supremacy is intimately associated with the
scientific-technologic supremacy and the favorable conditions generated by the
accelerated globalization process.  This process – whose origins go back to the
Discoveries and mercantile revolution, followed by the industrial revolution and,
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more recently by the extraordinary technological innovations in the field of
transports and communications that have substantially reduced space and time
notions – includes all world in a system of narrow interdependence. In these
terms, the conditions proposed and imposed by the USA are extremely efficient.
They work through the direct action of American governmental institutions,
its powerful network of multinational enterprises controlling world markets
and also through the international regulation agencies, such as the World Trade
Organization, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, deeply inspired
in North American concepts. It is obvious that this work does not come from one
country’s initiative or one economical group and that most of the developed and
developing countries will benefit with the globalization (it is the case of Asiatic
economies and China, in particular). However, in the extent that the USA control
the economy sectors of high technology and usually is highly competitive in
most important sectors, makes them leaders and controllers of the process. Their
economical supremacy is visible and projected by the fact that we live in a “Dollar
parity” era, and most of the international trading uses the reference of North
American currency. Despite their huge external debt, dependence of external
markets and high deficit on the commercial balance they have the highest GDP
of the world. The USA’s GDP represents around a quarter of the world’s GDP,
in just one country! In a ranking referring to the most important and powerful
companies of the world, half of the chart, or more, will present North American
companies. Some voices foresee the USA’s economical decline but numbers do
not show it. Referring to decline, the most concerning and impressive is the
European and not the Asian or the North American.
Cultural and Scientific-Technological power
The USA’s cultural power is frequently devaluated and considered only in
terms of its scientific-technological aspects.  However, this area has big power of
attraction and slowly shows great expression and domination. During the 20th
century, the scientific production has increasingly moved from Europe to the
USA. In the beginning of the 21st century, the technological and innovation
ability concentrated in the USA is significant as well as the increasing rhythm
of intellectual exodus from all over the world heading to the country, including
musicians, artists or actors. The English language became “the universal
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communication tongue”. TV, Cinema and Internet are channels that express USA’s
cultural supremacy and influence – they present a countless multiplying effect,
projecting life and behavior patterns and exporting their values and ideals. Medals
and sport achievements go to America at the same time as Nobel prizes and other
international scientific awards. Their universities, research and investigation centers
are the most prestigious and assume the role of international elite meeting and
working point. The world’s attention given to the cinema Oscar award ceremony
or NASA progresses is unprecedented. The immense and powerful dissemination
of American cultural style and values affects similarly the development of other
cultures. Helio Jaguaribe, Dean of Rio de Janeiro Cultural and Political Studies
Institute underline three of its most important effects: “ the first refers to the fact
that modernity and modernization, specially in what concerns youth from all over the
world, is seen as equivalent to an Americanization process or something resulting from
it. Institutions and American procedures, like democracy and neoliberal economy, super
competitive individuality, unlimited consuming is considered desirable. Finally – the
most disastrous – in all nations and social classes spreads the conviction that “the
American way of life” and its high unrestricted consuming are universally accessible
since American institutions and processes are adopted”3. Certainly, the USA’s own
ethnic-cultural composition conditioned the absorption of many cultural inputs
coming from diverse origins. Still, if there were doubts about real cultural power
emanating from the US, they would vanish when we realize that none of
civilizations is immune. Consolidated and millenary cultures, such as the Chinese,
the Indian or the Arabic try to resist “external influences” making a reference to
the USA. The “Western civilization” becomes Americanized even if the USA are
“Europe’s descendents”.
Besides the economical, scientific-technological and cultural power, the great
founder and catalyst of the USA’s hegemony is the military power, which means
clear political and strategical supremacy.
3 JAGUARIBE, Helio, O Novo Sistema Internacional in Estratégia – Revista de Estudos
Internacionais, IEEI, 16, 1st Semester 2002, p.27
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Military supremacy and strategical expansion
The USSR implosion has accented the unbalance of the USA towards the
rest of the world. They have a large military arsenal gathered to face the former
soviet threat, capacity to projecting power, influence and strength all over the
world, adapted the network of alliances made during the bipolar confrontation,
and military omnipresence in all world. The enormous American power finds a
private world with one relevant adversary only. Although the USA have tried to
enjoy the “peace share” – ordering their soldiers return from foreign areas specially
in Europe and Eastern Asia, reducing defense budgets, investing in the economical
recovery and deepening bonds with former adversaries as well as diffusing
democracy, human rights’ values and economical liberalism – the truth is that
they saw the end of the cold war as a chance to expand the strategical reach of
America. Many politicians and analysts have called the myth of isolation to defend
and try to demonstrate “American’ strategical withdraw”. However, the reality
has shown the USA’s military intervention abroad more often than before. Bush’s
father administration invaded Panama in 1989, had Gulf war in 1991 (having
sent half of a million American soldiers to Persia Gulf region) and made an
humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992; with Clinton administrations there
were interventions in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo; George Bush’s administration
made already interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, they increasingly
have used force in restricted ways with air raids and missiles attacks. All these
military involvements, different in what concerns contexts and motivations, are a
sign either of hyper power’s will to use war force or as of the assumption of world
police role responsibility, as guardians of international order and security in diverse
regions of the globe. In this period we have also seen a drastic reduction of the
world military expenses: from 1.100 billion USD in the end of 1980 to 900
billion in the end of 2003. In the same period occurred an abrupt slow down in
armament sales (around 50%) and a significant increase of armament market
control by the USA and its allies: the USA have increased its share of 20% to
more than 40% while NATO allies’ group have increased from 44% to 75%.
According to the estimates from the prestigious International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS), in 2003, the USA were responsible for 47.5% of the global arms
deliveries by supplier (in the amount of 13,648 million USD) and for 56.7% of
the market share of global arms transfer agreements by supplier (in the amount of
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14,543 million USD)4. Just to compare the market share of others leading suppliers
of arms deliveries, UK represents a share of 16.3% (in the amount of 4,700
million USD), Russia represents a share of 11.8 % (with 3,400 million USD),
France and Germany represents 4.2% each (in the amount of 1,200 million USD
each) and China represents 3.1% (with 500 million USD). In what concerns of
global arms transfers agreements by supplier, in 2003, Russia presented a share of
16.8% and an amount of 4,300 million USD, Germany represents 5.5% of share
and 1,400 million USD, France represents a share of 3.9% with an amount of
1,000 million USD, while China presented a share of 1.2% and and amount of
300 million USD5 (in fact, China is much more a leading recipient than a supplier
of arms – em 2003, received 1,000 million USD of arms deliveries and celebrated
arms tranfer agreements in the amount of 500 million USD 6). On the other
hand, the USA defense budgets in the first post cold war decade were kept above
3% of the GDP (3.7%, in 2003). On Europe the average defense budget was
reduced to less than 2% of the GDP. After the September 11th and due to the war
against terrorism and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq the American
Defense budget has drastically increased. In 2003, the US Defence Expenditure
ascended to 404,920 million USD (without counting extraordinary budgets
approved in April and September 2003 to support military operations and
reconstruction missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the “war against terror”, in
a total of 157 billion USD), which turns the USA responsible for almost half of
the world’s military expenses.
While many opinions foreseen “the end of geopolitics” by the supremacy of
geo-economy and International Law, the USA have launched a “Military Affairs
Revolution” (MIR). The North American strategy and planning are still based on
the supposition that their country might have to fight and win two wars
simultaneously in different regions of the world – being the Korean Peninsula
and the Gulf of Persia the favorite theatres for this strategic calculation.  Besides,
Washington have kept the alliances made during the bipolar era, adapting and
4 See The Military Balance 2004-2005, IISS, Oxford University Press, 2004, Tables 38 to 44,
refering to the International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Arms Trade, pp. 353-
359.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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expanding them and implemented “floating coalitions” and “will coalitions”
whenever it was useful and necessary.
Military Omnipresence
In this post cold war era, in fact, the USA represent a military superiority
and omnipresence never seen before in History. In peace times, around 255,000
North American soldiers are positioned outside of their territory, spread through
more than 150 bases and military installations in 110 countries. Summing the
additional forces positioned in Afghanistan and Iraq the number of American
soldiers out of the country largely surpasses 400,0007! Continuing the sum we
must consider the few thousand serving in vessels, aircraft carriers and submarines
sailing permanently oceans and seas around the world, the intelligence and special
operation units.
The great majority of North American military devices were inherited from
the cold war period, especially from NATO in Europe (Germany, Italy, United
Kingdom, Turkey, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Belgium and Portugal) and in Eastern
Asia (having large contingents of almost 38,000 soldiers in South Korea and
Japan). In the Old Continent, Partnership programs and NATO’s Enlargement
have expanded the USA’s military presence to East and Southeast. Due to the
enlargement, the USA and the Atlantic Alliance strategical reorientation,
implementation of NATO’s new command structure and also to “new European
fidelities”, the North American contingents might be moved to Eastern countries.
Eventually they might move from Germany (with more than 71,000 American
militaries) to Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria or even
to the Baltic countries. NATO’s missions and interventions in the Balkans have
also conditioned the expansion of the North American military presence.
Besides the maintenance of defense and security compromises coming from
the former bipolar context, another recent element justifies a military omnipresence
and also the creation of new coalitions and partnerships: the war against terrorism
and against weapons of massive destruction. This campaign, linked to Rumsfeld/
Wolfowitz principle that states “the mission determines the coalition” has promoted
7 Data about USA’s military presence is found in many publications and is not always coincident.
Numbers here quoted are from Newsweek Magazine, of July 21, 2003.
27The New World's Geopolitical Outline
a significant reinforcement of the North American military presence in the large
region of Middle East and Central Asia configuring a real “strategical revolution”
in this area of the world. Since the September 11th, the USA have created new
bases in this region or its surroundings: Pakistan (Jakobabad), Kyrgystan (Manas),
Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad), Afghanistan (Kandahar, Bagram and Mazar-al-
Sharif ), Djibuti (Camp le Monier) Hungary (Taszar), Romania (Constanza),
Bulgaria (Burgas). Meanwhile, the 5,000 militaries positioned since the Gulf
War are withdrawn from Saudi Arabia, only leaving a “residual force”. In Iraq, it
is expected the establishment of four military bases: Bashur, in Kurdistan; the
H1, near the border with Jordan and Syria; Baghdad, near the airport; and Tallil,
near Nassyria. Permanent contingents in other Gulf countries like Qatar, Bahrain
and Oman have also increased. Involved in the campaign against terrorism, besides
the traditional allies (European NATO, Japan, South Korea and Australia) other
States are supported financially and military or with Intelligence: Israel, Egypt,
Jordan, Colombia, Pakistan, Russia, Philippines, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore8.
The US’ strategical omnipresence and their world projection is clearly
assumed and expressed in their ten strategical commands9. Five of those are
functional: Space Command, Strategic Command (controls nuclear arsenal),
Transports Command, Allied Forces Command, Special Operations Command.
The other five are geographical commands that divide the world in great regions:
North Command USNORTHCOM (includes all North America and part of
Caribbean), South Command USSOUTHCOM (Central and South America),
Europe Command USEUCOM (commands Greenland, Europe – including
Russian Federation – and almost all African Continent), Pacific Command
USPACOM (integrating Antarctic, all Pacific-Asia and Australia, Indian continent
and shares Alaska with the North Command) and Central Command
USCENTCOM (embraces a particularly complex and sensitive zone of 24
8 TOMÉ, Luis A Omnipresença Militar Norte Americana e a Nova Nato, in Janus 2004-Anuário
de Relações Exteriores, Observatório de Relações Exteriores da UAL and Publico Newspaper,
2003, pp 24-25.
9 For more information about the Commands, see  A Politica Externa Norte Americana, in
Janus 2003-Anuário de Relações Exteriores, UAL Observatório de Relações Exteriores and
Publico Newspaper, 2002, pp 98-99 and the website: www.defenselink.mil.
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countries, from Sudan to Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf and Central Asia to
Pakistan)10.
These geographical commands are in charge of air, land and sea space defense
from military, terrorist, nuclear chemical or bacteriological aggression, coordinating
the response adequately. In times of peace, these commands allow the USA to
search and intervene in domains of natural catastrophes, narcotics traffic,
clandestine migrations, WMD traffic, assistance to civil population and military
operations and exercises.
Map: Five geographical commands of the USA
Source: USA’s Defense Department at www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/
10 For more information about the USA Central Command, see TOMÉ, Luis, 11 de Setembro:
consequências na Ásia Central e do Sul, in Janus 2003…, op. cit, pp 170-171 and the website:
www.defenselink.mil
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The North American military omnipresence as above described is both a
consequence and a catalyst of the USA’s hegemony giving an apparent unipolar
character to the international order. This character is proved by the “almost
unilateral” American military interventions in Afghanistan (it would have been
easy to do it under UN and/or NATO sphere, that has for the first time invoked
the collective defense clause, article 5) and Iraq. This idea is reinforced by American
initiatives to maintain maximum freedom internationally – boycott to International
Penal Court, unilaterally abrogated the ABM Treaty of 1972, non ratification of
the Non Proliferation Treaty, not joining the 1995 protocol about Biological and
Chemical Weapons, nor Agreements related with anti-personnel mines, abandoned
Kyoto Protocol about global heating… Concluding, and quoting General Loureiro
dos Santos “the American national interests look at other States as entities of limited
sovereignty, guarding full sovereignty only to themselves”11.
Enviable position
In fact, in the actual conjuncture the USA enjoy an enormous power disparity
in relation with the rest of the world. They cannot be coerced, imposed rules,
guidelines and behaviors that they do not wish to assume and respect. However
they enjoy a position that allows their virtual intervention where and whenever
they want. Limits are set by themselves, in their own terms and following their
interests and ideals. If necessary, the international organizations they belong to
are ignored and new circumstantial and convenient coalitions are made to meet
their own objectives (will coalitions). The USA have no will to give in or share
competences they consider exclusively theirs or any part of their sovereignty in a
classical definition that says “does not have an equal power in the internal order or
superior power on the external order”. This is clearly assumed by Jesse Helms, External
Relations Senate Committee president when he wrote in an article: “It is true that
50 years ago the USA Senate has ratified the UN Chart. With this action America has
not gave in a single “syllable” of its sovereignty to the United Nations. According to the
American system, when international agreements are ratified they simply become part
of USA’s domestic Law. They have no bigger or smaller importance than any other
11 SANTOS, General Loureiro dos, Regressa o Império Benigno?, in Visão magazine, nº 549, 11
to 17 of September, 2003, p.54
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American domestic law. Treaties obligations may be over passed by a simple Congress
act”12.
The USA’ strategic objective is to prevent any other power or coalition to
match the American power, to reinforce the difference of strength in relation
with other powers and to establish a real American pax in the world. They intend
a world reformation based on their own moral patterns and the progress towards
their world vision – messianic expressions of being an exceptional nation endowed
with virtues and singular responsibilities.  The American people do not see their
country as an Empire but as the last superpower. They are absolutely conscious
of possessing unmatched power and intend to preserve and consolidate this
position. For many of them this supremacy carries the moral obligation to play
a regulator role on the international affairs even if that is made at the cost of
exceeding institutional mechanisms, that being considered the most efficient way
to solve world problems or protect vital North American interests. Naturally they
look at their country as one good power trying to contribute to the world peace,
democracy, promotion of human rights and free trade. Intimately they look at
America as the great defender and promoter of liberties.
The primacy of Law and International Law mean the external use of American
values and law; human rights and trade liberalization are tools that legitimate the
USA’s interference and expansion. Thus it is understood “the humanitarian
interference right” and exclusion and cast out of certain states from the idea of
“International community” – these are identified as “Rogue States” potentially
dangerous and out of control, dissidents of Washington’s originated order and
with no respect for the rules imposed by the USA: Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan,
Somalia, North Korea, Syria, Sudan or Libya, just to mention a few. For many,
globalization itself – considered as a process of dilution of traditional borders,
increase of interdependence and interaction, rise of transnational reciprocity and
intensifying of processes and activities that turn the world in one place – is mainly
the expression of USA’ spirit of dealer and missionary, coming up as a kind of
ideology of the new world’s order leaded by Washington. Those considering the
existence of a unipolar or imperial order look at few international organizations,
12 HELMS, Jesse, American Sovereignty and the UN, in The National Interest, Washington,
Winter 2000/01, p.32, quoted by Admiral António Emílio Ferraz Sacchetti, “Estratégia e
Relações de Poder” in Anais do Clube Militar Naval, vol. CXXXIII, July-September 2003, p.
442.
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such as IFM, UNO, NATO and WTO as mere agents of American external
policy, ambitions and interests. They represent mere expressions of “the American
empire”, based in the supposition of order and stability and not on conquering
or territorial expansion.
The USA generically have the power to veto or boycott proposals that
affect their interests. However, the success of a relevant international initiative
depends upon the North American participation. This is the mirror of an order
that looks even more unipolar: the dominating power acquires a hegemonic
position, defining unipolarity as the force distribution for only one power clearly
alone at the top of hierarchy. This situation inevitably generates unilateralist
tendencies in the USA due to three main reasons: first, they have sufficient power
to act alone; second, they increasingly assume the role of world order regulator;
third, they identify American interests and ideals with those of the international
community – defending the first serves the second.
The frequent crisis and conflicts, and the end of cold war made clear that the
international system is not self-adjusted or self-regulated, meaning that in the
absence of another effective international regulator mechanism  - as the bipolar
scheme in which each one of the superpowers dominated its zone, and both
dominated the international system – and “impotence” of the UN (due to lack of
resources and necessary political consensus between the powers to impose the
Organization’s authority in all occasions) the USA started to assume that role,
step by step, either to secure their interests or on behalf of the “international
community”. However, this enviable position puts them as the most desired
target, due to their strategical dimension, their global responsibility and for what
they stand for.
THE UNI-MULTIPOLARITY
The existence of only one superpower its an undeniable fact, but does not
imply that the international order is truly unipolar, like in a situation where
there are no relevant powers besides the superpower. Despite being hegemonic
and possessing incomparable supremacy, the USA do not practice an effective
unipolarity, although they long for it. Four main reasons set limits to unipolarity.
In first place, it represents a model where only one power is relevant – in the
actual model the superpower coexists with other internationally very relevant
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regional powers, which prevent the USA to manage the world as unipolar. Secondly,
the USA represent the superpower in full strength (joining political, strategical
and military power with economical, scientific-technological and cultural power)
but having in some of these areas rivals with similar capacity. In third place, the
world remains too anarchic and complex for absolute hegemony. Growing
complexity is the trend making the holder of supremacy unable to solve great
international questions on its own. Finally, the USA do not show preparation to
run an “empire”, not only due to external factors but also for domestic reasons,
because the US citizens refuse to assume the consequent financial and human
sacrifices – represented for instance by Vietnam or Somalia “syndrome”.
In relation to domestic factors inhibiting Washington to exercise the world’s
domination, it does not mean that Americans would not prefer a true unipolar
order. In fact the USA face significant socio-economical and political restrictions
intrinsic to a democratic regime like theirs. These restrictions inhibit the USA
to take advantage of this hegemonic moment to directly and preventively
confront the biggest adversaries to their supremacy. There is nothing new in this
situation and its constraints. Right after the 2nd World War, in the brief period
when the USA had the strategical advantage of possessing an atomic weapon only
later possessed by Moscow in 1949, the Americans opted for a strategy of Soviet
Union’s “containment” instead of forcing Stalin to withdraw from its positions in
Europe. At that time, the biggest request for a USA’s force action came from
Britain and not from the American. Winston Churchill criticized “containment”
and laid objections to delaying negotiations until after the establishment of force
positions. He argued that the Western position was stronger than ever, so the
relative position could only deteriorate: “ what will happen when they possess the
atomic weapon and a large stock? You may calculate what will happen by the present
events… We should not move along with imprudent and incompetent, waiting for
something to happen, and I mean waiting for something bad. Western nations have
far more chances to achieve a long lasting bloodless agreement if they make their fair
demands before communists also have atomic power”13. Since the end of the cold
13 CHURCHILL, Winston S., His Complete Speeches, 1867-1963, ed. Robert Rhodes James,
Volume VII, 1943-1949, New York 7 London, Chelsea House in association with R.R.Bowker,
1974, p. 7710
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war, many people have used this same argumentation referring to China or Russia.
Today, like before, the USA are not willing to risk and bear necessary sacrifices.
Besides, the North American public opinion does not accept violent or evil
ways of coercion, which makes it very difficult to impose unipolarity or preserve
an imperial system. The American administration also feels the need to use the
character of legitimacy on its foreign interventions. They look for UN covering,
or the request of an Alliance (NATO) or a “will coalition” with other countries,
that somehow legitimate their action to avoid the previously seen “demonization”
of regimes and leaders. On the other hand, Washington always presents to American
public opinion (and also international) a powerful justification of its initiatives,
whether it is “universal democratic values” defense, security and “American vital
interests”, or on behalf of the community of nations and international legality. In
fact, not only other countries but also the North American population demand a
sign of legitimacy from Washington. In a democratic regime this factor is crucial
because governors depend on the population to maintain their position. It would
be very difficult for the USA to use unipolarity because this requires not only
reducing or containment of other powers but also the total marginalization of
international regulation mechanisms (like the United Nations) and its ally’s
alienation, which the American public opinion would not easily accept. We can
see this issue as one of the most important in the 2004 Presidential electoral
campaign in the USA due to Iraq crisis and its partners and allies problems. This
marginalization and alienation should be easily accepted by an isolationist impetus
rather than by the attempt to impose a unipolar world management.
The frequent references to “American empire” and an alleged “unipolar order”
come more often from anti-American positions or justifications of the good
character of this “empire” than from real facts descriptions. It is true that actually,
the only power with prominence in all power domains, from hard power to soft
power, being the only ones with capacity to promote their interests virtually all
over the world are the USA. But this is only one side of the coin. The success of
more important international dilemmas resolution, including the protection of
some values and American vital interests depends either on the effective
compromise of the USA or on the cooperation with at least some of the powers
whose role and international and regional status are really indispensable. For
instance, the combat against weapons of mass destruction proliferation and missile
technology, the war against terrorism or pacification and stabilization of one area
demand a wide collaboration among several powers, exactly because we do not
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live in a truly unipolar order. This is why other great powers, regionally important
in the world’s power architecture cannot be ignored – although not having capacity
to affirm their interests as globally as the USA – as their capacities, perceptions,
ambitions and evolutions are carefully watched and judged by the superpower
and other international actors. Among others, we can highlight France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom (for now avoiding a direct reference to the European
Union), Russia, China, Japan or India. Maybe this perception explains the reason
why in moments considered as of unipolar or American unilateralism, the USA
have tried to set up large coalitions with some of these powers and act on behalf
of the “international community”, in the pursue of its objectives and sometimes
controversial foundations.
Although in the height of their power, the USA cannot and are not willing
to coerce by force other great powers as Russia, China or India. In the current
context this is out of question even if the USA would like to establish unipolarity.
In the relation with these powers deterrence is still in force.
On the other hand, the international stability in several regions of the globe
depend equally on the behavior of the only superpower as on the regional powers,
although globally, the USA are the “essential nation” to quote Madeleine
Allbright. From a geo-economical point of view the USA face rivals with similar
power, like the European Union and the Eastern Asian block leaded by Japan
(and China in the near future). In a more cultural or civilizational consideration
the world is not favorable for American domain – we just need to remember the
difficulties of the North American culture or “Western values” penetration in the
Arab world, in the immense China or in the great Indian democracy.
Another restrictive factor of the USA’s unipolarity is the strategic aim to
prevent the formation and consolidation of “anti-hegemonic coalitions”. In the
present terms it does not seem possible to foresee a wide coalition integrating, for
instance, China, India, Russia and the European Union. Although they all deny
a hegemonic order, their coalition makes no sense even because some consider
themselves adversaries or antagonists. However, the USA’s pressure to manage the
world in unipolarity might lead other great powers to overcome reciprocal
disagreements and put together anti-American partnerships.
We may remember, for instance, “anti-hegemonic strategical partnership
launched in 1996 by Russia and China united (only 10 years after Gorbatchev’s
speech in Vladivostok allowing normalization of relations between Moscow and
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Beijing) or some analysis produced in the peak of Iraq crisis about a new strategical
axis, France – Germany - Russia to oppose the USA.
Even if no other power or coalition has the same capability pretension of
having the USA’s ambitions and status, the American hegemony is moderated or
balanced by significant regional actors. That fact justifies the North American
search for a balance between unilateralism, multilateralism and even bilateralism
in the relation with other powers. That also brings to the international order the
medley and hybrid aspect of uni-multipolarity. Notwithstanding, this does not
mean that the hyper power always depends of the articulation with other powers;
or that other great powers are open to that cooperation in all occasions, submissive
to American doctrines. This only reveals that the world is not truly unipolar. The
power structure shows the coexistence of a superpower, alone in its class and at
the top of hierarchy, with other determinant powers.
Long lasting character of the uni-multipolar order
To many authors, including North Americans, the present situation (whether
considered unipolar or uni-multipolar) is unstable and transitory as in relatively
short term the world’s order will evolve to multipolarity, either through the
emergence of new powers or through the future world’s power distribution among
several poles. So, some uphold that the USA should take this moment of supremacy
to create power partnerships – in particular in the Euro-Asia space, fundamental
for international stability and security – that will grant the prosecution of their
interests in less favorable circumstances (Zbigniew Brzezinski). Others, equally
foreseeing an order with more balance between three or four powers, defend that
the USA should use their temporary position to safeguard their vital interests and
not the international community’s, or humanitarian interests of peripheral
countries (Samuel Huntington and Henry Kissinger)14.
I do not believe that this kind of system, here described as uni-multipolar
is short of stability and longevity. The “stability” question of the uni-multipolar
14 See BOTELHO, Teresa analysis Os paradoxos do hiperpoder norte-americano, in Janus 2003-
Anuário de Relações Exteriores, Obervatório de Relações Exteriores da UAL and Publico
newspaper, November 2002, pp.103-103.
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system as well as its risks and dilemmas will be analyzed in the next chapter. With
reference to its more or less “long” character it is worthy of notice that the “long
lasting” concept is extraordinary subjective in these affairs. For a few it is considered
as one or two decades and for others it goes to half a century or more. If we look
at History’s examples, in particular recent History where we can find “world
orders”, a system considered as “durable” lasts for several decades, at least for 30
to 50 years. Not many will deny that a bipolar system has lasted for the period
known in History as “cold war” and we can date it as of 1947 to 1991 – that is 44
years15 – being in fact durable.
If we consider a length of period similar to the cold war, the current
international order transfiguration into another authentic unipolar, bipolar or
multipolar order does not seem reasonable. Mostly because we cannot predict
how the other powers might increase in a way to rival with the superpower. Or
that the latter can decline in a way that the international order would become
truly multipolar in a reasonably term. In the same way, I also do not believe that
the USA will be able to increase their hegemony to the point of “drying out” or
significantly reducing other powers, to determine alone the trend of the world
and regional’s policies. In affairs this complex, with such large variables and
contingency of factors it is obvious that any futurology seems risky and dispensable
(although I recognize the interest and utility of some studies and thesis). Also
15 As relative as these issues of dating historical periods might be, the year of 1947 seems to be
more adequate to date the beginning of cold war, because the American President then described
“two distinct ways of life...” declaring the later known “Truman doctrine”; General Marshall
presented an auxiliary and economical recovery plan for Europe (Marshall Plan); Foreign Affairs
Magazine published the article by Mr X (George Kennam) proposing “containment” strategy
which marked all the USA’s external policy during cold war. On the other hand, also in 1947,
the USSR refuted with “Jdanov doctrine”; created the first mechanism of satellite control-
Kominform; prevented Marshall plan’s acceptance to some countries under its domain sphere;
accelerated sovietization of Eastern Europe by the “Salami tactic”. Prague stroke followed, as
well as Tito-Stalin break up, first Berlin crisis and the formalization of GDR-Germany division,
creation of COMECOM, NATO, the communist victory in China, Korea war, San Francisco
system implementation, Warsaw pact, etc…. The year 1991 seems the more adequate to date
the end of cold war, because after the fall of “Berlin wall” symbol like and freedom of Eastern
Europe in 1989, or German reunification in 1990, cold war has meet its own end with Soviet
Union’s fragmentation in 1991. If the conservative authors of “Moscow strike” in 1991 had
been successful in August, it would have lasted a little longer. However other dates are accepted
to mark the beginning or end of cold war in relation to the importance given to other events.
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because History is fertile in more or less unexpected and sudden events which
have caused accelerations and changes in evolution rhythms and in particular in
the hierarchization and distribution of power (to demonstrate it we could call
many examples of revolutions, wars, fall of empires, military defeats, stroke of
States, etc.) However, if we invoke serious prospective sceneries and studies with
best chances of evolution and considering only some of the present trends –
without referring to unpredictable situations such as generalized confrontation
among great powers, China’s implosion, Russia Federation’s fragmentation, a step
back in European integration or serious US social-political disturbs, among many
others – it seems that we should not easily presume the close end of the here
described uni-multipolar order in terms of structure and power.
Effectively, the limits to unipolarity here exposed – internal constraints;
search for legitimacy; existence of other regional relevant powers; competition
and resistance of powers and international players in some domains of power;
need of articulation with other powers to guarantee the successful resolution of
some relevant international affairs; growing complexity of system and international
relations - make less probable that the USA will be able to impose a truly unipolar
management of the international system. I repeat, it does not seem that the
international uni-multipolar order should be brief and in transition to unipolarity.
I do not believe that the USA will have absolute domain of the world – even
because I doubt of this intention. As General Garcia Leandro refers, the USA
may be already approaching a pre-rupture situation by the excessive expansion
and over-stretched extension of its military responsibilities to the world scale,
which in a way, is convenient to their geopolitical adversaries, but not to Europe.
This is a geo-strategy and geopolitical classic. In geostrategy terms it happened to
Napoleon, Nazi Germany and Empyreal Japan in Pacific War; in geopolitical
terms it happened to cold war’s USSR, leading to its implosion; considering in a
wide perspective of History, the same has occurred mostly to all empires16.
The sceneries proposing the transition to a new bipolar order always present
the USA as one of the poles. The other pole is variable according to the authors,
their perspectives and intentions. The chances of a pseudo-bipolarization between
the USA and the “universal public opinion”, or between America and the “rest of
16 LEANDRO, General Garcia Paz e Segurança, in Nação e Defesa, n.106 – 2nd series (“A
Nova carta o Poder Mundial”), IDN, Autumn-Winter 2003, p. 23
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the world” seem so absurd that do not deserve any comments. Also, some thesis
expressing the confrontation between the “Western” and “Islam” (it is not visible
how Islam, so heterogeneous and diverse on the inside could be or would want to
be “as a group” a pole of world power) are left aside. Other thesis, more credible
and sustained usually point at China (very seriously considered by the USA,
specially in the 90’s but still considered today), Russia (looking at the resurrection
of the cold war rival), Europe (in a scenery of total political integration and tendency
to compete for hegemony with the current ally USA) or in a scenery of articulation
between two or more great powers (China-Russia or Europe-Russia, in a perspective
of a new strategic powerful axis to face the USA’s unilateral pressure).
However, in a relatively short term of one or two decades, it does not seem
probable that Russia, China or the European Union should be able to assemble
enough capacity and power that would allow them to compensate North American
power and project a bipolar system. In order to be a world power pole in a new
bipolar system at short or long term, it should be necessary and urgent to do the
following:
a) Very high increases of military and strategical power to surmount the
huge gap towards the USA and to be able to really project power, influence
and force all over the world – this is not compatible with economic
development priorities of any of these powers;
b) Implementation of alliances and partnerships policy to allow Russia, China
or the EU to form an “alternative” field to the USA and to have a world
strategic influence sphere – hard for any of those powers for the lack of
attraction and coercion ability;
c) Working up on efficient strategies to skirt policies of “containment”,
subversion or even confrontation directed by the USA and other regional
powers.
In the long term these tasks are theoretically possible (in particular in what
concerns China); in the short and medium term that seems as almost impossible.
In Europe’s specific case, we do not see the possibility of positively wanting to
reach the USA’s level of power or dispute the world hegemony with its actual ally.
It would mean to mischaracterize the European Union and definitely put in cause
the currently anemic “State Providence”. Even if they “wanted” to do so, still
had to put the question of “being able to do it” – a fundamental problem that
also concerns other powers. Above all it seems impossible to ascribe the European
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Union that whim – although some leaders and countries would like to bring this
perspective to reality – due to the immediate disastrous consequences it would
have on the integration process and in new breaches among Europeans. Is there
European cohesion to resist a project based in such plans, or abilities to achieve
such an assignment, we ask.
The European Union is already considered a power but in the perspective of
strategical and complementary partner of the USA – representing great part of
the “Western countries”. From this point to the evolution to a bipolar system
disputed with America it does not seem possible or desirable.
If this scenery does not seem likely it is also not probable that in the short
term a new alternative axis embracing two or more of the actual great powers
will come up. The options might present a new EU, Russia axis, or a triple
alliance between France, Germany and Russia; or another of Russia and
China’s17association; or this association extended to Japan or India. Theoretically
all these associations can be foreseen but never in the short or medium term.
Any of these options would have natural difficulties in being successful on a
bipolar system. Also, from the moment of starting their implementation they
should face the firm opposition, containment and subversion coming from the
superpower (USA) and from other great, medium or small regional powers that
would see it as a threat. Besides, nowadays great powers try to restrain USA’s
hegemony and unilateralism rather through strategical alliances and partnerships
than by the implementation of counter forces. Also, some of these powers – EU,
Russia, China, Japan or India - do not trust each other and consider themselves
as rivals (in some cases its more appropriate to say antagonists), which prevent
the creation of true alternative axis. The strategic partnership between China and
Russia shows the difficulties of creating a counter force to oppose the USA. During
the 90’s decade Moscow and Beijing were involved in pursuiting objective and in
1996, launched together a strategical partnership “against hegemonic strategies”.
After India’s participation being out of question (due to rivalries with China),
China and Russia associated with ex-soviet countries of Central Asia of Shanghai
Cooperation Group. However, this Group was not a real alternative nor able to
impose bipolarization to the USA, as it did not soften North America’s hegemony.
17 This hypothesis seems the most solid even because is based on recent events. This association
of China and Russia to face the USA is anticipated by ACHCAR, Gilbert in La Nouvelle
Guerre Froide Le Monde Après de Kosovo, in Éditions PUF, Paris, 1999.
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It did not exceed differences of interests, did not stop the USA’ strategical expansion
in Asia, mainly after the September 11th, and it did not prevent both countries of
trying to be the USA’s “main strategic partners”. Great powers look for status
recognition and important roles in the international stage and respective regions
rather than forming a new world’s power axis. This attitude might change, if the
USA starts to impose a unipolar and unilateral world management that might
lead to the approximation and articulation between some other powers.
Also, it should be necessary that the USA would not increase its power and
would do nothing to prevent the rise of a rival to the successful emergence of
other pole of power. This would not happen as Washington has already shown.
Since the end of cold war both analysts and political leaders have anticipated
perspectives and expectations of a true multipolar order. However, that has not
occurred due to the growing hegemony and incomparable supremacy of the USA.
Nowadays, many continue to anticipate an international system whose power is
divided in several poles, although not in the short term. Many of these theses
seem more as a desire than prospective sceneries based in real facts and trends. In
the short term the main obstacle to a multipolar or bipolar order has two sides.
On the one hand, the inability of third powers to grow and impose multipolarity
or bipolarity, and on the other, the supremacy of the United States and their will
to be isolated at the top of the world power hierarchy. Defenders of a favorable
evolution to multipolarity refer the conjunction of factors: emergence of new
powers and decline of Americans. However, we can see by some facts that the
actual trend, instead of American decline, is the decline of one other alternative
power pole – the European. Despite the unquestionable military and strategical
superiority, the USA still spend more money in defense than other great powers
altogether. As previously referred, the North American alone are responsible for
almost half of the world’s military expenses – and even expect an increase of 30%
until 2009. On its turn, Europe does not show appetence to increase expenses in
defense. The scientific investigation investment is also higher in the USA than in
Europe – for each active person the USA invest the double of the Europeans in
scientific investigation: EUR 1200,00 per year against EUR 600,00 respectively18.
18 BARNIER, Michel, Propositions pour une recherche Européene, European commissary, in Le
Monde, 09.07.03, in a quotation by GIL, Fernando, TUNHAS, Paulo and COHN, Danièle,
Impasses- seguido de coisas vistas, coisas ouvidas, Publicações Europa-América, October 2003,
p.167
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The American economy will continue to be predominant in the next decades.
For instance, American share in the world’s GDP in 2000 was 25% and will be
24% in 2020 and 23% in 2050; Asia will rise from 35% to 43% and 45%
respectively, and Europe will fall from 23% to 21% in 2020 and 12% in 205019.
At the same time, between the years 2000 and 2050 the active population in the
USA will grow from 269 to 355 millions, while in the same period the active
European population will diminish from 331 to 243 millions20 – it is like 90
millions active Europeans would move to produce in the USA!!!
Although unpredictable, in the short term, the international system’s evolution
to unipolarity, bipolarity (either in a dispute between America and another power
or an alliance of powers), or to multipolarity we have to conclude that the current
uni-multipolar power structure will last for a while. It should last for the next
decades, and its players should remain frustrated by their status and role either
regionally or internationally. However, if we account the longer term, let’s say 50
years the evolution might be different eventually to a mutipolar order.
Positive effects, risks and dilemmas of the Uni-Multipolar order
Recognizing that the characterization of the international order as uni-
multipolar is not consensual we also assume that describing its risks and virtues is
highly polemic. Mainly on an international environment marked by the Iraq
crisis effects, when many understand the international relations based on a
Manichean vision of “for” and “against”. Still, I believe this chapter to be very
useful.
Meanwhile, two previous notices. First, the positive effects and risks inherent
to this mixed and hybrid order live together, and might cross deeply depending
on the circumstances. Once again, the advantages and dilemmas of the uni-
multipolar order represent different sides of the same coin – that is why this
topic is related to the next one about the multiple containment game. On the
other hand we should not forget that, even in theory, we are analyzing the current
19 Numbers presented by GIL, Fernando, in Impasses-seguido de coisas vistas, coisas ouvidas,
Publicações Europa-América, October 2003, p.166, quoting “World Trade in the 21st Century”,
dir. Philippe Colombani.
20 Ibid.
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uni-multipolar order, comprehending a superpower, the USA that we consider
benign, and other powers – in particular Russia, EU, and China – that I also
consider benign through the share of common ideas, values and aims related with
peace, stability, economical growth and international cooperation.
The question should undoubtedly be different if on the USA’s position we
would find the Soviet Union, or if Iran, North Korea or Syria would be powers
comparable to Russia or China.
In theory, the positive effects of the uni-multipolarity mainly derive from
three essential factors. First, the world’s power structure as it is makes impossible
the international system management by only one power pole. As previously
referred the USA, despite their supremacy and panoply of powers, cannot
determine or solve alone the most important international or regional affairs
without calling for a source or justification to bring legitimacy to their action.
The superpower is forced to promote articulation of initiatives with other powers
and international mechanisms. This means that in the majority of situations
solutions depend on the articulation of ideals and interests of the superpower and
other relevant powers – although these do not possess the universal ambitions
and ability of the first – which is an obvious advantage even if we tend to see the
superpower as good. For instance, the promotion of security and stability in Europe
depends equally of the USA’ strategical presence, the European allies
complementarity and of a strategical partnership with Russia. Eurasia evolution
depends equally of Russian behavior and of China’s behavior in Asia. In the same
way, international security depends as much of the USA as of other powers’
articulation and cooperation in what concerns the war against terrorism or weapons
of massive destruction proliferation. The uni-multipolarity obliges to an agreement
between the superpower and great powers in the management of the world and
regional affairs.
In second place, the uni-multipolarity inhibits the confrontation between
great powers. The supremacy of the hyper power is so big that others would not
pretend to dispute with the USA the world hegemony in a reasonable term. Unless
the hyper power begins to antagonize or absolutely tries to domain the world, in
the upcoming times other powers are “dissuaded” of searching for the same
status as the USA, due to the gap of power and strength. As we will see later on,
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the strategies implemented are of “multiple containment” more than
confrontation.
On the other hand, one power’s clear supremacy and hegemony in the
international system allows to manage and attenuate confrontation strategies
among great powers and regional powers – in function of its role, its abilities and
political-strategical status. In a multipolar order, powers try to obtain hegemony
usually through coalitions with one or other powers. As an example we can recall
to the period before the Great World War or the period between Wars. In a
bipolar context, each power tries to obtain a definite supremacy towards the
adversary – during cold war the direct military conflict was avoided by the dissuasive
power of nuclear weapons and “mutual destruction guarantee”. As we may see in
History, in this kind of international orders the confrontation is inevitable and its
consequences are very well known. In the uni-multipolarity sphere, the superpower
is inhibited to coerce other powers – also to avoid collaborationism among them
– and they are limited or inhibited on the implementation of expansion strategies
of confrontation towards other powers or the superpower. In the uni-multipolar
order, on the international relations system the superpower tends to be an
“international balancer” and on the regional system a “regional balancer”,
articulating its action with other powers. We can see that the uni-multipolarity
inhibits large confrontations between great powers. It is the USA’ strategical
presence, role or guaranty that prevents the emergence of old rivalries and
antagonisms in Europe or Asia, for instance: in Europe the American pax makes
less complex the relations between a few countries with Russia or reunited
Germany; and in Asia it prevents Japan or India to confront again with China.
The third great positive effect is that the uni-multipolar order has proved to
be more multilateral than any other way of world power distribution. History
has demonstrated how periods of multipolarity or bipolarity have not been very
multilateral, due to the use of blocking mechanisms and mutual mistrust.
Obviously on an authentic unipolar order, the world’s management by one single
power does not imply its articulation with other countries. However, the uni-
multipolarity effect makes multilateralism develop easily. The success of finding
solutions to complex international and regional affairs demands so much effective
involvement of the superpower as cooperation with great powers – promoting
the agreement of policies and efforts or multilateralism. In addiction, if the USA
do not exercise a world unipolar management it obliges them to have allies, strategic
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partners and multilateral mechanisms to promote their ideals and interests in
cooperation with others. Multilateralism is also useful for the superpower: as a
grant of “legitimate force” for its actions, vital in the internal and external order;
as a way to “attract” and influence other powers and countries with “common
interests”, on behalf of “universal values” or of the “international community”;
and as a way to surpass complexes and obstacles inherent to initiatives of one
power only, or merely North American’s. If an initiative or condemnation should
be presented in the United Nations’ Security Council, in the Atlantic Alliance or
in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the object of the motion would be
more pressured than if it had come directly from Washington, even if the initiative
is American. Besides, any power would have less facility to oppose the USA’s
initiatives if they appear under the auspices of an international mechanism. In a
large extent, this justifies the USA’s search of multilateral mechanisms despite
their supremacy and power. On the other hand, for other powers the
multilateralism is the best way to associate, influence and contain the superpower.
For European countries, Russia or China, the multilateralism is unquestionably
the best way to attenuate the USA’s hegemony and unilateralist impetus. The
uni-multipolar world power distribution has constraints, which make the
superpower, and other powers turn to multilateralism to follow their common
interests, because multilateral processes, practices and mechanisms are easily
implemented and developed here than in a typical unipolar, bipolar or multipolar
order, due to the subsistence of the bilateralism among powers and the
unilateralism of the superpower. We can see that since the end of cold war the
United Nations’ missions and multilateral sceneries have increased. Between 1948
and 1988 the United Nations have only led 13 peace missions; and beteween
1989 and October 2004 they have already launched 46 new missions.
The positive effects of the uni-multipolarity cannot hide the existence of
risks and dilemmas. In a mixed uni-multipolar order none of the main players is
truly interested in maintaining the “status quo”. The superpower would prefer
a real unipolar system and usually acts as a hegemonic power. On the other hand,
great regional powers would prefer a real multipolar system, without the limits
and pressures coming from the superpower, which they would like to vanish.
The superpower will try to “refrain” the emergence of alternative poles of power,
while the great powers will try to prevent the transformation of the supremacy
into world domination by the superpower, loosing their interests and values to
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the exclusivity of those of the hyperpuissance. These kinds of dynamics and rivalries
may reveal dangerous if it means elaboration of policies, strategies and alignments
for the confrontation. It also mean that the uni-multipolar order may seriously
damage the multilateralism if the main powers have no interest in promoting
it: if the superpower understands the multilateral mechanisms as merely “the
breaks” of its hegemony and not adequate to the defense of its interests – it may
marginalize them; other powers may assume the multilateralism as a way for the
superpower to impose others the exclusive defense of its perspectives and interests
– having no more value as it no longer promotes the interests of all.
THE GAME OF “MUTUAL AND MULTIPLE CONTAINMENTS”
In the current uni-multipolar international order occur a great geopolitical
confrontation or better, a succession of geopolitical confrontations that represent
“multiple shocks of containment and competitions”. In the first place, on a wider
stage between the superpower, the USA and three great regional powers – EU,
Russia and China. Afterwards, between other powers and regional dominant
powers – in Europe, the United Kingdom versus Germany-France axis; in Asia,
Japan (Northeast Asia), India (South Asia) and ASEAN countries (Southeast Asia)
against China; in Eurasia, the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan
and Moldavia) plus Turkmenistan (from Eastern Europe to Caucasus and Central
Asia) and Turkey (in relation to the Transcaucasia) versus the Russian Federation.
This level of competition is often mediated, observed and orchestred by the
superpower. In third place, there is a reduced and varied level of geostrategic
confrontation among “other powers” – India versus Pakistan, North Korea versus
South Korea, and Israel versus Arab countries. This level of confrontation is
simultaneously “observed” and controlled by the superpower and significant
regional powers even suffers their interferences. Another level in this complex
political chess refers to powers that try to increase their status and regional
importance – Spain, Italy, Poland and Turkey, in Europe; Australia in connection
with the Southeast Asia; Mexico in North and Central America; Iran, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and, eventually again Iraq, in Persian Gulf/Middle East;
South Africa, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Congo and Nigeria in African sub-
continent; Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, among others. Obviously all
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countries try to increase their actions “refraining” or opposing the influence and
hegemony of powers.
To contain the emergence and consolidation of other great powers, the
superpower might take advantage of old antagonisms and rivalries between
those and other regional powers. The USA’ status and power of attraction and
coercion make possible to manage and manipulate rivalries either between great
powers or between those and other regional powers, in a strategy of “dividing to
reign”. For instance, in Europe before an hypothetically alliance between France,
Germany and Russia, the USA would promote and support another alliance with
the United Kingdom, Italy, Turkey, Poland and other Eastern countries as well as
with Portugal and Ukraine. In Europe, there is a clear division whenever a crisis
demands that the USA should or should not be supported. It should be worst
before the conception of opposing coalitions. In the same way, in Asia, if putting
China against Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and even Australia or
India, the USA might play with antagonisms, rivalries and historical alignments.
There is no doubt that when Washington realizes the emergence of an antagonist
or rival power it would not try a strategical agreement between powers but to
establish a new regional balance through the increase of power, status and strength
of powers closer and simultaneously adverse to the growing force. Actually many
Europeans prefer the “American pax” because they suspect from an “German-
French pax”, or “Russian-German pax” as the majority of Asiatic would fear a
“China pax” or a “Niponic pax” more than the “American pax”. This means that
in the game of world and regional power, besides the superpower and great powers,
the uni-multipolarity also involves other powers that try to project bigger status,
at the cost of great powers – favoring a partnership with the superpower – or
“aligning” with one of them – associating in the containment or confrontation
of the USA’s hegemony.
On the other hand, this approximation or use of adversary’s antagonisms is
also valid for the great powers in relation to the superpower. Effectively, to refrain,
oppose or balance the superpower, other powers may join together (strategical
partnership between China-Russia or France, Germany and Russia summits during
Iraq crisis and war) or promote “partnerships” with other antagonist countries,
outcast or adverse to the “imperial American order”. We all understand Moscow’
special relations with countries of the CIS, or with Serbia, Iran, Saddam’s Iraq
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and other Arab countries; we all understand Beijing’s “exchanges” or “deep links”
with Pakistan, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, etc.
These groups of dynamics – which involve the superpower, great powers
and medium or small regional powers – already perceptible in the present, increase
the escalade risks of international environment degradation, accelerating the
confrontation instead of cooperation. Effectively, the uni-multipolarity lives with
this dilemma due to the existent possibility of bad management of a situation, as
consequence of the relative discontentment with its current position – hence
trying to impose unipolarity or searching multipolarity in mutual containment.
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PART II
THE SUPERPOWER VERSUS THREE
GREAT REGIONAL POWERS
In the world’s power structure, three internationally relevant regional powers
appear along with the superpower: the European Union, the Russian Federation
and the People’s Republic of China. These powers are totally different of each
other in almost every aspect, from the relation with the superpower to their abilities
and ambitions. But they also have common elements: they are regionally
prominent; they desire a real multipolar world, where they can achieve a new
status and have a determining role in the international affairs; and, somehow
their whims are “contained” by the USA. Each one of these great powers tries to
be recognized by the superpower as a relevant strategic partner in the resolution
of great international and regional affairs and, at the same time, tries to set up
anti-hegemonic strategies aiming to contain the American supremacy or only to
avoid unilateral initiatives. These strategies are not articulated with each other
nor in the geopolitical relation with the hyper power and are diverse having distinct
objectives and ambitions.
THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
For many decades the transatlantic relation was seen as vital both for the
American and for the European. To the world, this relation appeared harmonic
and strong, representing the epicentre of “the West” or “the occidental world”, by
this meaning a specific community.
The four pillars of “the Transatlantic Community”
In fact, this transatlantic community exists and is based in four essential
pillars:
- Common historical legacy;
- Common ideals and values;
- Economies deeply interlinked;
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- A defensive alliance also promoter of security.
The historical legacy first results of the fact that the United States are naturally
“Europe descendents”, in the extent that its discovery and creation started with
European colonists, then followed by an exodus of emigrants from the Old
Continent to the New Land. Also important for the historical legacy is the notion
that the USA have several times “Saved Europe”, as their intervention was vital in
the 1st and 2nd World Wars and during the Cold War. Since the Great World War’s
intervention in 1917, the USA’s policy expressed their geopolitical interest in
avoiding Europe’s domination by a hostile power (similar to the United Kingdom’s
conduct, that through history has fought to avoid Europe’s domination by one
single power, which might oppose British interests). The USA again intervened
in the 2nd World War to defend their vital interest and then abandoned their
isolationist tradition. Following to the 2nd WW, the USA avoided the European
economic collapse and when Stalin created the Soviet Union threat, the USA
offered to defend Europe in the West of the “iron curtain”. Since 1945, the USA
have not left the European territory, contributing for peace, stability, security,
defense and development common to Europeans and Americans, and making
peace and union between traditionally antagonist Europeans. Even after the
disappearing of the Soviet threat the USA have stayed in the Old Continent,
according to former President Bill Clinton, to: “help to secure historical democratic
earnings in Europe (...) Erase the artificial line drawn by Stalin and unify Europe in
security and not keep it divided in instability (…) answer to threats and conflicts that
menace common peace for all”21. This historical legacy connecting the USA to
Europe is very important and gave birth to the other pillars of the transatlantic
relation.
The transatlantic community is also grounded in the share of ideas and
values related with democracy, political pluralism, individual freedom and free
market, the primacy of law and respect for fundamental human rights. Based
on these axioms, nations on both sides of the North Atlantic created a net of
relations and interests to express and reach a common destiny able to face and
defend them from adversaries, and to promote the expansion of those ideals and
21 CLINTON, President Bill, Graduation Ceremony of USA Military Academy, West Point,
New York, May 31, 1997.
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values. It is irrefutable that many of these “Western values” have become
“universal values” inspiring the Law of nations and the mechanisms of
international regulation – thus justifying “interferences” and humanitarian
missions, the liberalization of the world trade, assistance to the development of
populations in need or the support to democratic institutions proliferation and
human rights. Most of the actions done on behalf of the “international community”
come from the transatlantic community. Thus in this and other matters the
transatlantic relation is essential for Americans, Europeans and to the world.
This transatlantic community is also well expressed in a third pillar – the
economic interdependence. The United States and Europe have the largest
economies of the world, in many ways competing with each other, but deeply
interconnected. In 2000, American subsidiary companies in Europe have earned
333 billion USD, and European companies in the US have earned 301 billion
USD. European investments in the USA have profited 835 billion USD, 25%
more than American investment in Europe. Only in the State of Texas, the
European investment is bigger than all North American investment in Japan.
American subsidiaries in Europe employ 4,1 millions of people; European
subsidiaries in the US employ 4,4 millions. This interdependence is ancient but
has significantly increased on the last decade: the profit of European subsidiaries
in the USA was five times multiplied to 26 billion USD 22. Both economies together
represent more than 50% of the world GDP – although they only represent 15%
of the world’s population! Considering the world economy, the weight and
relevance of the transatlantic community is colossal either at the level of global
economic growth and wealth re-distribution, on the perspective of production
organization and world trade, on markets liberalization, support to emerging
economies, integration of other economies in the world trade or in what concerns
decision making of mechanisms such as the IMF, the World Bank or the World
Trade Organization.
Security and defense is obviously the fourth pillar of the transatlantic
community. Since the beginning, the Atlantic Alliance lays at the center of the
22 The data here quoted is from CUTILEIRO, Ambassador José, Relação Indispensável, in the
weekly article “O mundo dos outros”, in Expresso newspaper, economy and international
supplements, p. 27, April 3, 2004.
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transatlantic relation. Besides the community of values, interests, goals and
common destiny, this Alliance was founded when a group of nations from both
sides of the Atlantic joined to defend together specific populations and territories
(of member countries) from a specific threat – the Soviet Union. It was created
like a traditional collective defense organization. Being successful during the Cold
War, facing and defeating the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, NATO adapted to a
world with no immediate enemy. Nowadays NATO’s military functions and
abilities – as collective defense organization, peace, security and stability promotion
in the Euro-Atlantic area and outskirts, with mechanisms and capacity for crisis
and conflicts management and, as sponsor of embryonic EU strategic-military
ambition (ESDP) – coexist with the Alliance’s political role – to keep the USA
linked to the European security, aiding on the stabilization in Central Europe and
Balkans, contributing for the integration of “both sides” of the Continent and
giving Russia a formal voice in the discussion of security.
Under the USA’s leadership NATO has also: evolved in the sense of becoming
a collective security organization on the Euro-Atlantic area, without loosing its
character of military alliance whose main goal is to defend its members; developed
and reinforced its political dimension as essential mechanism for the strategic
dialogue between European and American, and between allies and their “partners”;
expanded and embraced former adversaries eliminating the strategic void in
Central Europe that for centuries had tempted the Russian and Germanic
expansionism. The Alliance has sponsored and launched cooperation programs
and mechanisms with former adversaries and neutral countries, such as the
Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Asiatic Partnership Council, NATO-Russia Council,
etc. In 1990 the Atlantic Alliance represented a crucial “pillow” for German
reunification, immediately integrating the former GDR; in 1999 it has allowed
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic’s integration; in 2004 it has integrated
another seven countries: Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and
Romania. Today almost all European countries, even non-members and far within
East are invited to participate in team exercises and trainings and receive military
aid. Meanwhile NATO has adopted a New Strategic Concept; a New Command
Structure; has interfered to impose and maintain Peace in Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo
and Macedonia, in Balkans) and has even acted as pacification force far from the
Old Continent (Afghanistan); sponsored the “autonomous” ESDP/RRF of the
European Union; stroke back, immediately and faithfully, to one member’s
aggression, for the first time invoking the collective defense clause (5th article, the
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day after September 11th, 2001); and has determined and created a new force
(NATO Response Force) to face new challenges and threats. This was all
accomplished, despite some negative foresights in the sequence of the disappearance
of the soviet enemy, the reason for its creation long ago in April 1949! The European
and American teamwork represents a remarkable achievement.
EU-NATO Relations
The European’s defense and security depends mostly of NATO, which
integrates 19 of the current 25 EU members (in a total of 26 NATO members).
In 2007, with the expected integration of Bulgaria and Romania, the coincident
members will sum 21, of the 27 from EU and 26 from NATO. That means that
a substantial part of “old” and “new” Europe will be allied to the USA and that
NATO’s European axis will match the EU in the geographical outline, except for
Turkey. This overlapping is significant.
Great divergences between some European countries and the USA in
reference to Iraq had a profound impact in the transatlantic and inter-European
relations. There were many opinions about the unnecessary duplication and above
all about the competition between both organizations. Curiously, during that
period the relations between NATO and the EU have intensified and
institutionalized.
Effectively, since January 2001 they had established formal relations but the
big step happened on December 16, 2002 with the approval of EU-NATO
Declaration about the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Since
then, both organizations negotiated several agreements and documents about
crisis management, that permitted the EU to replace NATO, for instance, in the
peace keeping mission in the ex-Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, in early
April 2003. In March 2003 they signed an agreement about Information Security
that allows the exchange and circulation of classified information and material
under reciprocal protection rules. Few days after, on March 17 they agreed on
several documents in the scope of the Berlin-Plus – this term is related to the
Berlin summit, in 1996, when NATO member’s representatives agreed in the
creation of the European Security and Defense Identity, that might use NATO’s
facilities. The Berlin-Plus arrangements try to avoid unnecessary resources
duplication and have four elements: ensure the EU’s access to NATO operational
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planning; put at the EU service NATO’s common capacities; NATO European
command options for actions directed by EU; adaptation of NATO’s defense
planning system to incorporate available forces to EU-led operations. This projected
models for the transference, control, restitution or devolution of NATO’s resources
and ability in operations led by the EU; consultation processes were created and
the agreement about the development of “requirements for mutually reinforced
coherent capacities” was reached. The Berlin-Plus arrangements were put into
practice in the Concordia Operation, the first EU-led military mission that developed
in Macedonia23 between March 31 and December 15, 2003 (followed by a EU
policing mission Proxima Operation).
There is also a daily EU-NATO operational coordination in Bosnia
Herzegovina (where NATO have deployed forces from KFOR and the European
Union has a policing mission – EUPM) and in Kosovo (where NATO have
deployed forces from KFOR and the EU is responsible for the economical
reconstruction). Both organizations maintain a ritual of cooperation: the Alliance’s
North Atlantic Council (NAC) meets the EU Political and Security Committee
(PSC), NATO’s Military Committee meets EU Military Committee and there
are several meetings between NATO’s Secretary-General and the EU Foreign
Policy High Representative or “Mr. CFSP” (Javier Solana, former NATO’s
Secretary-General). Further, the EU and NATO have agreed in a joint approach
to Western Balkans pacification; EU-NATO Capacities Group tries to secure
consistence, transparency and development of arrangements for common capacities
to both organizations, especially in what concerns the EU “Great Objective” and
NATO Capacities Compromise of Prague; and, EU and NATO leaders express
their commitment in the development of close cooperation to fight terrorism
and weapons of massive destruction proliferation, exchanging information about
their activities regarding protection of civil populations against chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear attacks.
The fact that so many important agreements were negotiated in a short
period and in an instable context marked by Iraq crisis may proof the great
commitment of the whole EU and NATO’s country members in developing a
23 WITTE, Pol de, Strengthen EU-NATO Relationships, in NATO Review, Autumn 2003, web
edition.
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strategical partnership between these organizations. However, the reality prevents
us from having so good expectations.
During the Cold War, the European integration was stimulated to
strengthen the Atlantic partnership; today many of its defenders look at it as a
counterweight to the United States hegemony. The European Defense and
Security Policy (EDSP) and European military capacity represent the logical
corollary of the European political integration.24 The European Union’s Helsinki
Declaration of December 1999, express as the “Great Objective” “…its
determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO
as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response
to international crises…”25 appealing to the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) until 2003, with at least 60.000 military forces to deploy within 60 days
and sustain for at least 1 year. This force should be capable of the full range of
“Petersberg tasks” that include tasks such as rescue and humanitarian missions,
and peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions. In May 2004, the EU assumed
a new “Headline Goal” for 2010 with the purpose to have forces with a higher
level of credibility and flexibility, to develop a wide range of missions, ambitioning
to be able to decide the launching of an operation in 5 days and deploying ground
forces in not more than 10 days after the decision is made.
The political leaders of both sides of the Atlantic countries and maximum
leaders of the EU and NATO have repeatedly affirmed that EU’s ambitions in
terms of CESP are complimentary to the Alliance’s and the strengthening of
European military capacities should reinforce NATO as group – however, until
now the emphasis in connection with the European policy and forces has been
related with “EU’s autonomy to make decisions” and not with military capacities
increase. The EU and NATO appear more often as competing organizations
than complimentary.
On the other hand, European and American leaders do not spare compliments
about the achievements done under the scope of the Atlantic Alliance.
Notwithstanding, today many opinions cynically refer to NATO’s acronym as
24 About Europe’s evolution progresses and dilemmas in security and defense areas, see TOMÉ,
Luis and TOMÉ, Paula Monge, A Identidade e a Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa, in
EdiUAL and Observatório de Relações Exteriores, Lisbon, 2001, pp.201.
25 Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 27.
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“No alternative to obsolescence”. Consequently, and quoting Henry Kissinger
“remains the question of knowing whether the alliance is still considered the expression
of a common destiny or if it is becoming a security network for mainly national and
regional policies”26. Why do these visible contradictions between what is said,
what is done and what is felt exist? Why is there a growing feeling of
miscoordination between speech and binding ties and bigger discredit about
the “Atlantic community”? Naturally, the answers lie on the transatlantic
controversy and squabbles…
Differences, divergences and squabbles
“It is time to stop pretending that European and American share a world vision
or even live in the same world. (…) Concerning the up to date main international
strategical affairs, the North American are from Mars and European are from Venus
(…) When the point are national priorities, identification of threats, definition of
challenges, and conception and implementation of foreign and defense policies, the
USA and Europe do not go in the same direction.”27
The current crisis in the transatlantic relations between the allies is not the
first. Controversy has cyclically existed since the beginning: in 1956, during
Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration separated and opposed their British
and French allies; between 1958 and 1961, the management of the “second Berlin
crisis” was followed with great apprehension by France and Germany; in 1966,
France left the military structure of the Alliance despite USA’s dislike; the USA
replacement of the “Massive Retaliation” by the “Flexible Response” doctrine
was very contested by the European; in the 70’s, after Vietnam’s problems, Nixon
administration tried to redefine American foreign policy and a new transatlantic
relation which met France and also Germany’s resistance; and, in the early 80’s
the installation of American ballistic missiles of middle range (Pershing) in Europe,
at the apogee of the euro missile crisis, was protested in public manifestations all
26 KISSINGER, Henry Does America need an external policy? Diplomacy for the 21st Century,
Gradiva (Portuguese edition), Lisbon, 2003, p.30
27 KAGAN, Robert Paradise and Power – America and Europe in the new world order, Gradiva
(Portuguese edition), Lisbon, June 2003, pp.11-12
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around the continent. Hence, former crisis within the Alliance and transatlantic
relations were usually a kind of “family quarrel” related with different
interpretations of the arrangements for the common security agreed. Today, we
witness a significant difference towards the past: it is the common security and
the common goal that are in question28.
In an article published in the Foreign Affairs magazine, Andrew Moravcsik
makes a distinction between two perspectives about the seriousness and depth of
the present crisis in the relations between Europe and America, following to Iraq
war: the “pessimists” – who defend that differences of power, threat perceptions
and respective values are inexorably forcing a divergence of interests between
European and American – and the “optimists”, who affirm that recent problems
result mainly from the conjuncture of internal policies, of “ideological
stubbornness” and lost diplomatic opportunities29. Like him I agree that both
positions are right. But in the simplified Moravcsik’s classification I stay among
the “pessimists” because I consider that the problem has a deep root, surmounting
merely conjuncture circumstances.
Disparity of Power and Forces
In first place, between Europe and the USA there is an enormous disparity
of power and strength, that is constantly increasing and that originates a growing
divergence between the superpower strategical culture capable of global
interventions, and their European allies. Cold War has caused Europe’ strategical
dependence from the USA, due to the confidence in the North American nuclear
protection and the hope that European security shall be protected by the balance
of terror and the “mutual destruction guaranty”. The previous military capacity
disparity increased significantly during the post cold war period, underlining
Europe’s weakness and dependence of United States – the Gulf war, the Balkan,
Afghanistan and Iraq’s conflicts showed the gap in terms of war capacities and
military technologies. This happened because the allies have been going distinct
28 KISSINGER, Henry, Does America need an external policy? Diplomacy for the 21st Century,
Gradiva (Portuguese edition), Lisbon, 2003, p.28
29 MORAVCSIK, Andrew, Striking a new transatlantic bargain, in Foreign Affairs, July/August
2003. Web edition
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directions: while the Europeans have never been willing to significantly invest in
defense, military programs, re-structure and modernization of their armed forces,
the North Americans, despite their clear superiority, have substantially invested
in military technology to increase deadly military capacities, more precision, from
longer distance, with less risks for their armies and capable of avoiding “collateral
effects” – assuming the leadership in “the military affairs revolution”. The numbers
are elucidative and revealing. Presently, the EU distributes 48% of the common
budget to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – being a quarter to France -,
while for the Security and Defense Policy are allocated only 0,5% of the common
budget!!! There are intentions to change this situation, but the budget proposed
for 2007-2013 still does not make a difference: 40% is for CAP and 1,5% for
ESDP. One can say that as ESDP’s essential amounts should come directly from
member States this small commitment is natural – this is true. But this also reveals
the governments’ main budget concerns and priorities, besides the amount spent
by the states in defense, are in average only 1,9% of their GDP. The Europeans
represent around 65% of the Atlantic Alliance population. Collectively, the 24
European NATO members represent more than 2,5 million troops and the USA
approximately 1,5 million (NATO’s total number in Armed Forces is around 4
millions30). Nevertheless, the 24 European allies defense budget together represents
a half of the American defense budget (respectively around 220 billion and 405
billion USD); and while the US spent per year between 30 to 50 billion USD in
technological research and development, the EU countries spent together less
than 10 billion USD per year. These numbers help to explain why the European
capacity of projecting forces that is only 10 to 15% of the USA’s.
It might be hard to recognize this reality, but the European speech and the
attempt to implement ESDP in the last years represent the answer to this disparity
and power capacity. It is also an attempt of balancing and strengthening the
European axis. Also the demographic trends show that at the same time that the
North American population is growing faster and is younger, the European
population is gradually diminishing and aging: “Based on the actual trends the
North American economy, now having the same dimension of the European, it might
double in the year 2050. Currently the American population average age is 35,5 years
30 Canada, NATO’s ally in North America has 62 thousand troops. These numbers are referring
to 2003. See NATO’ statistics, available on the internet at www.nato.int
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while the European is 37,7 years. In 2050, the average age in America will be 36,2.
In Europe the current trends point to an average of 52,7 years old in 2050. Among
many things, this means that the financial burden represented by the elder will be
higher in Europe than in the USA. And this means that European will have less
money to spend in defense in the years and decades to come”31.
The power and military capacities disparity has had severe consequences
to the Alliance and to the transatlantic relation. To start with, the “share of the
burden”, in which the European’s role is limited to supplying pacification and
peace keeping forces, after the United States practically alone have done the decisive
and “clean” phases of the military operation – that is, USA “does the cooking” and
European “does the dishes”, as has been said in Europe. In the long term, this is
not acceptable. On the other hand, in the extent that European forces are not
very useful to the USA, NATO might tend to have less of alliance and more of
a mechanism of American “protectorate” over Europe, and/or a forum for
Washington to look for, not effective military support, but for political comfort
for its initiatives – unconceivable for the European. Finally, the disparity effects
created in the North American the propensity to resort to military force –
unilaterally if necessary – unlike the European, incapable of projecting forces
and launching surgical or devastating attacks from a safe distance.
Necessity and legitimacy of the use of force
In second place, between America and Europe exists a great divergence
about adequate ways and processes to solve problems and about the need and
legitimacy of the use of force.  Due to its recent history, the European Union has
become a fierce supporter of the soft power strategies – showing preference for
negotiation and political, diplomatic and economical tools; using persuasion and
its attraction power, as well as commercial relations and assistance to the
development; frequently calling the International Law, international agreements,
“international public opinion” and multilateral institutional mechanisms. Europe
is more tolerant and patient and even prefers to live with the threats than to
eliminate them by force. Intrinsically European became true “Olympians”, to
31 KAGAN, Robert, quoting a study in The Economist Magazine “Paradise and Power…”, op.
cit., p. 98
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quote Pacheco Pereira: “(…) today’s prevalence of what Kenneth Minogue calls
“Olympianism”, that manifests, among other things, in the utopic belief that all
conflicts might be solved by negotiation and international organizations mediation.
Hence, for the “Olympians” to go into war would be a contradiction for democracy,
or at least a diminishing or suspicion of that quality of democracy. The popular use of
the term “empire”, created in a Toni Negri marxist pamphlet to label the USA, intends
to establish the difference: democracies do not make war, empires do (…) In the
aftermath of September 11th, when Americans said that “they were in war”, the
European, specially the French-German axis have pulled out immediately. Today
the EU is the most important world institution, together with the international
organizations bureaucracy, driving forward an ”Olympian” policy”32.
On the other hand, the USA mostly use hard power strategies, favoring
coercion policies and punishing sanctions. They are inclined to act unilaterally
and are skeptical in relation to formal multilateral mechanisms; they easily tend
to act outside of their scope when necessary and especially if their values and vital
interests are in cause. They prefer to eliminate threats, choosing the confrontation
not only because they consider themselves able to do it, even alone, but also
because they feel more vulnerable in their strategical dimension and by their
global responsibilities. In fact, this attitude has sprout more vivid after the
September 11th, which led American administration to abandon their initial
isolationism to a new interventionism based on the “war against terror”.
Inevitably, Europeans and Americans are more and more divided about
issues like legitimacy, morality and legal use of strength, or about the resolution
of global affairs and threats elimination, mainly if it includes the military option.
The Iraqi crisis has made these disagreements visible: even if some European
governments understood and publicly supported the American assignment, almost
all public opinion, European intellectuals and politicians have frontally opposed
the USA’s attitude and specially the military intervention. At the bottom, the
divergences now are related with the means used for political ends.
32 PEREIRA, José Pacheco, Podem hoje as democracias conduzir uma guerra? (2), in Publico
newspaper, May 20, 2004. Underlined by the author.
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Threats perception and strategies to face them
The third divergence between American and European is at the level of
perception of new threats and strategies to face them. Along the years the USA
have been defining as main threats to the world and their security the weapons of
massive destruction, terrorism and “Rogue States”. Since the 90’s, the association
and connection of these three threats is the biggest American nightmare. Several
American administrations have declared it and little by little they have been warning
it. The September 11th confirmed the worst fears and since then the North
American feel vulnerable, look at themselves as a preferred target for some groups,
States and asymmetric devastating methods and have assumed a warfare position
to eliminate those threats. In Europe, although some speeches and official
documentation make abundant references to those “new threats”, usually they
are associated with other “challenges”- ethnic-religious conflicts, organized crime,
narcotics and people traffic, poverty and social exclusion, migration, environmental
degradation, infectious diseases. Objectively, some European do not take the
“new threats” as very preoccupant or dangerous – even if the September 11th
attacks’ had victimized more than 800 European citizens from NATO members
in New York’s Twin Towers; that on March 11th in Madrid more than 200 people
were dead; or that in Europe hundreds of individuals were arrested and several
terrorist groups and cells have been dismantled, most with supposedly connections
with the Al Qaeda; or, that in several European countries several explosive devices
have been deactivated and some attacks avoided. Whether we recognize it or not,
threats are not perceived in the same manner in Europe or in America. Maybe
that justifies among some European a certain excuse of this new type of terrorism:
every time that “terrorist acts are firmly condemned” and strong epithets like
“hideous” and “barbarity” are used to describe them, it is immediately requested
to “attack and eradicate terrorism causes”, sometimes suggesting that in the origin
of those causes is the invisible and machiavellian hand of the USA and the
“globalization”. In Europe, many opinions try to “understand” and in a way
“excuse” terrorism, withdrawing the responsibility of this type of terrorism and
putting the guilt in the White House – to whom they ascribe multiple mistakes,
arrogance and imperialist attitudes. This also gives the idea that these threats will
only happen in Europe if Europe supports America, or to those European “that
will be on the side of the USA’s empire policy”. On the other hand, even “New
Europe”, as Rumsfeld refers to Eastern Europe that is being integrated in Western
64 Luis Leitão Tomé
mechanisms, and for now very grateful to the USA, is more concerned with the
reappearance of the Russian threat or the French-German hegemony than with
“new threats”.
This divergent consideration of threats is absolutely decisive to forge
different policies and strategical cultures, non-coordinated and even opposed
in its implementation between the USA and their European allies (this topic
will be developed in the third chapter “New strategies for new threats”). This is
also clear in the treatment given to “Rogue States” or in the perception of
North American “preventive and preemptive actions” that caused such a fuss in
Europe. Or about USA’s antimissile defense system. We should not be surprised
that some European face political-diplomatic commitment or economical and
humanitarian aid as the only answer tolerated for problems or threats resolution.
They also resist to the idea of military action outside Europe’s geographical limits,
especially via NATO, even if those threats come from beyond.
For some European, the USA and their war strategy against these threats
represent a bigger danger to peace and world stability than any of the referred
threats. A survey done in 1999 showed that most French people considered that
USA had “excessive power” and 68% showed concern with the existence of a
unipolar world33. Other surveys done in France in 2002, indicated the USA as
the main adversary of France in the world with 31%, after terrorism (63%) and
Islamism (34%), ahead of China (10%) and Russia (4%) – Germany is not
mentioned. One year after the September 11th, French people (35%) considered
the USA the fourth country to threat the world, following to Iraq (62%), Israel
(45%) and Afghanistan (40%)34. Today these results would be even worst in
relation to Israel and the USA.
33 GORDON, Philip H. “The French Position”, in the National Interest, Fall 2000, p. 57,
quoted by DE ALMEIDA, João Marques and RATO, Vasco, A encruzilhada. Portugal, a Europa
e os Estados Unidos, Bertrand Editora, Lisbon, 2004, p.154
34 BUREAU, Jean-François, Létranger dans le Champ de vision des Français, in Politique Étrangère,
Winter 2002-2003, quoted by DE ALMEIDA, João Marques and RATO, Vasco, A
encruzilhada.… op. cit., p. 155
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The Transatlantic confrontation – the end of “Euro-Atlantic
community”?
All these transatlantic divergences and differences have been originating
geopolitical confrontation between America and Europe that requests their
mutual containment and that has been referred to as “Western civil war” –
representing a paradox between Allies. To the European growing resistance in
following American initiatives the American answer with unilateral actions; to
each North American action considered unilateralist the Europeans react with
more fear and lack of support. The superpower is obliged to undertake the
responsibility of defending threats (considered by some as threats to the superpower
only) and expresses its annoyance for the European “ingratitude”, “weakness”
and “pusillanimity”, loosing the will to hear and negotiate with the allies.  The
European try to moderate USA’s unilateralism through the “multilateralization”
of its actions, this appearing as the great priority of some European countries
external policy. They permanently insist on harmonizing NATO’s remaining
members positions and only act under the auspices and after the express approval
of United Nations Security Council, an organ that in R. Kagan words, “… is a
pale resemblance of a genuine multilateral order (…) is the only instance where a
weak nation as France has at least the theoretical power to control the North American
actions (…), the United Nations Security Council represents to the European a surrogate
of the missing power…”35.
The European usual resort to multilateralism, International Law, the
settlement of international conventions, the international actions legitimacy,
results mainly from their historical experience, from their world vision, and from
a self assumed “civilizing mission” – to show the world the virtues and possibilities
of their “Kantian paradise”. But these tools are also intended to contain,
contradict, and restrain the North American superpower. For Europe and other
powers the dilemma is that the United Nations Security Council have only one
superpower – the USA. This is a new situation to which nobody really adapted,
starting with the allies. The USA may act alone and the geopolitical logic requests
the preservation of the maximum capacity to keep on doing it.
35 In “Paradise and Power”, op. cit
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However, Europe went even furthest in the adoption of a new realpolitik
that valorizes power distribution in detriment of political values and points out at
policies of alignment against the hegemonic power36. Inherently that causes rivalry
and conflict among great powers and weakens the international organizations.
This is visible in the growing European mistrust towards the American hegemony
and unipolarity, in the frequent appeal to the creation of a ”multipolar world”
or in the vibrant praise of multipolarity virtues. In 1998, Hubert Védrine, French
former Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the American power was a problem
to the world and that American foreign policy was not appropriated37. Ten years
ago, we would not believe that a head of State or government from the Atlantic
Alliance member States, together with the Russian President, would publicly
attack the options of an ally from whom depends their security and defense.
Thus this had happened in October 2000, during Vladimir Putin’s visit to France,
by that time in presidency of the European Union. In a press conference the
Russian president and Jacques Chirac – speaking in his EU president quality– has
deliberately attacked the Clinton administration plan to study the revision of the
ABM Treaty: “The European Union and Russia have a similar idea. We condemn the
revision of the ABM Treaty, because we believe that this revision will involve proliferation
risks that might be very dangerous in the future”38. This competition with the USA,
has other consequences as is shown in France’s case that has been active in
competing and strategically containing the USA, being followed by Germany and
other European in the establishment of strategical relations with other great
powers as Russia and China. In several occasions, Chirac and also Schroeder
have made reference to a “strategical partnership” with Russia considering it
essential for a multipolar world. In China’s case, in 1997, after a visit to Beijing,
Chirac and Jiang Zemin signed a joint declaration, stating that “cooperation between
both countries will speed up the progress towards a multipolar system, to avoid attempts
36 PIERRE, Thierry Jean Les Déviances d’une Realpolitik Post-Guerre Froide, in La Revue
Internationale et Stratégique, 45, Spring 2002. About this subject see also DE ALMEIDA,
João Marques and RATO, Vasco, A encruzilhada …, op. cit., Chapter 3 – A Realpolitik Europeia
contra a hegemonia Americana, pp. 111-169.
37 Quoteb by HIPPEL, Karin von, “Définir les origines du terrorisme: un debat transatlantic?, in
La Revue Internationale et Stratégique, n. 51, Fall 2003, p.104, 3rd note.
38 Press conference of European Union – Russia Summit, October 30, 2000, cit in Henry
Kissinger Does America need a Foreign Policy, op. Cit, p. 29
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of world domination”39. Obviously the problem resides “only” in the fact that
these strategic partnerships are perceived as opposing tools to the USA. Besides,
being unable to contain the USA’s hegemony alone, France and Germany have
lately tried to drag the EU to the strategical rivalry with USA, under valuating
the Atlantic Alliance framework. Former French FAM, Védrine declared, “the
(transatlantic) community of values is based on an alliances system and is not enough
to build a common identity”40.
Not long after the September 11th solidarity, the European had a growing
feeling of discomfort towards the USA: in the Afghanistan intervention the
American practically ignored their allies, and after they increased the pressure
and targeted at “evil axis” (Iraq, Iran and North Korea). Thereby, mainly after
the early 2002, the great strategical aim of Chirac’s France and Schroeder’s
Germany among other European leaders and ex-leaders, seems to be the opposition
to the USA’s hegemony, partly because they fear a new American strategic expansion
following to the war against terrorism. On February 6, 2002, long before Iraq
crisis and 5 months after the September 11th, the here referred French FAM,
Hubert Védrine underlined: “Today there is the threat of a new “simplism” that is to
relate all the world’s problems with the war against terrorism. That is not serious (…)
we should fight poverty, injustice, humiliation, etc. Today there is a clear difference
between our vision and that of the American administration.”41. In the same line the
Foreign Affairs European Commissary, Chris Patten, accused the USA of
imperialism and criticized its “dangerous instincts”42.
Since the summer of 2002, the American started to express their
determination in military invading Iraq and some European seized the opposition
to the military intervention to demonstrate their opposition to North American
hegemony – which goes until today. In September 2002, the US approved their
polemical National Security Strategy (coincidently in the same month that France
39 Brenner, Parmentier, Reconcible Differences, p.23, quoted by DE ALMEIDA, João Marques
and RATO, Vasco A encruzilhada…op. cit., p. 157
40 Quoted by SERFATY Simon, Ides Simples mais Idées Fixes, in La Revue Internationale et
Stratégique, Spring 2002, p. 102
41 VÉDRINE, Hubert, live interview in the TV show Question Directe in France Inter, Paris,
February 6, 2002. See also LESNES, Corine, Hubert Védrine dénonce le “simplisme” et
l’uniteralism “utilitaire” des Américains, in Le Monde, February 8, 2002
42 See European Ease Criticism of Washington, in International Herald Tribune, March 5, 2002
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have approved its Military Programming Law 2003-2008) and made an enormous
international campaign, especially with the allies, in favor of the military
intervention against Iraq, having led the United Nations to make an ultimatum
to Saddam’s regime. Meanwhile, the European countries, under Washington’s
pressure and dealing with inter-European and EU divergences, defined their
position as: any military action against Iraq should be legitimized by the United
Nations Security Council. In this phase, the European did not want an unilateral
United States intervention but did not refuse the possibility of the use of force
if within the UN’s ambit.
The German leaders Schroeder and Fisher suddenly led Germany to
abandon this position. These and other known leaders of the SPD and Green
parties, apprehensive and fearing to lose the elections have radicalized their pacifist
speeches and assumed their frontal opposition to the USA. Schroeder declared
“absolutely against the war” even legitimized by a United Nations’ Security Council
resolution and “showed no availability to follow the American military adventures”.
The former Minister of Justice, Herta Daubler-Gmelin, went even further in the
demagogical speech, comparing George W. Bush to Hitler, and declaring that
both used an external crisis to deceive internal problems. For most of the observers
this change on the German traditional position was so surprising that could only
be understood in the electoral campaign context. This is partially correct. But it is
also right that 10 years after the reunification, Germany was willing to affirm
itself as a “normal country”, meaning to leave definitely behind Nazi guilt and
emancipating its foreign policy from the United States. Germany’s position had
created a delicate situation: if the United Nations Security Council approved a
resolution for the use of force in Iraq, Germany would not be in legal standards;
so, Germans expected this resolution never to be approved, and the USA and
British allies intervention without express authorization. In a strategy opposing
to the US only the second option would be valid for Schroeder. As Germany is
not member of the UN Security Council their position would not be relevant in
reproving the proposal, so they hold together with France, that not only possessed
veto power as shared the German expectations in containing the USA’s hegemony
and achieving the EU leadership through the French-German axis.
France’s position led by both Chirac and Villepin, was not so surprising
and even more fierce heading the opposition debate against the USA. French
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leaders have frequently been recurring to a “Gaullist” speech, which at the same
time did not prevent Paris to be a conciliating element between Washington and
Berlin actively participating in the solution created by the Resolution 144143
(considered as a France and United Kingdom’s diplomatic victory). France has
simply changed its attitude and took the  opportunity to stress its opposition to
the USA. In Chirac and Schroeder’s vision this opposition is essential to emancipate
Europe in its relation with the USA, turning the EU into a power – eventually
rival of its traditional ally and as a way of better defending and multiplying the
influence of France and Germany. This point was totally coincident for Chirac
and Schroeder as both were decided to reinforce French-German leadership in a
crucial moment for the European project – with the approach to the EU
enlargement and the discussion about the European Constitution.
In January 2003, with the celebration of the 43rd anniversary of Ileuses Treaty,
this French-German goal was assumed and achieved, when Chirac declared the
French veto to any UN Council resolution authorizing the military intervention
against Iraq. To show the possibility of valid diplomatic initiatives the French-
German axis proposed the “Mirage” plan. This consisted of the increase of the
number of UNO and IAEA inspectors in Iraq’s territory, protected by “blue
helmets” force and the reinforcement of air surveillance. Afterwards, there was
the attempt to extend Iraq inspections. But nobody took these proposals seriously
because of the scale in the transatlantic crisis whose consequences might reveal
dramatic. The opposition to the Iraq’s military program and pressure over Saddam
passed to the opposition to the USA and pressure over the White House and its
supporters. The crisis in a peripheral country and the divergence about the
military option proceeded to a deep crisis within the United Nations, the
transatlantic and Atlantic Alliance relations, and the European Union.
On January 31, 2003, after having read the open letter from eight European
countries’ leaders (United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland) stating publicly their loyalty to the Atlantic alliance
and their determination to support Washington in the Iraqi affair, the French
President Jacques Chirac, showed his anger and said that “besides ill-breeding,
43 See annex 2 for quotations on this resolution
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those countries lost a good opportunity to stay quiet”44. The Letter of Eight evinced
not only the deep European division about the crisis, but also the loyalty to the
USA of former Warsaw Pact members about to join the European Union. It was
clear; “those countries” were the three candidates and not the current members of
the EU that President Chirac preferred to ignore! To top the serious divergences
among the Fifteen, Chirac’s words had a devastating effect in Europe especially
in East. After all, these countries had recently regained their full sovereignty after
more than four decades of soviet domination, and were not willing to stand another
“Brejnev”45 with a new conception of “limited sovereignty”. Their mistrust in
the hegemonic intentions of the French-German axis was suddenly made worse.
Besides, since the end of the Cold War their option was to attach to the “West”
and integrate in its institutional mechanisms – NATO and European Union –
but now they were being told that they should opt between America and Europe
(obviously this scenery was not exclusive to the Eastern countries). The nightmares
summed up and the inter-European crisis accentuated. In February 2003, French
Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie visiting Warsaw warned that the support
to USA might harm the admission to EU, reminding – as Chirac had already
done in the extraordinary EU European Council meeting – that France would
have to ratify the entrance treaties and threatening with a referendum. In the
same month, in Paris, a summit gathered the French President, the German
Chancellor and the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. France was trying to
create a new axis opposite to the USA, with Iraq as lead, but developing its vision
of “multipolar world” in which Europe should counterbalance the North America’s
hegemony. De Gaulle once said, “Europe’s mission is to prevent American and Russian
domination”. Chirac was reformulating this idea and implicitly saying that Europe
and Russia had the mission to prevent the American domination. For Central
and Eastern European countries, another nightmare was taking shape – to be
confined between the “Russian wall” of which they still suspect and fear and the
“European wall” of Paris-Berlin axis that they start to mistrust. With no surprise
and sometimes only symbolically, from Poland to Romania, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Hungary or Baltic States, all Eastern European countries wanted to
take part in the military effort to Iraq stabilization and be enrolled in the USA’s
44 DE SOUSA, Teresa, Entre o coração americano e a razão europeia, in Publico newspaper, May
1, 2003, p.7
45 This term was used in a Czech republic newspaper, commenting Chirac’s words.
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“allies” list. After all these countries were recently or would be soon NATO
members. Donald Rumsfeld thanked the “new Europe” loyalty and despised, in
his words, the” Old Europe”. Today, partly due to the historical celebration of
integrating ten new members and seven new allies in NATO, the European context
is more cordial. Anyway, in the first months of 2003, all parts should have been
more cautious and wise than it happened.
The opposition to Iraq’s intervention was the ideal opportunity to show
the French-German opposition (pretentiously European) to the USA’s
“unilateralism”. But the USA is a democracy and in the North American
administration as in its society – there are multiple tendencies and visions
(frequently described in Europe as “pigeons” and “hawks”). In a moment of
crisis, the pressure to isolate and contradict the USA had the effect of increasing
the domestic support to the “hawks” in the direction of strong hegemony and
unilateralism. Actually, there is a strange alliance between American neo-
conservatives – that have no interest in the multilateralism and do not give
much importance to the United Nations and the Atlantic Alliance, preferring
“floating coalitions” – and traditional “Gaullists” and European pacifists – that
dislike NATO and only expect the UN to stop the USA!
France might have fulfilled its ego with the veto announcement to any Security
Council resolution that should legitimized the use of force over Iraq, maybe naively
thinking that it would stop North American determination and/or would
consolidate UNO’s authority.  On the contrary, the further developments put
the UNO at the brink of a crisis. It was the opportunity for the American “hawks”
to show the United Nations, that it was unable to handle responsibilities and was
no longer useful for the USA to be member. Instead of opposing and inverting,
France’s position only exacerbated North American unilateralism. This might
allow us to understand Azores summit (announced as “war summit” by
propagandists) in a different way. This summit joined in Lages Base, George W.
Bush, Tony Blair, Jose Maria Aznar and José Manuel Barroso, three days before
the beginning of Iraq war. The USA, the UK and Spain achieved a dialogue and
decided to not present to the UN Security Council a proposal for a second
resolution to explicitly authorize the use of strength against Iraq. In extremis this
might have saved the UNO. If that proposal should be presented – to force the
veto and the proposal refusal, the Iraq military intervention afterwards should be
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expressly against the will expressed by the UN Security Council – the crisis would
certainly be worse and the United Nations might disappear as a relevant
international institution. Maybe this was the ideal move for this Administration
“hawks of the hawks” that saw the opportunity to definitely dismantle the main
international regulation body created after the 2nd World War, and install a truly
unipolar world of American hegemony. In the current Bush administration there
are opinions as Richard Perle’s: “it will be important to know, and understand, the
intellectual sinking of the liberal concept of security through the law of nations
administrated by International Institutions”46.
Also at the brink of a crisis was the Atlantic Alliance that passed the most
critical moments in more than 50 years of existence. As referred by João Marques
de Almeida and Vasco Rato, “For many Europeans the question was no longer Iraq
intervention but the future of the alliance with the USA. This political leap gave birth
to the transatlantic crisis.”47. On February 10th 2003, during a NATO meeting,
Turkey expressed the concern of its vulnerability in an eventual war against Iraq.
The Turkey-Iraq border is 300 Km long and passes the instable area of Curdistan48.
In the occurrence of war, Ankara feared Iraq’s reprisals through direct bombing
or curds rebellion or even extremist or Islamic groups actions’. That caused the
invocation of the 4th article of North Atlantic Treaty –“The Parties will consult
together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” – and the USA proposed
the allies to start the reinforcement of Turkey’s capacity of defense. However
France, Germany and Belgium were against this proposal, because they did not
want to accept even implicitly the inevitability of the war against Iraq. They
considered that political actions were not yet exhausted so they rejected to organize
Turkey’s defense and the intervention’s consequences. Obviously this originated a
brutal crisis as one of NATO’s main principles was questioned – the solidarity
between allies. As France is only part of the Atlantic Treaty and does not formally
46 PERLE, Richard Goodbye to United Nations, in Diário de Notícias newspaper, March 29,
2003, p. 12
47 DE ALMEIDA, João Marques and RATO, Vasco,  A encruzilhada... op. cit., p. 150
48 During the 1st World War, in 1915, the Curds took part in the Armenian population genocide,
perpetrated by the Turkish. In 1920, with the end of the war, the Treaty of Sévres establish the
creation of a Curd territory but the decision was forgotten and the Curd population was divided
by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and in less number by Armenia and Azerbaijan.
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integrates NATO’s military structure, the solution was to avoid it: in a NATO’s
Defense Plans Committee meeting Turkey’s request was accepted49. France’s
position was not new. It has systematically contested the USA’s leadership of
the European security and defense, although not possessing an exemplary
conduct on this issue. As Almiral António Emílio Sachetti recalls “In 1954, it was
France that proposed and after made impracticable the European Community of
Defense; it was founding member of NATO to abandon it in 1966; it has boycotted
for more than a year (February 1969 to June 1970) the WEU Council of Ministers,
and pressured its reactivation afterwards (February 1984); with Germany, took part
on the creation of an “European army”, the first attempt to create a North American
independent defense; during the Gulf war, initially refused to integrate the coalition
against Iraq, because the Chief Commander was American, and at last minute changed
its attitude; it did not participate in Travemude’s NATO summit (October 1993),
when Les Aspin, US Secretary of Defense, presented the concept of “partnership for
peace”, etc. More recently, France surprisingly vituperated the future EU members
that supported USA’s policy for Iraq. On April, 29, 2003, after Iraq’s war France
supported a proposal also signed by Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg for the
constitution of an autonomous military defense force…”50. We may add that, despite
the United Nations Security Council (being France a permanent member) new
resolutions’ about Iraq – Resolutions 1472 (28.03.2003), 1476 (24.04.2003),
1483 (22.05.2003), 1490 (03.07.2003), 1500 (15.08.2003), 1511 (16.10.2003),
1518 (24.11.2003) and 1546 (08.06.2004) -, some of which encourage several
ways of collaboration and participation of member States in Iraq’s stabilization
and reconstruction, and after consecutive appeals of the UN General Secretary in
that sense, France (like Germany and other European countries) resists to send
resources and capacities to Iraq.
This might help us to understand why Dominique de Villepin, French Foreign
Affairs Minister has refused to say his preference for the winner of the war – if
Saddam or Bush…
In a similar opposition to the USA, many interpretations and allegations
about Madrid’s attacks on March 11th, 2004 were made in Europe. For a
49 This description follows SACHETTI, Almiral António Emílio’s words in Estratégia e relações
de poder, op. cit., pp.438-439
50 Ibid., p. 440
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significant number of European politicians and analysts, this attack had an
“obvious” and “direct” relation with Aznar’ support to the American intervention
in Iraq. Meaning that, in the end of the day, former Spanish government and the
American were the responsible for the tragedy – in a Manichean, simplistic,
ignorant, fearless vision revealing bad faith. Few days after, when Zapatero’s
government – that already affirmed his will to change Spain’s position towards
Iraq – was ready to take over, another attempt in Spanish railways was deactivated.
Later on, members of a terrorist group that prepared new actions exploded
themselves in their apartment. Zapatero’s PSOE had promised in March 2004’s
electoral campaign, to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq, which he did hastily
right after his government took over. Many European circles applauded this
position, notwithstanding the Spanish international compromises, or Iraq’s
situation or subsequent developments at politic-diplomatical level. One year after
Iraq’s military intervention, the Spanish new government changed its country
position and associated with the French-German axis in the opposition to the
USA. Their legitimacy is unquestionable as it represents the most important
electoral promise. However, this was marked by March 11th attacks (occurred 3
days before the elections and with a vital role in the “turn up” of the voting
results), by threats of new attacks against Spain and by the violence escalade in
Iraq. The risk is that Spain not only opposes to the coalition military presence
in Iraq, but also to the USA generally or that its position is weak before terrorism
–in this case we might watch the “domino effect” in terrorist targets, as they
might consider to be able to influence electoral results and foreign policies of
certain countries.
The confrontation atmosphere is also perceptible in the idea that both the
European and the American make of each other and of the transatlantic
community – this image has evolved to an unexpected level between allies.
Effectively, European and American currently look less at each other as “world’s
good sides”. The European Union looks at itself as a “shining city on the top of
the hill”, in a similar image that American have of themselves. Despite, there are
more and more Europeans to consider the USA a severe cowboy, more dangerous
than other threats or even as the “evil empire”. In Europe there is a growing
anti-Americanism feeling with the correspondent syndrome of “you deserve it!”
every time something goes wrong for the North American (particularly in Iraq,
but also in Afghanistan or in the war against terrorism!) – this is aberrant, as we
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are allies and our security depends from them. On the other hand, there is an
increasing number of American bearing a grudge towards the European,
considering them “cowards” and “traitors”. For them they play their enemies’
game, acting like former sheriff ’s assistants turned into preachers – equally absurd,
because their security also depends on the cooperation with the allies.  Truly,
many of these comparisons are based in old prejudices and ignorance and do not
represent the majority but also reflect a significant progress in some public opinion
sectors, intellectual elites and decision makers.
From this geopolitical gap between allies – the USA expressing hegemony
and trying to make Europe to accept its leadership; Europe’s interest in “autonomy”
and containment of hegemonic and unilateral actions of the superpower, through
multilateralization and subordination to the International Law, in a growing will
to rivalry - that was clearly demonstrated with Iraqi; question, resulting in a
severe breach in the “transatlantic community”. This crisis, which was originated
by a secondary and outcast actor in the international scenery (Iraq from tyrannical
Saddam) but where opposing interests and values were in cause, from Europe and
the USA - affected seriously the transatlantic relations, endangered the cohesion
among the Atlantic Alliance, threatened the union and solidarity of the European
Union (because their members divided in the support or opposition to the USA)
and put the United Nations on the brink of a precipice. The “West” is in danger,
and the danger increased and/or became visible with Iraq crisis. The USSR’s
failed objective – to separate the European from the American – is now happening
with Iraq, the epilogue of a series of divergences and catalyst of a severe
transatlantic crisis due to the irresponsibility of some leaders. If the USA’s foreign
relations have been affected with this crisis, this happened mainly with Europe
and not with Russia or China. To such an extent that Eastern European countries
pressured either by the USA and the French-German axis have said, “We do not
want to chose between the father and the mother”51…
51 This expression is ascribed to Slovenia Prime Minister, but reveals the feelings of the candidates
accessing to the European Union and others.
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The Transatlantic challenges in the path of a “revealing Iraq”
“What I fear is not the American unilateralism, is the isolation, the distance,
when we need a committed America”
Tony Blair, in the annual Labor Party congress,
in Bornemouth, September 30, 200352
“It (Europe) is a single entity – though it is culturally, ethnically and economically
immensely diverse. For the first time in its history, this entity has an opportunity to
establish an internal order on the principle of co-operation and equality among the
large and the small, the strong and the weak, on shared democratic values. This is also
an opportunity to put an end, once and for all to the export of coercion and wars.
Should Europe fail to grasp this opportunity, we could be heading to a new global
catastrophe, a catastrophe far graver than previous ones. This time the forces of freedom
would not face a single totalitarian enemy. They could well be drawn into a strange
era of all against all, a war with no clear front…”
Vaclav Havel, 199853
As previously referred the crisis about the military intervention in Iraq had
significant consequences in the transatlantic and inter-European relations. It is
amazing how fast this all happened. However, Iraq’s case gave us some lessons and
launched new challenges. In many aspects Iraq has revealed previously existing
symptoms:
- It revealed the difficulties in having consensus about collective security
between American and European – the Cold War nostalgia and the team
work done are not enough to continue to draw a common destiny;
- It revealed to both transatlantic sides the seriousness of divergences and
the lack of a common strategical culture;
- It clearly revealed the huge disparity between power and strength of both
sides of the Alliance due to the extraordinary combat capacities expressed
by the USA during the military campaign;
52 Quoted in Publico newspaper, October 1, 2003, p. 15
53 HAVEL, Vaclav, The charms of NATO, speech in Washington after being awarded the
Fullbright Prize, October 3, 1997, in New York Review of Books, January 15, 1998, p. 24
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- It revealed to the American the risk of unilateralism and the crucial role of
the Allies in managing security, in reconstruction and peace keeping –
fabulous capacities and easy military victory do not mean the achievement
of political and strategical goals and stabilization;
- It revealed to the European the limitation and dilemmas of their ESDP
and the risks of European fragmentation before a serious crisis with opposed
policies to the superpower of which depend the European defense and
security;
- It revealed the use of the EU, NATO and even UNO by some countries’
political factions to obtain internal political victories and by some nations
to obtain international importance – at the cost of the transatlantic
cooperation and with overwhelming consequences for all multilateral
mechanisms;
- It revealed a new awakening of European strategical conscience, recalling
that it cannot avoid the burden of security management for the benefit of
all.
The Iraq’s case brings a brutal message: a transatlantic breach is very
dangerous as it might shake some of the fundamental bases of international
security. It is dangerous for European and American, for the Alliance, the EU
cohesion, the United Nations, for Iraqi and Afghans. It might be dangerous for
Bosnia and Kosovo, for the fight to terrorism, weapons of massive destruction
proliferation and “evil States”, for peace promoting and keeping, in the end is
dangerous for the European and the world’ security. The only to profit from this
strategical irresponsibility are the enemies of democracy and West: terrorists,
“lords of war” or some countries’ evil leaders – people like Osama Bin Laden or
Saddam Hussein. The first and main transatlantic challenge is to overcome
divergences, reinforce the transatlantic partnership and keep the Atlantic Alliance
political and military effective, expression of community of values and destiny.
Thus, it is strange that some analysts and leaders have come to the
conclusion that the USA and Europe, the EU and NATO should ultimately
follow paths apart. For those, who consider that North American and European
do not share the same world vision and that the Alliance is dead or pronounced
dead, Europe might choose between two alternatives only: loyalty and obedient
silence, since the USA are so powerful and dominant that Europe’s only hope of
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influencing its behavior is to be the loyal ally (Blair’s option); or the re-militarization
and competition, enabling Europe to have its own aims and develop its own
comprehensive capacities taking on more responsibility for its own security and
that of its neighborhood (so called Chirac’s option). In these terms, as the Brussels’
Director of European Policy Center, Fraser Cameron says, “I am sure that in the
long term Europe must adopt Chirac’s attitude…54” Robert Kagan and the North
American radical neo-conservatives should be happy with this perspective coming
from Europe – as they consider this European mission impossible, despite it
distances Europe from the USA.
However, there is a preferred option for the European and equally better
for the transatlantic relation: a strong investment in defense and capacities but
in a perspective of the USA and NATO complementarity, not of competition
and conflict. This is not new, this is only to put into practice the contents of
official declarations and documents. As referred by General Garcia Leandro “For
Europe is not interesting to compete with the USA in the field of armament. It is not
a question of inability. It is an option. It is another world philosophy (…) Sometimes
there is no alternative to military force use and, if the USA are the biggest military
power that accept all delegations, they cannot be abandoned in great crisis moments.
Europe must have military capacities… that allow to teamwork with the USA. And
let NATO continue to be a relevant common house as it interests both North Atlantic
sides…”55.
The tasks split between the EU and NATO is clear and complementary.
The EU’s Defense and Security Policy (EDSP) is to harmonize progressively the
security concepts and cultures of the European countries so they are able to
gradually undertake the responsibility of civil and military security since the low
until medium intensity level and develop a defined doctrine for peace keeping
and consolidation. NATO has a permanent and crucial triple role: to grant the
continuity of lower and higher intensity levels, or control the escalade; to secure
that American and European work together to reach the world’s security; and to
54 See also the curious and clarifying debate between CAMERON, Fraser and MORAVCSIK,
Andrew, Debate – Should the European Union be able to do everything that NATO can? in
NATO Review, Fall 2003, Web edition, available at www.nato.int
55 LEANDRO, General Garcia Guerra e Paz, op. cit. p. 21
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secure the guarantee of essential security so that Europe’ security re-nationalization
does not shake its political bases and prevent its emergent projection capacity. 56.
So, the second great transatlantic challenge is to implement
complementarities. One year and a half after the Iraq’s situation shows how vital
that is. For the American the main lesson is that is harder to build peace than to
lead a war. The USA could learn a lot with the way some of the Allies have done
peacekeeping and stabilization. In peace re-establishment the USA definitely
depend on Europe in what concerns civil and military power of low intensity.
The European cannot juggle the lack of capacities and will have to invest, either
to fulfill the EU ambition of being a stronger international security player or to
avoid its troops to dye in vain in forced operations. Therefore another transatlantic
challenge is a new security agreement between Allies in which the American
learn how to do peacekeeping and the European get better equipment to fight.
Another transatlantic challenge, means to deepen the Atlantic Alliance
cooperation or deepen the EU-NATO cooperation to be effective and real in
crisis management. Both the EU and NATO contribute to the management,
differently but complementarily. Working with NATO the EU secure a faster
and a bigger access to a substantially more coercive power. Europeans that
presume a strong ESDP through a weak NATO are totally wrong as, among
other things, they forget: the lack of a strong, coherent European political objective,
the lack of resources that allow a significant increase of military capacities and the
impossibility of the ESDP suddenly becoming in a mechanism for planning and
executing multinational European coalitions with several levels of military
technology, consisting of coherent forces able to be projected to dangerous and
distant places around the world. Without NATO, Europe takes the chance of
being even more insecure and unable, lacking self-confidence, hesitating and
probably without the notion of its place and mission in the world. If the Alliance
disappears what is the alternative? How can Europe develop its own distinct and
complementary security culture? For those in the USA, that believe in NATO’s
insignificance and in America’s ability to manage the world and all crisis alone,
they will isolate America making it loose legitimacy and efficiency. Will the
USA be safer alone?
56 LINDLEY-FRENCH, Julian Unifying links by, in NATO news, Fall 2003. Web edition.
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We only expect that few opportunist politicians and intellectuals realize
the damage caused to their own security structures by weakening essential relations
either for the European Union and NATO – or that they are removed of their
decision making positions. We could almost consider this as another transatlantic
challenge. Chirac-Schroeder’s thesis are not accepted in several Europe’ sectors
and countless leaders reveal great prudence. During the Iraq’s process many
European countries have chose to support, or at least not oppose, their American
ally. Obviously France and Germany’s positions do not reflect all Europeans
positions or the EU’s position (actually there are several European positions
and not only one). Officially the prevalent thesis tends to preserve the Atlantic
Alliance, to reinforce the ESDP and to invigorate the EU-NATO cooperation.
In the United States, it becomes evident that the neo-conservatives messianic
vision and unilateralist tendency will not be successful due to its inefficiency –
already being corrected. The White House policy has been severely criticized
not only by Bill Clinton and John Kerry, but also by the many signatories of
the document “For renovation of the Transatlantic Partnership”. Here, among
others, we find Democrats like Madeleine Allbright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Warren
Christopher or William Cohen and Republicans, such as Frank Carlucci, Robert
Dole, Alexander Haig Jr. or James Schlesinger57. These personalities from both
great political parties are not European nor anti-American. That also shows that
there are several world and transatlantic relations visions’ in the USA. However
we must note that the Bush Administration has always officially emphasized the
present importance of the value and use of the Atlantic Alliance. In an article
meaningfully entitled “A Strategy of Partnerships”, the former Secretary of State
Colin Powell referred to Europe as follows:
“It is true that we have had differences with some of our oldest and most valued
NATO allies. But these are  differences among friends. The transatlantic partnership
is based so firmly on common interests and values that neither feuding personalities
nor occasional divergent perceptions can derail it. We have new friends and old friends
alike in Europe. They are all, in the end, best friends, which is why the President
continues to talk about partnerships, not polarities, when he speaks about Europe.
Some authorities say that we must move to a multipolar world. We do not agree – not
because we do no value competition and diversity, but because there need be no poles
57 Document quoted by LEANDRO, General Garcia in Guerra e Paz, op. cit, pp. 22-23.
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among a family of nations that shares basic values. We believe that it is wiser to work
at overcoming differences than to polarize them further”58.
Another great challenge for the transatlantic relations seems to be the future
of European integration. While the American unilateralist impetus resulted from
political decisions that may and are already being modified, the European
integration challenge is structural for Europe, America and the Atlantic partnership.
On both sides of Atlantic the traditional and official statements refer that European
integration strengthens Europe, which automatically reinforces the whole Atlantic
Alliance and consequently leads to a balanced relation within NATO. However
for some authors, for instance Henry Kissinger, two other outcomes are possible:
“Europe that reduces its global responsibilities, taking a mini United Nations status
and preaching moral at the same time that focuses on economical competition with the
USA, or, alternatively Europe that defies the United States and builds a foreign and
mediation policy between America and the rest of the world, very similar to India’s
attempt during Cold War. With internal affairs prevailing and no security threat in
the horizon, Europe might take its time to choose between these options. Therefore it
might melt both approaches, as each one alone, would slowly destroy the Atlantic
partnership”59.
During the whole integration process of Europe, the USA had a supportive
role and showed it benevolently. Back in 1963, President Kennedy defended
Europe’s unification to achieve a balanced relation:
“Only a cohesive Europe may protect us from the Alliance’s fragmentation. Only
that Europe may allow full reciprocity in the Atlantic policy treatment between both
sides of the ocean. Only with that Europe we may have a situation of “take and give”
among equals, and balanced share of responsibilities and an equal level of sacrifice.”60
This vision still prevails in Europe and the USA. However, the current
challenge fomented by the actual stage of the European integration and the
transatlantic relations degradation is substantially different and uncertain. As
58 POWELL, Colin L. A Strategy of Partnerships, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, n. 1, January/
February 2004, p. 30.
59 KISSINGER, Henry, Precisará a América de uma política Externa?, op. cit, p.45.
60 KENNEDY, President John F., speech in Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany, June 24, 1963,
quoted by KISSINGER, Henry, idem, p. 41
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61 DE VASCONCELOS, Álvaro, Vencer a Paz, in O Mundo em Português, n. 43, IEEI, April
2003, p.3
referred by Álvaro Vasconcelos, “The European Union faces the need of redefining
its relation with the USA, causing the evolution of ideological atlantism, proper of
Cold War, to a Euro-American partnership. The reflection about the current (Iraq)
war should be the catalyst of this change”61. Waiting for the ESDP evolution is still
necessary to clearly know Europeans’ ambitions and goals for their “autonomous”
military capacities. Also, we should be aware of the direction chosen by the
European Union in what concerns its role in the world and its relation with the
United States to understand the impact of the European integration in the
transatlantic relations and the American attitude towards different European
integration options. Anyway, for all sake, it is vital that the EU should integrate
and maintain close links with the Atlantic partnership and that the USA keep
on supporting the ESDP.
The common and joint management of threats such as terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction and “Rogue States” represent an important challenge and
should be faced as vital for the transatlantic community of security and defense.
The articulation between the USA and Europe, and NATO-EU is crucial for the
clearance of common threats – and though much has been done in this sense it
lacks a common strategy clearly and undoubtedly undertaken by all. Smaller and
dangerous groups might easily have access to destructive power that until now
was exclusive of the most powerful. The European and American, as world “good
forces” should get prepared for this reality together.
A perhaps more immediate transatlantic challenge is the cooperation
reinforcement in Afghanistan’ stabilization and above all, in Iraq’ stabilization
due to its gravity and symbolism. In what concerns Iraq the European objections
are reasonable – shared by moderate conservatives like James Baker or Brent
Scowcroft and by many democrats like General Wesley Clark, Supreme
Commandant Ally in Europe, between 1997 and 2000. However, Europe should
not misunderstand the Iraq’s war opposition with the USA opposition or the
European dismissal in Iraq stabilization. If the USA want help after the
intervention they must be ingenious in the commitment of multilateral
institutions and in the preparation of post war mechanisms – this should have
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been done before, but now they have no other choices. That is why Washington
is acting cautiously in what concerns Iran, Syria or North Korea. They are clearly
looking for the United Nations and NATO’s involvement in Iraq. The Atlantic
Alliance is emerging as a promising forum to organize peacekeeping and develop
common principles to organize future interventions. Following the United Nations
Security Council and Iraqi government appeals, NATO has started to support
the Iraqi security forces training (as decided in Istambul summit). The chance of
a NATO’ stabilization mission in Iraq should be considered seriously as it already
occurs in Afghanistan: here NATO’s mission has the United Nations approval
and the military collaboration of other countries like Argentina, Armenia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine.
In any of the cases NATO has to show its ability for these kind of missions (which
is not happening in Afghanistan), or it will loose its credibility and power. The
current problem lays in knowing if the European are willing and able to
constructively commit on this process. Practically ignored in the war preparation,
many European have been understandable reluctant in using their resources and
troops – contrasting with the first Gulf war and with Kosovo. To interrupt this
complex conciliation process renouncing to the Atlantic Alliance and abandoning
Iraq to chaos would represent a tragic victory for all that hate the Western
community.
It is now the moment for European to move on and for American to meditate.
It is now the moment to reinvest on the transatlantic relations, on the Atlantic
Alliance and on the EU-NATO relationship wisely, with transparency and realism.
Not to do this is simply too dangerous.
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THE USA-RUSSIA RELATIONS
Russia and its relations with the USA are totally different of “Europe’s” case
above studied. The state of its relation with the USA since the end of Cold War
and especially since the September 11th has an opposing curve to the USA-Europe
relationship: in Russian case it shows progressive approximation.
Before this analysis, we should remind the existing perceptions about Russia,
as well as some Russian perceptions about the west, and describe the new post-
soviet Russia profile. Russia – with its geographical dimension and natural
resources, its place on the United Nations Security Council and G-8, its natural
influential area, its nuclear and strategical armament and all its past, present
and potential future - represents a great power. But what kind of power and
where is it heading to?
Images of Russia
“Russia is a great country and I am not referring to geography. Russia is a great
country on the inside. On the inside. There is a tremendous force on this side of the
world. Where is it heading to, I do not know.”62
José Pacheco Pereira, May 2004
Western images of Russia are embedded with strong ambivalence. On one
hand, it is a recent element on the international stage; on the other, is the heir
of the “old” Russia of the Tzars. It is the main responsible for the dismantling
of the feared Soviet Union but it is also “USSR’s mother and daughter”, as it
was in its epicenter during seven decades and its legitimate heir. Russia is an
“European” country, Slavonic and mostly Christian, and since the 18th century
has always been involved on the Old Continent’s conflicts – Seven Years’ War,
Napoleonic Wars, Crimea War, 1st World War, 2nd World War, Cold War. However,
it is considered an “eastern” country, European but Asiatic, Christian but
orthodox, Slavonic but oriental – always seated in both continents, Europe and
62 PEREIRA José Pacheco, Impressões in Abrupto, internet blog, May 20, 2004, comments on
his trip to Moscow, in www.abrupto.blogspot.com
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Asia, “the Russian people”, quoting Dostoievsky, “has always been considered European
in Asia and Asiatic in Europe”63. Cold, mysterious, wide, autocratic and violent,
Russia has always been a sui-generis Empire State.
Russia’s image has also been originated by its long expansionist period. Right
after its release from Mongolian domination (Golden Horde), Russia has not
ceased its expansion until the 1st World War: it arrived at the Urals and Caspian
Sea (16th century), conquered Siberia (end of 16th century and first half of the
17th century), pushed over the Baltic (end of 17th century and beginning of the
18th century), the Black Sea and Crimea, shared Poland and took possession of
Kamchatka peninsula and Okhotsk Sea (18th Century). It has conquered the
Caucasus and annexed Finland (end of 18th century and beginning of the 19th),
conquered the Central Asia – Kazakhstan and Turkstan, Pamir and Turkmenistan
– approaching the Afghanistan, Persia, Ottoman empire and Tibet -, occupied
half of the Sakhalin and Kuriles Islands and had Amour and Ussuri regions given
by China (second half of the 19th century).  In the end of the 19th century, with
ottoman decline Russia claimed an “influence zone” in the Balkans and, in 1900,
had military occupied Chinese Manchuria, and even ambitioned Korea. Loosing
a significant quantity of European territory between 1917 and 1920, the USSR
would integrate great part of these and other territories in 1939-40 and after, in
1945 (Finnish Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Eastern Poland, Rutenia,
Bessarabia), and made its satellite countries of several European countries – Poland,
Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. After USSR’s
implosion, the new Russia claimed again an empire status upon old territories,
and in particular upon remaining members of the Community of Independent
States (consisting of 12 former soviet republic members – the exceptions are the
three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).
This strong expansionist impulse results, in Russian perspectives, from a
certain moral superiority and from a huge insecurity and vulnerability complex.
Their European borders have been challenged by Polish-Lithuanian, Swedish,
English, Ottomans, French, German and Austrian; from the East came the
Mongols and, seven centuries after, Russia has faced twice the Japanese (1905
63 Quoted by STEPHAN, John J. in Asia in the Soviet Conception, in ZAJORIA, Donald S.
(ed.) Soviet Policy in East Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982, p. 35
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and 1945); to confirm their possessions in the southwest wing, Russia had to face
the Persian and Ottoman Muslims, and also the British.
To sum to all this is the fact that the Russian empire has since ever suffered
strong pressure for its disintegration due to its wideness and its multinational
character. Russia has always been an empire of captive peoples, forced by
repression, violence, brutality and sacrifice.
On the western minds no one forgets that the wideness of its territory and
tenacity of its people was fundamental to save Europe twice: in the beginning of
the 19th century, with Napoleon, and between 1940-1945 with Hitler. But no
one forgets also, that after having started the 1st World War against Austria-Hungary
in the name of a pan-orthodox and a pan-Slavonic appeal (to help sister Serbia),
Russia betrayed its allies in Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918), by prematurely
withdrawing from the 1st World War; it is also present on minds, the German-
Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, a week before Poland invasion and the beginning
of war, that would turn Russia in a true ally of Nazi Germany – with whom
Poland has been shared in the two first years of the 2nd World War64. Its schemes
and diplomatic ability (despite not always being successful) have conditioned its
alliance with the United Kingdom, Prussia and Austria against France; with France
and the United Kingdom against imperialist Germany and Austria-Hungary; again
with Germany to save the “October revolution”; with the UK, France and later
Nazi Germany to avoid isolation; with the USA and other democracies to avoid
the 2nd World War catastrophe; with the USA to have an “influence zone” in
Europe; and, in the Cold War period, in an attempt to separate western European
and North American through nuclear blackmail and pacifist messages.
Russia’s History with Europe has left a heavy legacy of fear – as Finnish,
Latvians, Estonians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Moldavians, Czechs, Slovakians,
Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians or Polish may easily confirm. However it
has also left some nostalgia of the co-operation periods. In Germany, some
identify “historic mistakes” to not have followed Bismark, Ratzel or Haushoffer’s
advises, to not attempt the invasion and occupation of such wide territory and
64 In fact, it was a Non Aggression Pact of 10 years, but should be more than that. For further
information see FURET, François, O Le Passé D’Une Illusion, (Portuguese Edition), Presença
Publishers, Lisbon, 1996, specially chapter 9 “A segunda guerra mundial”, pp 362-441.
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always maintain open a diplomatic option with Russia. France might recall that
in the 20th century it was saved twice by its alliance with Russia. Also the United
Kingdom reminds that but also the Russian threats to the Bosporus and their
approaches to India. With such historical legacy, plenty of ups and downs, Russia
originates contradictory perceptions on the European minds. Today, some
Europeans imagine again a wide cooperation and partnership with Russia to
balance the USA; however, others search in the USA a warrant against the
resurgence of an aggressive Russia.
Obviously, the USA’s historical experience with Russia is more recent and
less direct. Considered as the symbol of European autocracy, this did not prevent
the USA of buying Alaska in 1867, and in 1904-1905 they were caught by
surprise by Russian defeat by the Japanese. The 20th century has left a negative
but curious legacy of the USA-Russia relationship. For several months during the
1st World War the USA and Russia were allied; after the Bolshevik revolution in
October 1917, Russia has became the incarnation of absolute evil (despite the
most famous author of the revolution report was North American, John Reed in
“Ten days that shook the World”). The USA had even supported a civil war
against the “red”. Only in 1934 the diplomatic relations should be re-established
with Russia, because in that period the communism and capitalism were considered
as barriers against Fascism and Nazism. Again no relations between 1939 and
1941, but due to Hitler and later to Japanese Empire, the USA and Russia faced
again common enemies. Following to its resistance and victimization, to Europe’s
total destruction and to its euro-Asiatic capacities, President Franklin Roosevelt
considered the USSR as one of the piles of the new world’s emerging order.
However, this honeymoon was very short. The expansionist conjugation of
communism and Stalinism led the USSR to dominate half of Europe, imposing
the Old Continent an “iron curtain”. The USA, with President Harry Truman,
implemented the “containment” strategy and the international relations quickly
became bipolar, with hostility and confrontation between the superpowers. Due
to the impressive accumulation of nuclear weapons this war was always “cold”
promoting a series of negotiations between the powers about control and armament
reduction. Independently of serious ideological and geopolitical divergences, the
nuclear weapon represented a risk of cataclysm, threatening the whole world.
Both superpowers should limit, or if possible eliminate this threat. Today, no
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matter what geopolitical or geostrategical differences exist, a strong collaboration
at this level is indispensable.
The New Russia
Post-soviet Russia descriptions are ambivalent due to this historical legacy
but not only. Being only one of the fifteen parts of old Soviet Union, the new
Russia in its present situation is the biggest state of the world. It spreads for
17.075.200 square kilometers and contains eleven different time zones. Moscow
is closer to Paris, London or Lisbon than to Vladivostok that, on its turn, it’s
closer to Beijing, Tokyo or Seattle than to the Russian capital. In the last fifteen
years this colossal country has embarked on a dramatic and extraordinary change.
Evolving from communist dictatorship to multiparty democracy, with more
than 700 political parties registered and having political leaders freely chosen in
ordinary elections – between 1991 and 2003, there were seven national, four
parliamentary and three presidential elections -, Russia is still pointed out as an
unfinished democracy, with imperfect political institutions and civic freedoms:
Russian leaders are accused of elections’ manipulation through a tight control of
the state media, prosecution and censorship of independent press and the use of
judicial and administrative resources to intimidate or turn the rivals unable. In
June 2000, The Economist magazine considered Russia a “phony democracy” and
more recently, the Freedom House group classified Russia with “5” on the political
freedom and “5” on civil freedoms in a scale of “1” (best performance) to “7” (the
worst); in what concerns “political pressure, control and violence” against the
media, the Freedom House gave “30” to Russia in a scale of “0” (best) to “40”
(worst)65. On December 7, 2003 the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) has also expressed reserves about the last Russian parliamentary
elections, noticing the “intense use of State means and media favoring” in benefit of
Pro-Russia Party, the pro-Putin’s party66, (that got more than 37% of votes).
However, it is curious to note that no matter Putin’s clearly pro-western foreign
65 Data quoted by SHLEIFER, Andrei and TREISMAN, Daniel in Russia – a Normal Country,
in Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, n. 2, March/April 2004, pp 31-32.
66 Ibid., pp33-34
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policy, more than its predecessor Boris Yeltsin, his power handling is correlated
with a significant increase of western criticism on Russia’s democratic attitude.
For instance, Z. Brzezinski in a text wrote on the Fall 2003, said: “I am concerned
with the unconditional smoothing towards a government of ex-KGB agents as in a
mature democracy… If Russia should be part of an extended area, it should not take
with itself the imperial luggage, or a genocide policy against Chechnya’s population; it
cannot kill journalists and repress the mass media. I think that we should be sensitive
to these facts…”67. Colin Powell seems to have listened him. In an article published
in the late January 2004, in Moscow daily newspaper “Izvestia”, coincident with
his official visit to Moscow, the US former Secretary of State has harshly criticized
some aspects of the Russian policy: “It seems that Russia’s democratic system has not
achieved a balance between executive, legislative and judicial powers… the political
power is not totally according the law’s rules… main aspects of civil society, such as
freedom of press and political parties development do not have a stable and independent
character”68.
In the same day, Pacheco Pereira, after a recent trip to Russia describes his
“Impressions”: “Some freedoms have stabilized but there is no “freedom atmosphere”.
Putin rules with his KGB’s friends. He seems a man without personal corruption
temptations but enjoys the autocratic power. The power show pleases him and he climbs
alone the long Kremlin’ stairs, stepping on an endless red carpet to swear in an isolated
lectern his fidelity to Russia. It is natural that by his attitude he imagines to give
Russian power a new image, depressed by difficult and vain years. But so much ostensive
solitude power is also an autocratic sign. (…) Putin’s Russia reveals its strangeness, the
strangeness of transition moments, when nothing is defined. Moscow’s city centre is full
of luxury stores, imported vehicles fill gigantic highways and prices are exorbitant.
Today Moscow is more expensive that Tokyo. The five years ago beggars and indigents
selling grandfather’s samovar or youth’s rollers and kitten baskets are gone from the
metro stairs access and the big luxury shopping mall next to the Red Square. However
“Chechnya” the national issue remains taboo. Vocabulary is checked.  Millionaire
Russians in prison remind to “new capitalists” the risk of the job. The difference between
67 BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew, La Seguridad de EE en un mundo unipolar, in Politica Exterior,
97, January/February 2004, p. 61
68 Quoted in Público newspaper, January 27, 2004, p. 16
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what is legal and illegal remains discretionary, mainly in the economical field. Who
makes the decision? The political power.”69
Although in great controversy and turbulence, the planed socialist economy
regime gave room to a capitalist economy based in private property. There are
frequent descriptions of “wild capitalism” practice, associated with the immense
power of oligarchs and mafia networks, which led the country to the “economical
collapse”, “massive unemployment”, “growing poverty” and “brutal disparities”.
Between December 1991 and December 2001, Russian rouble devaluated more
than 99% in relation to the American dollar. In the last decade of the 20th century,
some consider Russian economical performance as “a tragedy of historical
proportions”70, defining the country as the “most virulent cleptocracy of the world”71.
Corruption in Russia is also described with impressive records, always having a
high position in several reports and rankings: 142 in 160 countries, on the World
Bank list of 2001; 71 in 102 countries on the Transparency International ranking
of perceptions of corruption in 200272.
However, over the last years Russia has been showing an important
economical recovery, changing many of the perceptions coming from the Yeltsin’s
era. In 1998 it overcame the financial crisis – in that year its fiscal system collapsed;
it refers admirable economical growth rates (6,4% in 1999, 10% in 2000, 5% in
2001, 4,3% in 2002 and 7,1% in the first half of 2003); its currency is stable; the
inflation seems under control (in 2002 it was around 10-12%)73. Consequently,
a more self-confident Russia no longer needs international institutions’ funds but
even started to pay part of its huge external debt. At the same time, Russia is
negotiating to achieve in the short term its accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) with minimal concessions. It is estimated that Russia will
double the GDP within one decade – but still, its share on the world economy
69 PEREIRA, José Pacheco, Impressões in Abrupto, website blog, May 20, 2004, comment on
his trip to Moscow, at www.abrupto.blogspot.com
70 SANDERS, Bernard, member of the USA congress, quoted by SHLEIFER, Andrei and
TREISMAN, Daniel, op. cit., p. 21
71 LEACH, James, cit in ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 30
73 Data quoted by RUMER, Eugene B. and WALLANDER, Celeste A., in Russia: Power in
Weakness?, in the Washington Quarterly, 27:1, Winter 2003-2004, p. 59
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will be only 3%74. Anyway what makes Russia economically important to the rest
of the world are its energy resources.
In the energy sector, Russia stands as one of the most important
international players: it is one of the biggest oil producers (the second, after
Saudi Arabia in some opinions) having 10% of the world’s reserves and is the
world’s biggest producer of natural gas – with 30% of the world’s reserves – to
add to its 20% of coal reserves. This gives way to the USA contract with Moscow
gas and oil conducts to allow the access to the Urals, Siberia and Caspian
hydrocarbon; and, China and Japan compete to attract Russian pipelines that will
satisfy their needs. Also the European Union is a growing consumer of these
Russian resources: 45% of Russian energy exportations are to the former 15
members of the EU; 21% of the EU(15) oil imports come from Russia, which
represents 16% of total EU(15) consumption; 41% of EU(15) gas imports come
also from Russia, representing 19% of the total consumption in the European
Union of 15. These numbers have a significant increase with the 25 members’
European Union (most of new members are from eastern Europe and already
depend on Russian energy), and increases are estimated for the European imports
of Russian energy resources until 2020, mainly due to the growing dependence
of gas of which Russia has fabulous reserves. The European support to a substantial
part of Russian pipelines in construction is not innocent (Yamal-Europe pipeline,
Shtockman gas camp, Drouzba-Adria pipelines connection or electric networks
inter-connections, as well as the funding of the viability study of Northern
European pipeline). So, the energy sector growth to 20% of the Russia GDP75 is
not surprising. Actually, the Russian energy production makes it a vital partner
for prices and markets’ stability, especially due to the unsteadiness of the Middle
East and Persian Gulf.
Russia‘s energy resources are a catalyst of power and influence projection:
it injects the “health” that sustains the economy; balances the budget; funds national
defense; provides the neighbor States with strategical cover giving them a
supplementary incentive to integrate the CIS; increases its stature before the Middle
East’s main powers as Saudi Arabia, Iran or even Israel; and is an extra excellent
74 TRENIN, Dmitri, Pirouettes and priorities – Distilling a Putin doctrine, in The National
Interest, Winter 2003/2004, p. 78
75 Data quoted by CLAIRET, Sophie, Le dialogue énergétique Europe-Russie, in Diplomatie
Magazine, n. 7, February-March 2004, p. 40
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motive for developing good relations with powers such as the USA, EU, China,
Japan and India. At the bottom, oil and natural gas give Russia a prominence in
the international relations that it never had before in the post-Cold War world.
After 15 years of reforms Russian military forces are a pale version of the
Soviet military power. In 1985, the USSR disposed of the world’s biggest military
contingent, with around 5 million and 300 thousand troops; today, Russia has
five times less power with 1 million of effectives in its armed forces76. Russia has
a rather reduced capacity of military power projection beyond frontiers and its
capacity to defend the territory and sovereignty has been severely tested in
Chechnya. The expected modernization has successively failed due to the lack of
political support and mainly to the lack of financial resources, resulting in a
significant gap between Russian aspirations and the reality. Russian defense
budgets have declined, being in 2003 of 65,200 million USD 77 (the global military
budget of the CIS was around 75,000 million USD) – which means that its
military budget is seven times smaller than the USA’s -, however, this value
represents 4.9% of Russian GDP (while the American defense budget is only
3.7% of its GDP). This restriction does not allow Russia an efficient and necessary
recruitment, renovation, training, equipment, maintenance and above all,
modernization of the military sector. Degradation of Russian armed forces has
come to a deplorable condition, suffering many fatal accidents: the nuclear
submarine Kursk, in 2001, that victimized the whole crew; another nuclear
propulsion submarine, close to the harbor, in August 2003; collision between
two MI-24 helicopters during a military training in Russian Far East before the
eyes of the Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, also in August 2003. These are just
few of the cases and the most publicized aspect of such degradation, that is a
consequence of lack of resources for adequate maintenance of military equipment
and necessary trainings. For instance, the Russian press constantly refers to
electricity cuts due to lack of payment in military bases, delays in official salary
payments and malnutrition cases and even hunger among privates. There are also
reports of desertions, corruption, abuse and lack of discipline in the Russian
army. Generally, Russian armament is obsolete having at least one-generation
76 See The military balance 2003-2004,  p.336 and The military balance 2004-2005, p. 354
77 Ibid.
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delay (some say even more) in what refers to conventional weapons in comparison
to the USA. It is not surprising that Russian strategies and doctrines keep on
highlighting the nuclear weapons, their only “equalizer” in relation to the USA
and their advantage in relation to other powers.
Russian defense industries sell few of their present production to the domestic
market, so they depend on exportations – in particular for usual customers and
big buyers like China, India and Iran – to be able to sustain their production. In
2003, Russia was the third major arms supplier, in the amount of 3,400 million
USD, which represents 11.8% of market share by supplier of the global arms
deliveries – right after the USA with 13,648 million USD (47.5% of market
share) and the United Kingdom with 4,700 (16.3%) and ahead of France and
Germany (representing 4.2% of market share each with a figure of 1,200 million
USD each). In the same year Russia was second in the ranking of arms transfer
agreements by supplier, in the amount of 4,300 million USD, representing a
market share of 16.8% of the global arms transfer agreements by supplier – only
surpassed by the USA with amounts of 14,543 million USD and a rate of 56.7%,
but right ahead of Germany (1,400 million USD and 5.5%) and France (1,000
million USD and 3.9%)78.
Russian army has pacifically withdrawn from Eastern Europe, Vietnam and
Cuba and part of former Soviet republics. Instead of a belligerent adversary, the
Europeans find in Russia a partner willing to cooperate in disarmament, in the
combat to massive destruction weapons proliferation and terrorism and in crisis
and conflicts management. However, the Russian army has everywhere a blamable
behavior in Chechnya - being criticized by the USA and the EU, NATO and
OSCE and the Council of Europe – and does not seem ready to abandon some
positions in the Transcaucasia and Central Asia. In the whole, this gives Russia an
ambivalent and contradictory image: is partner but feared, has an emergent
economy but chaotic and corrupt, is democratic but not totally. This led to
ambiguous relations of western powers with Russia on the last fifteen years of
changes: on the one hand, supporting the transition, trying to consolidate Russia’s
democracy and market economy, giving relevance to its energy production and
assuring it a respectable role in the international and European affairs mainly in
security matters; on the other, condemning its internal policy, trying to “contain”
78 The Military Balance 2004-2005, op. cit. p. 359.
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its imperial impetus towards neighbor countries and fearing that the Russian
situation affects the international security – through weapons exportation, namely
missile and WMD technology; through a “back to the past”; or through a
nationalist and anti-western evolution. Actually, Western countries fear more
Russia’s internal evolution than its international policy, and their policies towards
Moscow try to influence the domestic situation as much as Russia international
behaviour.
Russia and “West” in the first post Cold War decade
With the Soviet Union fall down, Russia’s dimension was diminished as in
many centuries ago. Again it found itself geostrategically “stuck” in the Euro-
Asiatic area, but with a collapsing economy and strong tendencies for central
policy weakness and territorial disintegration. Immerse in a deep and traumatic
transition, the new Russia soon defined priorities for its external policy:
- Protect the interests of Russian populations beyond new frontiers, especially
in the territories of “near ex-soviet neighbors”;
- Restore the imperial domain in the old soviet area, reintegrating it through
mechanisms of the Community of Independent States (CIS);
- Obtain support for undergoing reforms from the “west”;
- Regain little of the lost stature, in order to be a relevant player in the
major international affairs, specially in what concerns European security
– affirming the United Nations at the international level and the CSCE at
the European level, implementing an “equal partnership” between the
Atlantic Alliance and Russia;
- Develop links with the west, both the USA and the European Union;
- Keep an important position on the Asiatic affairs, strengthening ties mainly
with China, and with Iran, Iraq, India and Japan.
In the first times of new independent Russia, President Boris Yeltsin and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, affirmed that the country’s future
should be linked to the west through its compromises with democracy and market
economy and that security and economical development should depend on a
tight cooperation with the USA, Western Europe and Japan. In June 2000, in my
report to NATO I described Russia’s initial expectations: Politically, the “West”
should treat Russia as an ally that had brought about the end of communism.
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Economically, however, Russia deserves the kind of massive aid extended to those
defeated and/or destroyed in the Second World War.”79
For that, Russian government used the nationalist and communist strategy
in the geopolitical and geostrategic negotiations with the west, trying to
demonstrate that Russian pro-western orientation needed stimulation. As Andrei
Kozyrev said in the first article by a Russian Foreign Minister published in NATO
Review in February 1993: “If we began to be seen in Western capitals as something
“unnecessary” or “dangerous”, this would only encourage our “national patriots” to
increase their attacks on current Russian policy and would sustain their chauvinist
desires to close off Russia in pseudo-superpower isolation”80. In the same symbolic
article Kozyrev also made a very important warning: “we are opposed to closed
groupings, to doctrines such as Pax Americana, Pax Germanica or Pax Eurasiatica”81
However, this Russian policy almost exclusively pro-west did not last long
– Russia suspected of the west, and the west did not trust new Russia. The most
paradigmatic case is maybe Russia’s relationship with NATO.
Russia and NATO in the first post Cold War decade
For some time, the possibility of the Atlantic Alliance enlargement to the
East did not seem to bring great concern to Moscow. In August 1993, President
Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw and showed sympathy with Poland’s desire to join
NATO, stating the final Polish-Russian Declaration of August 25: “Such a move
would not be counter to Russian interests nor to the pan-European integration process”82.
However, few days later, in October 15, in a letter addressed to the USA’s President
Bill Clinton and other Western leaders, Yeltsin dramatically changes his position
and shows his frontal opposition to the possible admission of the Central and
Eastern European countries to NATO. He pointed out that such a decision
would cause a negative response from Russian society: “It is important to take into
79 TOMÉ, Luis L., Russia and NATO’s enlargement, final report for NATO Research Fellowship
1998-2000 program, June 2000, p. 12, available on the internet at www.nato.int
80 KOZYREV, Andrei, The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance, NATO Review, Vol. 41, n.1,
February 1993, Web Edition, p. 3.
81 Ibid., p. 5
82 Quoted in ITAR-Tass Carries Russian-Polish Joint Declaration, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Daily Report – Central Eurasia (FBIS – SOV), FBIS – SOV – 93-164, 26 August
1993, pp. 13-15, in International Herald Tribune, 26 August 1993.
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account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but
the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country as
opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space – and the illegality –
“the treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany signed in September
1990, particularly those of its provision that prohibit stationing of foreign troops within
the FRG’s Eastern lands, excludes, by its meaning, the possibility of expansion of the
NATO zone to the East83.
Russia, asserted Yeltsin in the same letter, favored a situation in which its
relations with NATO would be “by several degrees warmer than those between the
Alliance and Eastern Europe. NATO-Russia rapprochement...should proceed on a
faster track”84. In other words, Russia did not see or treat NATO as an enemy – on
the contrary, it wished to move closer to the Alliance – but did not wish Eastern
countries to become members. At the end of his letter, President Yeltsin expressed
Russia’s readiness, “together with NATO, to offer official security guarantees to the
East European States with a focus on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity,
inviolability of frontiers, and maintenance of peace in the region. Such guarantees
could be stipulated in a political statement or co-operation agreement between the
Russian Federation and NATO”85.  Russia signaled to seek a “droit de regard” over
the decision on expanding the Alliance, on the one hand, and pretended to
determine the processes and means of ensuring the security of its close neighbors,
on the other. The will and positions of Eastern European States, as well as Alliance
members were simply ignored in the letter. Today we know that totally ignored
was Russia’s opposition to the Alliance enlargement: in April 1999, NATO
formally integrated Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic; five years later, in
April 2004, another seven countries, among which three ex-soviet republics, were
joined: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.
Meanwhile Russia signed the agreement in June 1994 and integrated the Atlantic
Alliance’s Partnership for Peace program; followed by other military co-operation
agreements. In 1997, joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council-EAPC (that
replaced the former North Atlantic Cooperation Council and whose name was
83 Letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to US President Bill Clinton, 15 September
1993, reproduced in SIPRI Yearbook 1994, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, Appendix
7 A, pp. 249-250.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
98 Luis Leitão Tomé
suggested by Russia), signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act and created the
Permanent Joint Council with the Alliance. But their leaders showed Russian
evident discomfort towards NATO. In December 1994, in an OSCE summit,
President Boris Yeltsin made another threatening warning: “Europe, which has not
had time to rid itself of the legacy of the Cold War, runs the risk of plunging into a
“Cold Peace””86. In effect, to the enlargement issue was added the growing role of
the Atlantic Alliance in the European security, as its activism in the Balkans has
proved.
NATO’s actions in former Yugoslavia contributed to drastically deteriorate
Russian perceptions about the Alliance. In the summer of 1995, following to
allied bombings over Serbian positions in Bosnia – under a United Nations Security
Council resolution of which Russia is permanent member – Russian Minister of
Defense stated, “We might objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear
weapons in the Western regions87. Russian apprehension derived mainly from the
fact that NATO no longer developed the proclaimed purely defensive missions,
as demonstrated by a liberal Dumas character, Alexei Arbatov: “The massive air
attacks on the Bosnian Serbs on the Summer of 1995 demonstrated that force, not
patient negotiations, remained the principal instrument of diplomacy and that Moscow’s
position was only taken into account as it did not contradict the line taken by the
United States. In the eyes of the majority of Russians, the myth of the exclusively
defensive nature of NATO was exploded”88. Afterwards, Russia intensified its
diplomatic efforts to denounce the USA’s hegemonic position and NATO’s
aggressive character – in 1996, Russia and China announced a partnership to
oppose the “hegemonic practice”, both in Asia and in the world.
But, the most serious crisis was still to come with Kosovo. At the same
time that NATO formally integrated three Eastern countries and approved its
New Strategical Concept (considered by some Russians as deliberately provocative
as it permitted the Alliance’s intervention in all Euro-Atlantic area on behalf of
security, stability and human rights, even next to Russia borders), precisely on
86 Cit. in DANNREUTHER, Roland, Escaping the enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian relations,
Survival, 41-4, Winter 1999-2000, note 1, p. 162
87 Cit in Komsomolskaia Pravda, September 29, 1995.
88 Nezavisimaia Gazeta, March 14, 1997.
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the celebration of the 50 anniversary, the Alliance started an air-strike against
Serbia due to the serious crimes committed in Kosovo against Albanian population.
Immediately after air strikes began, Russia suspended its participation in all NATO’s
co-operation mechanisms –Partnership for Peace, the Founding Act, and
Permanent Joint Council -, withdrew its military mission from Brussels, and
ordered NATO’s information representative in Moscow to leave the country. In
an official statement, Russian Ministry of Defense was very hard in accusations,
declaring “there is no opportunity today to continue cooperation with NATO – the
organization which committed an aggression, the organization which has destroyed
the agreements reached in a persistent joint search, as well as ruined those constructive
foundations on which this cooperation was beginning to form”89. Another Defense
Ministry’s official added: “NATO, as an organization that has committed an act of
aggression and a crime, has no right today to be part of European security system”90.
NATO not only carried old Cold War perceptions, but in Russia there was a
growing conviction about “NATO not being an institution or instrument of security
but of war, murder and aggression”91.
Strong Russian objections and its reaction to NATO’s campaign against
Serbia were conditioned by a number of factors, including historical links, Russia’s
political turbulence, the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia complex, its
perception of NATO’s recent transformation and expansion, and the bitter
Russian sense of loss of superpower status – the feeling of being humiliated and
marginalized. Viktor Gobarev has even compared the situation with the Nazi
aggression, in the 2nd World War: “Every country’s absolute national interest is to
secure protection against any form of aggression. For the first time since 1941, the year
of Hitler’s invasion, Russians have felt what they see as a direct threat to their national
sovereignty. The fact that the war on the Yugoslav Federation has not been formally
declared makes it even more threatening: Hitler attacked Russia in 1941 with no
declaration of war. Both the Russian elite and ordinary people believe that Serbia is
being beaten to humiliate Russia and teach it a lesson”92 On the other hand, Russia
89 “Russia suspends relations with NATO”, BBC SWB SU/3496 B/$, 30 March 1999.
90 Statement by IVASHOV, General at a press conference on 31 March 1999, BBC SWB SU/
3497 B/8, 31 March 1999.
91 BBC SWB SU/3497 B/8, March 31, 1999
92 GABAREV, Viktor, “Russia and Kosovo – Feeling Threatened”, The World Today, June
1999,  p. 17.
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genuinely feared that Kosovo was only a precedent: “Who can guarantee that, if
not Russia, then somebody else close to Russia will not be punished in the same way?”,
asked one Russian deputy of the Duma93. Gobarev plays for the same idea: “Russians
were convinced that the Alliance was not going to stop after bombing Belgrade. The
most likely candidates for the next NATO attacks, they felt, were former Soviet Union
Republics where separatist movements were on the rise. Such situation always provides
an opportunity to launch interventions on humanitarian grounds. After that, many
fear bombing will turn to Russian itself in an effort to end separatist movements, most
likely in the Northern Caucasus”94. These fears were fanned by renewed appeals
from Georgia and Azerbaijan for NATO to intervene in their own internal
conflicts95.
In the 2000’s report for NATO, I summarized:
“The main source of Russian disappointment with NATO is the perception
that the member States of the Alliance have consistently made promises and offered
concessions, particularly over the issue of enlargement, which they have
subsequently reneged upon. This perception has resulted in a widespread consensus
in Moscow that NATO’s stated intention of developing a genuinely cooperative
relationship with Russia cannot be trusted, and that the Alliance seeks to
marginalize and exclude Russia from European and international affairs... that
sough to contain Russia’s political influence and prevent it from re-emerging as a strong
regional power… Moscow started to realize that NATO enlargement would be neither
accompanied by Russia’s integration into the Alliance, nor by a most profound NATO-
Russian dialogue, nor even by NATO’s transformations into a political institution
(…) In fact, the fora where Russia has both a voice and a veto, such as the UN
93 Transcript of the Plenary Session of the Russian State Duma, 3 February 1999.
94 GOBAREV, Viktor, op. cit.
95 Georgian President Eduard Shevarnadze suggested that events in Kosovo could set a good
example for a speedy and fair settlement of the conflict in the Abkhazia and sought military
intervention from the west to guarantee the return of Georgian refugees. Azerbaijan (that had
for years a conflict with Armenia due to Nagorno-Karabach) sought to exploit the Kosovo
crisis to establish closer military cooperation with NATO and Turkey. They offered the territory
to establish a NATO base and expected the support in Armenia conflict. Azerbaijan was also
the first CIS’ state to volunteer for peacekeeping duty, as a part of a Turkish battalion with
NATO forces in Kosovo.
101The New World's Geopolitical Outline
and the OSCE, have been marginalized. As Kosovo showed, Russian positions,
opinions and suggestions were completely disregarded by NATO”96.
On the other hand, as Nadia Arbatova defended in a Conference in Lisbon
in 1997: “Russian democrats do not understand what Russia did after the
dissolution of the USSR to be punished in such a way... One of the lessons drawn by
Russian political elite... is that any attempts to be better and to become part of the
civilized international community won’t be appreciated and paid off politically if you
are weak and if you are not inducing fear: nobody liked the USSR, but its position
could not be ignored at least because it was military strong. So Russia may be tempted
to come back to more self-assertive if not nationalist course in order to revive its prestige
and power. In sum, what Russian nationalists failed to do – to destroy New Political
Thinking – was done by NATO’s extension…”97.
Russian Failures
As demonstrated during the first post cold war decade, Russia did not achieve
its main geopolitical goals on the Atlantic Alliance relation: concerned it watched
NATO’s transformation from strictly defensive organization to security and defense
organization in all Euro-Atlantic area, affirming itself as corner stone of the
European security; did not stop NATO’s expansion to Eastern Europe, despite its
clear and strong opposition; protested and threatened without success, NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo against Serbia, a historical ally; never saw the recognition
of playing an important role on the European strategic decisions, it was only
offered “voice, but no veto” through NATO-Russia Founding Act and Joint
Permanent Council. Following to Kosovo crisis, this mechanism would be rejected
by Russia as it considered that it institutionalized the principle of “19 against 1”
instead of “19 plus 1”.
Still in the European security scope, in its first decade of existence, new
Russia added two other big failures to its geopolitical and geostrategic ambitions.
96 TOMÉ, Luis L., Russia and NATO’s Enlargement, op. cit, pp.42-44
97 ARBATOVA, Nadia Alexandrova, Russia and the European Security after the Madrid Decisions,
International Seminar about “NATO’s Enlargement and the future of Europe” IDN, Lisbon,
October 9-10, 1997, pp. 4-5, text distributed in the Seminar.
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On the one hand it was not able to make CSCE/OSCE the great pillar of
European security, having former members of the Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw
Pact an equal status, as suggested in the early 90’s. On the other, having developed
the notion of “two wests” – the “far west”, or the USA, powerful, arrogant and
hegemonic, and the “near west”, or the European Union, that Moscow wished
to work with for a real integration in “the European common house”-, Russia
never truly saw, the implementation of distinct policies from these “two Wests”,
not being able or aloud to take advantage of the growing divergences between the
European and the North American.  More than dividing the “west” Russia was
looking for both the USA and the EU’s recognition of great power status and
their commitment on the strengthening of links with Moscow. Despite having
developed specific relations with the USA and the European Union, Russia
have failed its essential goals: partly because during closer periods between the
Russian Federation and the USA, Moscow “forgotten” Europe, ridiculing its lack
of strength, or vision, or both; or, because the Europeans have never considered
new Russia as part of the “new European house”, opting for focusing on domestic
issues (as the single currency, the enlargement, the institutional deepening, the
revision of the treaties and CFSP/ESDP) and on the transatlantic relations; or,
still because the USA were skilful in the management of perceptions and “western”
policies for the new Russia. Actually, either politically or economically new friction
points constantly arouse between the EU and Russia: Chechnya, access to
Kaliningrad, production quotas and wheat market, human rights, anti-dumping
measures, steel quotas, etc.
During the 90’s, mainly due to NATO’s evolution and activism, Russia
frequently accused the USA of the practice of “containment” and “interference”
policies. However these accusations were based on Russian perceptions on the
North American policy and strategy towards the former soviet area, Russia’s
external policy priority, and where it has also summed a few geopolitical failures.
Since the beginning of their independence the Baltic States have tried to stress
out their individuality in relation to Moscow searching for a link with the “west”
– Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have always refused to join the CIS, preferring
to bet on their integration in NATO and in the EU. Among the Community of
Independent States, Russia became aware of the difficulties to restore its
domination, particularly with GUUAM (acronym with initial letters of the
involved countries – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia)
and Turkmenistan, which are protected by the USA and continuously try to
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avoid Moscow’s instructions. These Russian “difficulties” occur even in countries
where they have a strong military presence and where Russian mediation is vital
for the stabilization, as occurs in Georgia and Tajikistan. In fact, every time those
ex-soviet countries try to affirm themselves before Russia, they usually do it
heading towards the “west”, particularly towards the USA. On its side the USA
promote in the ex-soviet area a “geopolitical pluralism”98, as designated by Z.
Brzezinski. This endeavor to oppose Moscow’s natural influence, specially in the
Baltic countries, Ukraine, Transcaucasia and Central Asia – in these last regions
the USA, have never stopped insinuating and supporting Turkey, their geopolitical
pawn. So, in its external policy first priority - the ex-soviet space – Russia’s
aspirations were relatively “contained” by the USA. Furthermore, the “west”
revealed few comprehension by the way Russia was dealing with its most delicate
internal problem, Chechnya, even pulling out a campaign for the stop of hostilities
by Moscow. To counterbalance the American ascendance in its outskirts, Russia
attempted to reinforce the integration mechanisms within the CIS, mainly
through the Collective Security Treaty, the energy resources management, the
economical interdependence reinforcement, the mediation of conflicts and the
stronger military presence.
In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Russia never surpassed the supporting
role level, despite the Arab and Muslim countries’ great criticism to the USA. In
what concerns Palestine, the leading role was always performed by the USA,
followed by the European Union, though Russia has been included in the “Quartet”
that would afterwards launch the damaged “Route for Peace” (the fourth element
are the United Nations). To increase its status in the region, and mainly to
counterbalance the USA and its pawn Turkey, Russia has developed relations
with States outcast of the American order, especially with Saddam’s Iraq, Iran
and Syria – becoming one of the most important commercial partners of these
countries -, and has rehearsed approaches to the Arab League and the Islamic
Conference. For instance, during Clinton’s administration, Russia celebrated an
agreement with Iran, in the amount of 800 million USD, to build a nuclear
reactor in Bushehr.
98 BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew, The Premature Partnership, in Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, March/
April 1994, pp. 67-82.
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In the Eastern Asia chess, Moscow’s power relevance abruptly declined,
including within the Northeast Asia, where Russia is physically present by its
Far East. Although by the 90’s all border disputes were solved with China, Russia
was never able to project power or influence over the Eastern Asia region. With
no adversaries or regional allies, it maintains until today the conflict over Southern
Kuriles/Northern territories with Japan (USA’s ally). Korea’s dilemmas have been
essentially managed by the USA and China “the external powers” that play the
leading role. To countervail the American hegemonic growth, Russia and China
have since 1996 announced a “strategic partnership”. On the Russian perspective,
this “strategic alignment” was also important for the stabilization of Central Asia
and for the promotion of Russia status in Eastern Asia. Although it represented a
new challenge for the USA, this “partnership” had clear limitations, being its
most visible and relevant dimension the astronomic Russian armament sales to
Beijing. In 1998, when Russia suggested this partnership extension to India, neither
this country nor China have accepted, due to traditional differences and rivalries
still not solved between them. Anyway, this confirmed Russian geopolitical
incapacity in creating broaden coalitions to face the North American hegemony,
and its reluctance and tenacity in containing and even confronting hegemonic
practices.  And the same applies to China99.
During the first post cold war decade, these Russian geopolitical and geo-
strategical failures – strongly marked by the gap between their initial expectations
and their current situation – have helped to stress out the decline of Russia’
stature and role. Being a fact that Russia’s transition was supported by the “west”
(that always feared Russia’s “back to the past” or the re-appearing of an aggressive,
expansionist and anti-western Russia) it was relatively “contained” by the USA
in geopolitical terms. On the opposite, Moscow was the promoter of strategies
aiming the “containment” of the North American supremacy, namely through
the partnership with China and the development of bonds with some “outcast
States” of the American order, mainly with the purpose to alleviate the North
99 About new Eastern Asia order, the redefinition of the power balance and main disputes and
conflicts in the region, see TOMÉ, Luís, L. Segurança e Estabilidade no Nordeste Asiático, in
Estratégia Magazine, Vol. IX, Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, Lisboa, 1997,
pp. 265-236; A Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroeste da Bacia do Pacífico, in EdiUAL, 2000,
303 pp.; and A Segurança na Ásia Oriental, Instituto Internacional de Macau (IIM), Colection
“Milénio Hoje”, n. 3, editions in Portuguese and Chinese, 2001, 70 pp.
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American pressure in both Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and to increase
Russia’s international status.
The geopolitical leap after September 11th
Coming from the soviet secret police world, Yeltsin’ successor Vladimir Putin
soon defined the great lines of his government: re-boost Moscow’s authority and
regain Russia’s international dignity. Internally that has mainly reflected in two
vectors: it initiated a new and very violent campaign in Chechnya (vindicating a
series of attacks occurred in Moscow in the Fall of 1999) to demonstrate Moscow’s
force and determination on Russian political and territorial integrity keeping;
and launching a vast anti-corruption campaign, specially against Russian oligarchs,
to sustain an authoritative attitude but also to recover Russian finances and gain
the confidence of foreign investors and international organisms to whom they
have debts. Externally, Putin started maintaining an anti-western rhetoric, following
to Kosovo crisis, and assumed the imperial Russian position towards ex-soviet
space. On December 31st 1999, on the day before his ascendance to the presidency,
the up to then Prime Minister Putin wrote: “It will not happen soon, if it ever
happens at all, that Russia will become the second edition of, say, the US or Britain
(…) For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite
the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main
driving force of any change”100 In May 2000, in Putin’s inauguration speech, he
explicitly re-affirmed Russian imperial tradition: “We must know our history, know
it as it really is, draw lessons from it and always remember those who created the
Russian state, championed its dignity and made it a great, powerful and mighty state”101.
The truth is that Putin soon realized that to undertake the fundamental
transformation of the Russian economy, it needed to attract great inflow of
investment and technology primarily from the West. On the other hand, he quickly
assumed that Russia’s international stature critically depended on how he would
be treated by Washington. So the new Russian President began to change Russia’s
attitude towards the USA, restarting a constructive dialogue with Washington.
100 PUTIN, Vladimir, Russia at the turn of the Millenium, December 31, 1999, quoted by
KISSINGER, Henry, Does America need a foreign policy?…, op. cit., pp.66.
101 Cit. in ibid.
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Putin explicitly acknowledged American global supremacy, something that Yeltsin
and Yevgeny Primakov, then foreign minister, had found hard to do. This
supremacy, for Putin, was but a geopolitical fact, conditioning Yeltsin attempts to
counter-balance the USA to be useless and harmful. By unilaterally deciding to
drastically slash the Russian nuclear arsenal, further reduce and restructure
conventional forces and eliminate two important remaining vestiges of erstwhile
Soviet global military presence-the Lourdes base in Cuba and the Cam Ranh base
in Vietnam (and all this before September 11th)-Putin was trying to signal to
Clinton’s ceasing administration and to Bush’s new Administration that he was
finally pulling out of virtual competition with the United States.102 Putin was
starting to adopt a “no contest” attitude, but still showed reserves towards a series
of US actions, such as the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the growing American
military presence in the former Soviet south and the possibility to admit the three
Baltic States to NATO. Effectively, there was missing a catalyst event, which
would significantly transform the geopolitical tradition of new Russia. That event
would not be long on the September 11th…
In fact, the September 11th brought about a significant leap in the geopolitical
relationship USA-Russia. If observers might refer to significant changes in the
world geopolitical chess in the aftermath of the tragic September 11th 2001, is in
connection with the answer and strategical North American expansion and with
the Washington-Moscow relations, that went through more radical changes in
few months than since former USSR’s collapse.
Russia’s reaction to the attacks was ready and undoubtful. President Putin
quickly understood that the September 11th would push forward an abrupt
historical acceleration, announcing a new geopolitical outline to which Russia
should adapt.103 The first foreign leader to contact President Bush – on board of
the Air Force One and just arrived at Nebraska Strategical Command -, the Russian
President granted his country total support in the fight against terrorism. While
Bush ordered the North American army to maximum alert level, Putin announced
that Russian forces alert level – particularly nuclear forces – would not be raised,
102 TRENIN, Dmitri, Pirouettes and priorities: distilling a Putin Doctrine…, op. cit., p. 77
103 See TOMÉ, Luís and TOMÉ, Paula Monge, NATO, Russia e Segurança Europeia após o 11
de Setembro, in Janus 2003-Anuário de Relações Exteriores, Edition UAL and Publico Newspaper,
Lisbon, November 2002, pp. 108-109.
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breaking the procedure in force since the 50’s. Maneuvers of the Russian fleet
and air force in the North Pacific were immediately suspended to avoid any risk
of supplementary tension104.
The firm condemnation of September 11th attacks was widely shared by
the Russian political class. With the exception of Vladimir Jirinovski group and
Liberal-Democrat Party – one of its deputies, Mitrofanov declared at the Duma
“Russia should supply the Afghanistan with nuclear weapons, as it was facing a
difficult situation with the USA”105. Notwithstanding the undivided support to
Washington, there was no consensus within the Russian strategic community
about the position to adopt concerning the announced American counter attack,
nor about the modalities of anti-terrorist cooperation with the USA.
After a brief period of hesitation, Russia has assumed an historical geopolitical
change. For the first time since 1945, Moscow and Washington were facing a
“common enemy” and Russia shows its willingness to embark on a new “great
alliance”. Few days after the attacks, President Putin announced the “five points”
of Russian participation in the international coalition against terrorism: exchange
of information, permission to fly over Russian aerial space for humanitarian
missions, contribution in eventual rescue operations in Afghanistan, authorization
for the use of military bases in Central Asia, and enhanced support to the North
Atlantic alliance. Russian leaders understood the opportunity to re-enter on the
international geopolitical game: ten years after the USSR dissolution – a period
during which the gap of power between the weakened Russia and the USA, only
superpower, has always increased – Washington would be tributary of a biggest
co-operation and Moscow had something to offer.
Some have concluded, a bit harshly, that Putin would be ready to give full
power to the USA’s “crusade” against international terrorism. But that would
mean to forget that Russia had no motive to humbly embark on an adventure in
which it might suffer serious repercussions. Actually, in the short term Putin’s
104 DUBIEN, Arnaud, A Russia e as consequências do 11 de Setembro de 2001, in As Lições do 11
de Setembro, Coord. By Pascal Boniface, IRIS, Portuguese edition – Livros Horizonte, June
2002, p. 125.
105 Quoted by KHAMRAEV, Vitor, September 20, 2001, in WPS Monitoring Agency
(www.wps.ru)
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attitude would not cost a great deal to Russia: Afghanistan was long before at
Moscow’s sight line, particularly due to the alleged support from the Taliban and
Al-Qaeda to the Islamic faction of Chechnya’s rebellion; on the other hand, Russia,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were already supporting the North Alliance, the power
they desired to be set in Cabul.
Russian leaders, that months before the September 11th had already denounced
the international terrorism (to justify their repression in Chechnya), have since
then continuously established the parallel between these events and the situation
in the rebel province. In the Bundestag speech, on September 15, 2001, President
Putin declared that the attacks inflicted to Moscow two years before, in the fall of
1999 106, and the attacks to American cities carried the “same signature”. The first
reward for their collaboration was to obtain political support (or at least a mollified
attitude) from the west towards the war led against Chechnya – important for its
priorities being Chechnya far in front of Afghanistan.
The USA have also enticed with financial compensations, such as the
reduction of Moscow’s external debt from governmental creditors of the Paris
Club, or the American support to Russian request of fast accession to the WTO,
in the horizon for 2004. Russia was also rewarded with the announcement of an
investment of 4.000 million USD by the American giant oil company Exxon in
Sakhalin 1 plant. In the height of Russian-west honeymoon, on October 2, 2001,
Moscow has even dared to sign a frame-agreement with Iran to supply armament
in the amount of 7.000 million USD, sure that Americans would prefer to remain
silent to not disturb the “Holy Alliance” – as it happened.
The major risk for Russia, which aroused bigger reserves, was to see the
USA’s military installation in Central Asia and even in Caucasus permanently.107.
Despite of inherent risks, Russia did not stop to look for initiatives. Having
convinced Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to coordinate their policy with Moscow,
Russia’s goal was not to dissuade these countries from receiving North American
troops in their territory but to pass the message to the world and especially to the
USA that their decision was made after Russian approval. Being an easy task in
Tajikistan – a country dependent of Russia for its security, where more than
106 Attacks to residential blocks in Moscow, on September 1999, that made more than 250
deaths, ascribed to Chechnyan rebels.
107 See TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, 11 de Setembro: consequências na Ásia Central e do Sul in Janus
2003, op. Cit., pp. 170-171.
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25.000 Russian soldiers are deployed – this mission was more complicated in the
Uzbekistan:  willing to be apart from Russian control, in February 1999, it has
abandoned the CIS Collective Security Treaty and organized military exercises in
the territory within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Anyway,
the American administration had to negotiate with Russia the right to lead
operations from ex-soviet republics’ territories and current members of the CIS.
The same way, in Caucasus at Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge Mountains they negotiated
the deployment of 200 special troops, near the border with Chechnya, Russia, to
collaborate with Tbilissi in the campaign against terrorism – actually, Moscow
and Washington increased the pressure over Georgia, regularly accused by the
Russians of accommodating rebel Chechnyans in their territory.
The doubling of American military presence in Caucasus and Central Asia,
in a climate of “strategic alliance” with Moscow, has clearly reinforced the USA’s
strategic assets in this vast and important region. Thus, in a “great negotiation”
context with Russia, that foresees both “condominium” in the region. Certainly,
Putin was forced to accept it with no chance of rejection.
Putin has also politically used this moment to affirm Russia as “fundamental
strategic partner”. In the European stage, this has passed through Russia’s closer
approach to the EU – obtained monthly consultations with the Political and
Security Committee (PSC), ESDP main organ; strengthened reciprocal commercial
ties; made progresses on Kaliningrad issue, important for Russian access to its
enclave after the EU’s enlargement to Baltic countries108 – and, specially achieved
a new cooperation with NATO. Enthusiastic about the sudden improvement of
their relationship, the leaders of the Atlantic Alliance and Russia have cleared the
way for new opportunities of closer collaboration and a heighten relationship.
Russia’s main goal had not changed: above all, it endeavors to be treated as an
influential power on the decision making about European security architecture.
Therefore, the institutionalization of the cooperation at “20” through NATO-
Russia Council, in May 2002 was like a Russian dream coming true and the
promise of no more “19 against 1” times in NATO. After providing Russia with
“voice but no veto”, NATO was for first time giving the possibility to take part
108 About the strategic impacts of the EU’s enlargement see TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, Segurança
Europeia e Alargamentos da UE e da NATO, in Estratégia magazine, Vol. XIV, Instituto Português
da Conjuntura Estratégica, Lisbon, 2003, pp.341-354
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on the Alliance’s decision making in subjects such as countering terrorism,
preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, civil emergency planning,
humanitarian crisis and ethnical conflicts. The creation of mechanisms at “20”
with Russia, without the existence of previously coordinated positions does not
mean that Russia may veto over NATO decisions or action: NATO retains the
freedom of make decisions and act, over any issue compatible with its
responsibilities as stated in Washington Treaty and in its new strategical concept.
Meanwhile, Moscow stopped contesting NATO’s expansion and quietly accepted
NATO’s invitation, on Prague Summit of November 2002, to seven new
countries109 to join the Atlantic Alliance, in 2004, among which there were the
three Baltic States. Actually, even Russia’s accession to NATO started to be
considered either by Moscow or by the west.
Russia also quietly accepted the file about American anti-missile defense.
Until the summer of 2001, the Russian leaders have threatened Washington with
“asymmetric measures” and a new “armaments race” if the American unilaterally
abrogated the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, but after the September 11th
they defended that such a decision “would not harm the confidence relations
established between both countries”110 being in any case for the continuing of the
strategic dialogue. Consequently, it is not surprising that President Bush and
President Putin have signed a new Treaty for the reduction of nuclear arsenals,
establishing a significantly low “plafond” until 2012 (1700 and 2200 nuclear
heads, respectively for the USA and Russia, being today still around 5500 and
6000 each), and that Moscow has opted for discretion when the USA formally
announced the unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty, in 2002. In reality, Russia
stopped opposing to an inevitable project, trying to obtain compensations such as
the maintenance of a bilateral strategic-juridical framework and the industrial
participation in the project.
After Iraq
Opposite to what happened on the September 11th and to America-Europe
relations we do not see significant changes on the geopolitical relationship between
109 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.
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Russia and the USA after Iraq crisis. Despite of Russian clear opposition to Iraq’s
military intervention – to be expected, as Russia together with France were Saddam’s
main commercial partners! -, the relations with Washington were not seriously
affected. Still with supplementary incidents – such as, the “diplomatic Russian
train” bombing, or the accusations that a Russian company should have recently
sold technology for missile mislead, or the suspects about some Saddam’s regime
members that were refuge in Russia. Actually, according with some analysts,
Moscow might even have agreed with a second proposal of resolution in the SC
of the United Nations, which expressly authorized the use of force against Iraq111,
to avoid ending again isolated. But seizing the opportunity created by the French
pre-announcement of veto and the vehement French-German opposition, Russia
would strengthen its contest to the USA on this issue – either for domestic reasons
and for international affirmation -, and took the opportunity to strengthen ties
with the French-German axis. During the crisis, successive meetings and official
contacts between Putin, Schroeder and Chirac led some opinions to foresee a
new strategical axis between the three European powers to balance the Anglo-
American axis – that, if true, would in fact bring serious consequences for the
geopolitical European and world chess. Maybe it is still early to have the real
picture of this crisis’ effects but this scenario does not seem probable.
Anyway, the North American intervention in Iraq and subsequent installation
in this country have relevant geostrategic consequences for Russia: puts Moscow
into second role in Iraq, when previously it was one of its main partners, meaning
a more problematic access to Iraq’s immense oil resources; deprives Russia of one
of its “problems” in the geostrategic relation with the USA, as the new Iraq,
finally stabilized, will not have motivation and ability to contest the USA and,
eventually, play Russia’s game; due to the significant reinforcement of their military
presence, the USA have the best position to project power and influence and to
prevent Russian influence in all Middle East and Central Asia region; and, increases
the pressure and surveillance on Russia’s other important strategic partner – Iran.
However, Moscow will not stop to seize opportunities. Besides the strategical
approach to Europe, Russia might intend to take advantage of the Arab’s reaction
to the new North American positioning, as well as of the coolness between the
USA and Turkey relationship. Turkey is Russia’s direct competitor in the pipelines
111 See RUBIN, James P., Stumbling into war, in Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003
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projects and planning of oil and gas routes from the Caspian Sea. On the other
hand, Moscow tries to benefit its international political stature on account of the
good relationship it has with Iran: first, helping in the resolution of the Iranian
nuclear program problem (similar to China’s action in North Korea), standing a
vital partner on the fight against massive weapons proliferation; afterwards, because
in a way it might contribute for Iraq’s pacification due to Iran’s influence over
Iraqi shiites. Furthermore, Russia is fundamental on the elaboration of UN’s role
in Iraq, and it also tries to gain benefit of it.
Accounting the interests in stake and Russia’s traditional geostrategic
positioning, the USA have shown much more “comprehension” for Russia’s attitude
towards the Iraq crisis than for France and Germany “betrayal”. Maybe this helps
to explain the easy and fast restoration of links between Russia and the USA. A
proof of good relations between both countries is that, during Putin’s official visit
to the USA, on late September 2003, he said to have the goal “of making Russia
the biggest oil partner of the USA, until the end of the decade”. Through its President,
Russia also declares to “be committed in the war against terrorism and in the
maintenance of the strategical partnership with the USA”. This does not mean that
Russia is not concerned with the USA’s hegemony “containment” – it only shows
that concessions and benefits expected from the relation with the west, and specially
with the USA, drive Putin’s ideas despite of Russia’s traditional geopolitical vision.
This represents a huge risk, which can turn Russia to a victim of the “floating
coalitions” and put it at the hand of the North American geopolitical trumps.
Russian leaders certainly meditate about this, but alternatives to put forward
Russia’s role and political stature in open conflict with the USA can bear even
bigger risks and disadvantages.
The Russian challenges
Actually, the Russian political elites recognize that they made a mistake in
thinking that the proclamation of a new country would be enough for former
enemies to hold Russia and did not understand that for western countries Russia
lost the Cold War. For Russian people the price was too high, and they consider
that their country was not treated respectfully nor faced as an equal partner by
western countries. Thus, the hardest challenge that Russia faces is to know how
can a potentially powerful country with an agitated history develop a stable relation
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with the rest of the world112. Although immense, but reduced to ancestral border
limits, Russia has to adapt to its new dimension and the loss of empire at the same
time it edifies democratic institutions that are historically unknown.
The USA and European countries owe to Russia the recognition that it is
undergoing a historical transition, understanding its multiple specificities, helping
it to be successful in the reforms and stimulating it to embrace a new external
attitude that should not harm its neighbors nor western interests. On the other
hand, the USA and Europe must recognize the importance of giving an important
role to Russia on the international affairs without grounding it in its historical
patterns, creating an effective system of co-operation with Moscow. For instance,
the existent consultation mechanisms and political collaboration in the scope of
the OSCE should be strengthened; NATO-Russia Council should effectively give
Moscow a voice; the EU-Russia dialogue must be deepened; the G-8 and the
United Nations must be used to elevate Russia status as great power and continue
to integrate the country in the international community.
The European integration was used to pacify Europe, promote the common
interests and the economical development and to anchor a significant number of
countries to “western world”. Later, the west used efficiently the “bait” of EU and
NATO’s accession to help Central and Eastern countries to head West and incentive
good reforms. For now, the same cannot be offered to Russia, and so the West, or
better the “two wests” need to find good incentives to help the Russian transition
in a pro-west direction – the participation in the WTO does not seem enough.
On its side, Russia faces the challenge of a non-institutional integration, quite
different from Germany or Japan’s experience after the 2nd World War, or from
the Eastern States currently.
As referred, after the September 11th, there was a significant strengthening
of relations between Russia and the USA with real progresses that should not be
really affected by the Iraqi crisis. There are comments that say “Putin has had
more benefits with the bilateral relation than Bush”113. Independently of whom
have had more benefits lately, actually in the political plan seems that Bush needs
Putin more than its Russian homologue, or, that the USA have more to ask and
112 KISSINGER, Henry, Does America need a Foreign Policy?…, op. cit. p. 69
113 GOLDGEIER, James M., L’État actuel des relations américano-russes, in Diplomatie Magazine,
op. cit. p. 24
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Russia more to offer than the opposite. Actually, Russia is indispensable in
determining issues of North American foreign policy. Iraq for instance. Being a
fact that Putin was faster than Chirac and Schroeder in the reconciliation initiatives
with the White House, it is also true that he did not offer anything yet to his
friend George W. Bush for post war reconstruction. And, while permanent member
of the UN Security Council, Russia is also decisive for the UNO commitment in
Iraq stabilization and reconstruction. Afterwards, there is Iran, one of the toughest
points in the American-Russian relations. Putin’s position is almost the same; on
the contrary, after great hostility towards Teheran, Bush’s attitude evolved for a
far more conciliatory tone either for the achievement of a “denuclearization”
agreement for the country or for obtaining Iranian help in Iraq’ stabilization
through this country’s influence over the major Shiite population. Russia is also
relevant for the North Korea nuclear program management, being integrated in
the “conversations at six”, where there is also the participation of the USA, China,
Japan and both Koreas. This means that the USA need a vast Russian collaboration
for the success of their efforts in the non proliferation and in the solution of some
delicate problems at this level. Finally, Russia is relevant in the fight against
terrorism, either through privileged relations with Arab countries or by their
Intelligence.
The Russian Asiatic policy is highly influenced by concerns related with its
Far East and Siberia viability. Kremlin is certainly desirable of maintaining good
relations with China and expanding the mutual commercial links, but shows
growing concern with the possibility of Chinese immigrants crossing the border,
changing the ethnic aspect of the region and questioning Russian identity.
Effectively, Russian demographic decline – from 150 million of inhabitants in
1991 to 144 in 2002, and as estimated by the United Nations to 126 million in
2025114 – is an issue plenty times addressed by Putin. Moscow also intends to
develop economic and other links with Japan, but the territorial conflict of Kuriles
Islands still represents an obstacle. Putin maintains a good relation with the Japanese
Prime Minister Koizumi and the Russian-Japanese dialogue is in the same way
focused on security and energy. A new co-operation level due to the North Korean
nuclear program and missile technology and the suggested Angarsk pipeline for
114 RUMER, Eugene B. and WALLANDER, Celeste A., Russia: Power in Weakness?, op.cit. p.
61
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Kakhodka – in direct competition with Angarsk-Daqin, China route – symbolize
perfectly the current opportunities in the Moscow-Tokyo relationship. Still in
Asia, Russia is trying to revitalize relations with India, looked as less problematic
partner and a surplus for the regional balance.
In a great extent, the new Russia, considering the re-evaluation of its foreign
policy, must reflect on and solve questions that have always been in the center of
its foreign policy during the 19th and 20th centuries. To start with, finding a
balance between its international ambitions and its real capacities. The unbalance
of these two factors has originated catastrophes in the past (Crimea war in 1854-
1855, Russian-Japanese war in 1904-1905, the 1st World War), and was one of
the major causes for the end of the USSR, and one can say that was also the main
reason for countless Russian failures in the first post cold war decade. Another
problem consists in the resolution of an old debate between Russian elites: Russia’s
place should be more at west or east? To these crucial questions Russia has decided
to answer, as the journalist Rémi Gamba said, “adopting a policy that might be
qualified as multipolar, based in non ideological criteria and grounded on the national
interest notion”115. Russia considers that its western policy should complement the
eastern policy, that a strong relation with the USA and Europe may increase its
maneuvering on the foreign policy ambit, or that the participation in the APEC
summits allows a role in Asia and the preservation of interests. Mainly after the
September 11th Russia has understood that its foreign policy and national security
cannot be achieved through isolation, but through a more intense collaboration
with its partners in the search of the common interest. Within this frame, Russia
is challenged to articulate its interests in all directions, from the USA to the
Community of Independent States. From the economical point of view, the
European Union represents a natural strategic partner, with whom it develops
more than 50% of the external trade and from whom they receive most of the
external economic help. From the political point of view, Russia mainly and
sometimes simultaneously plays with the CIS, the USA, China and Europe, but
also with Iran, India, North Korea, Israel and Saudi Arabia. To manage finding a
satisfactory balance for the Russian interests in the middle of such diverse agenda
represents and enormous challenge only to be achieved by a truly great power.
115 GAMBA, Rémi, Les défis globaux de la politique étrangère de la Fédération de Russie, in
Diplomatie Magazine, op. Cit. P.18
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THE USA-CHINA RELATIONS
During the Cold War period, China could be described as “a regional power
with global influence”116. Much less powerful than the two super powers, China’s
interests were focused on Asia. But as the threats to its security came from both of
the super powers, PRC considered its geostrategic and geopolitical positioning
dependent of the relations with the USA and the USSR and dependent of the
relations of the super powers between themselves. Now, making the most either
of its global limitations or the expectations and fears of the Unites States and the
Soviet Union, China would be able to implement an independent policy and gain
access to a privileged place in the bipolar system. Specially, since the beginning of
the 70’s, the time that a strange “triangular link” between the Washington-Moscow-
Beijing’s axis took place, where China participated in the USSR’s117 ‘containment’.
Nevertheless, the end of the “double Cold War” – between the two super powers
and between the two great communist powers – had significant consequences for
China’s geopolitical and geostrategic framing as well as to all Asia, the same way it
would happen after the September 11th.
After the end of the “double Cold War”
During the Cold War, East Asia reflected the bipolar structure of the international
system, though regional policies were simultaneously familiar with another phenomena
– from the decolonisation to civil wars, from the hot wars (Indochina and Korea) to
the other Cold War between China and USSR. However, with the end of the double
Cold War significant changes occurred in determining variables to the Asia-Pacific
security.
• The Soviet Union implosion – without meaning a “power void” or the increase
of the region’s instability – allowed the USA to abandon their containment
strategy, revising their strategy in the Pacific and readjusting their military
116 According to Michael Yahuda’s formula in (1996) The International Politics of the Asia-
Pacific, 1945-1995, London and New York: Routledge.
117 About the Cold War effects in Asia-Pacific see, TOMÉ, Luis Leitão A Segurança e a
Estabilidade no Noroeste da Bacia do Pacífico - Parte I – O Impacto da Guerra Fria, p.23-73; and
Michael Yahuda, op. cit.
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situation in that region; allowed China to reinforce their strategic security
(freeing itself from a heavy threat with the soviet siege) and to redirect south
and to maritime spaces; allowed Japan to stop being regarded as the USA
forward aircraft-carrier in the communism containment, permanently leaving
behind the Yoshida doctrine and recovering political-strategical ambitions;
allowed South Korea to significantly improve its relations with Russia, while
North Korea was deprived of one of its powerful allies; allowed the Southeast
Asia to be free of the possibility of a major conflict between the great powers
and to advance on regional cooperation.
• Geo-economic factors have prevailed and an improvement on the relations
between the region’s countries had occurred with visible effects on the progresses
of the incipient regional cooperation. This is proved by the ASEAN enlargement,
the APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) creation, as well as the bet in
making free trade areas in the scope of the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA), in
2003, and the APEC between 2010 and 2020. In parallel, a certain “Asian
identity” began to develop, laid on presupposed “Asian values” facing the
competition and integration processes in other globe regions and to the so called
“western values”, which shows the increase of the Asia-Pacific confidence on
the thesis that points the “21st century as the Pacific century”. Yet, the fact that
greater priority was given to geo-economic factors also brought into view new
commercial tensions, either among the Asian countries or specially between
Asian and the western countries, particularly the USA – as it is obvious in the
American relations with the Nipponese ally and with China.
• The end of the double “Cold War” has also dissipated the reasons for
regional or sub-regional conflicts and the considerations of global power,
so that the differences have became “regionalized” or localized. This means
that they stopped being directly involved in global geopolitics calculations of
the great powers, becoming possible to re-value the national security complex
in an exceptionally stable environment, due to lack of open conflicts between
the main powers. This would allow either the resolution of conflicts –
Cambodia and East Timor – or a greater opening to soften tensions -like in
Korea. Yet, this greater strategic autonomy equally opens way to the reappearance
of conflicts and differences (Taiwan, Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, Spratley and
Paracels archipelagos), to the restitution of old rivalries (Sino-Japanese and
Sino-American) and to the appearance of resentments (Chinese-Japanese,
Nippo-Korean, Chinese-Vietnamese).
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• As the autocratic anti-communist regimes lost purpose, there were significant
progresses on the democratization processes of some societies (South Korea,
Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia), and the coexistence between still formally
communist regimes (China, Vietnam and North Korea) with other several
region regimes became much easier. By the way, in contrast with Europe’s
situation, if in Asia the end of the Cold War did not correspond to the
disappearing of the communist regimes, it revealed even more distinctly the
nationalist roots of these Asian regimes. Although this situation does not
cause, for now, a true ideological conflict, it means that in Asia there is still a
vast resistance to ideas of political liberalism and that many might be tempted
to proceed in “more Asian” political ways and alternatives to the Western type
Democracy, thus making market economy and economic liberalism coincide
with authoritarian regimes and political power monopoly systems.
These changes, and others that we could invoke, reveal that the environment in
which Asian countries develop their policies is far more positive and benign than
the Cold War context. Yet, this “post Cold War new order” is more uncertain, more
volatile and much more unpredictable than the former bipolar order. This paradox
situation derives from four factors:
- Because the redefinition of the scale of powers is in course;
- There are still several unsolved conflicts and differences, many of which
involve great powers;
- There is a dormant armaments race;
- And the lack of cooperation and regional organization about security issues
persists118.
As far as China is concerned, the end of confrontation between the super
powers would withdraw importance to Beijing’s international role, because of its
apparent minor intervention capacity in the structures of the global power, as
well as it had happened as a result of its “intromission” on the bipolar balance.
Nevertheless, without the USA-USSR dispute constraints, China has re-valued
the Asian context as a space for affirmation. That would work as a lever for taking
part as one of the world system’s great powers anticipated as a multipolar one.
118 TOMÉ, Luís L. A Segurança e a Estabilidade na Ásia Oriental, Instituto Internacional de
Macau (IIM), Colecção Milénio Hoje, Nº3, Portuguese and Chinese editions, p.13-14
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On the other hand, the end of the Soviet siege – that a foretime reached from
Vladistok to Hanoi, passing through Kabul and a strong soviet military presence
along the vast border with China - and the normalization of relations with the
new Russia, that has significantly reinforced PRC strategic security, allowed to
redirect Chinese interest to south and to maritime spaces, particularly over China’s
seas.
China’s international affirmation has gone through three fundamental
vectors:
Firstly, by its audacious economic reform policies and by the success of its
integration on the regional and world trade, and because of that the establishment
and the consolidation of its economic and commercial relations with Japan,
ASEAN, the USA and Europe, as well as the increment of commercial bonds
with other Asian States and with Chinese communities overseas has become vital.
The pursue of the economic development is, in fact, priority to China, because it
is, simultaneously, a source of reinforced military power and a justification to,
internally, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party.
Secondly, it has tried to show that it is a stabilizing power instead of a
threatening one and, of being up to the responsibility of being “Asia’s natural
leader”: it has normalized relations with Russia, solving border differences with
Russia and with other former central Asian Soviet Republics; it has re-established
relations with South Korea; it has deepened bonds with Japan; it has given a
significant contribute to the adhesion of the two Koreas to the United Nations; it
has ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1992), after it’s own adhesion to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1988; it has accepted that
commercial relations with Taiwan, the “rebel province” should be developed,
proposing its integration within “Motherland” under Deng Xiaoping’s principle
- “one country, two systems”, which allowed a peaceful return to its sovereignity
of Hong Kong (1997) and Macao (1999). The PRC had also a important and
constructive role in two regional conflicts: is has decisively contributed to the end
of the conflict in Cambodia so that United Nations good offices could reach that
country, helping to make all Indochina peninsula stable; and its status near
Pyongyang was crucial - first to the adhesion of North Korea to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and to IAEA, and after to the resolution of the conflict opposing
North Korea to the USA and to the IAEA, on the course of its nuclear program
(1993-1994). Simultaneously, China has strengthened bonds with each and every
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one of the Southeast Asian countries and with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), and has joined several regional and international organisms
from APEC’s (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) – which goal is to reinforce
economic bonds between all Pacific waterside States, either from the Asian
Continent and South Pacific or from the American Continent – to the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) – founded in 1994 to promote the dialog about security
issues on Oriental Asia, that gathers from Southeast Asian countries to great powers
such as the USA, Russia or China -, going to the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
or to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC).
Thirdly, PRC ‘s recovery strategy of a greater regional and international status
as gone through the attempt of affirmation of a certain “Chinese imperial” order
in Asia and by the strict defense of the non-interference principle: strong
maintenance of its integrity and political and territorial union – with prominence
to Tibet, Mongolia, Xingjian but also Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; bet on
reorganization, re-dimensioning and great military modernization, simultaneous
to the significant and not very clear increase on its defense budgets; fierce
persistence on not submitting to external prescriptions, specially the “western”
ones; the claim of a sovereign space so wide that it overcomes many of its neighbor’s
interests and positions – Japan (Senkaku islands), India, Taiwan and the Southeast
Asian countries (Paracel and Spratlys archipelago, on the South China Sea119).
But, such Chinese whims, if “natural” and not very surprising, instill on their
neighbors great fears about “Great China’s” true intentions and ambitions.
To counter-balance the different powers before Beijing, many of the Asian
States, particularly on the Oriental edge, are looking for shelter on the United
States strategic presence. The American on their turn, have never made a secret
that they faced China, in the new post Cold War context, more like a strategic
119 In reality the dispute over the Paracels islands (in Chinese Xisha, in vietnamese Hoang Sa)
involves just PRC and Vietnam. Over the Spratlys Islands (in Chinese Nansha, in vietnamese
Truong Sa), the situation is more complex since it involves China, Vietnam, Philippines,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. About Oriental Asia conflicts see TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, A
Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroesta da Baía do pacífico, op. cit., Parte III – Principais Disputas
e Focus de Tensão, p.221-266.; and A Segurança na Ásia Oriental, Instituto Internacional de
Macau (IIM), op. cit., Chapter on Diferendos e Conflitos Regionais, p. 24-34
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rival than as a strategic partner. This way, if it is true that the new environment
was more favorable to China’s geostrategic affirmation and to the defense of its
interests, the country saw itself face to face with the grounded fears of many of its
neighbors and in a way “contained” in its aspirations, by the United States.
In the new context, China was no longer worried with Soviet Union’s old
threatening and hegemonic intentions, thus being in a better position to prosecute
an economic modernization strategy. But the “century of humiliations” at the
hands of foreign powers, from 1840 to 1949, and the level of threats that it
endured from the two super-powers during the bipolar period, deeply marked
its external relations, particularly with the United States. Indeed, during all the
post Cold War period, China was paying more and more attention to the USA’s
Asian policies. Beijing considers that the USA are practicing an hegemonic strategy.
To Chinese ruling classes and analysts, the American purpose is to stop global
power redistribution in the sense of multipolarity, in sharp confrontation with
China’s intentions.
The United States are the keepers of the complex regional balances and
therefore, its role is determining to other issues that directly interest and influence
China’s geostrategic context: Japan status  - a preferred USA ally since 1951 and
where the Americans have a significant military situation (about 38.000 soldiers);
the situation in Korea - the USA are also South Korea allies, maintaining in their
territory about 37.000 militaries and show great suspicions and even hostility
towards North Korea, a likely new nuclear power and Beijing’s ally; the Taiwan
issue about which the United States keep a unilateral defense warranty (Taiwan
Relations Act), since 1979; or the situation in Southeast Asian – Washington
keeps privileged relations with Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and
Brunei, some of which are disputing with Beijing the Spratlys Island possession.
China and the United States also have very distinct perspectives about
subjects such as the human rights, nuclear proliferation, armaments’ sale and
missile technology, the treatment towards “Rogue States”, commercial
liberalization, political democratization, minorities rights, Tibet self-determination,
etc. – well, practically all these issues were conducted by the USA and led Beijing
to be under Washington’s accusations several times. In China those accusations
were considered as subversive and as a super power abusive interference in their
sovereignty.  In fact, besides evident interest of both in keeping world and regional
stability and in promoting economical development and growth – extraordinarily
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important to the moderation of both - it is difficult to find truly common
interests between the Chinese and the North American.
As a consequence, during the post Cold War, China and the USA have set
up diametrically opposite strategies and often turned against each other: the
USA tries to keep the status quo that gives the country its hegemony, trying to
show the advantages of the pax Americana (including to China, by keeping Japan
under the American strategic dependence) – which to most Asian countries is
definitely more desirable then a “Chinese pax” or a “Japanese pax”; China, the
unsatisfied and revisionist power, trying to contradict North American hegemony,
affirms a status that it thinks is untitled to, based on its History. To implement its
strategy, the USA have been keeping part of their important “San Francisco System”
(formerly set in name of the containment policy of the USSR and of the Asia-
Pacific communism) sustaining a significant local military presence and promoting
regional balances through the increase of Japan status, ASEAN and of Australia
(remember the Australian role on East Timor).
Because of all this, China regards itself as the new target of the North
American containment, on a post-bipolarization context. In order to oppose
American hegemony in Asia, to break up with USA’s containment and enlarge its
own status, China has adopted a modernization policy of its conventional and
nuclear forces, considered absolutely vital to defend its national interests and
purposes; it has committed on a strategic partnership with Russia (announced
since 1996 and confirmed with the signature of a new 20 year Chinese-Russian
cooperation and mutual support treaty, in July 2001 in Moscow); it has reinforced
the alliance with Pakistan (also important on the difficult Beijing-India relation),
supporting its access to nuclear technology; it has kept a certain tutorship over
North Korea, helping on the development of its missile technology and eventually
on its nuclear “civil” program; it has deepen bonds with Myanmar, a state “stuck”
in Indochina Peninsula and in a way proscribed of the international community;
it has sold armaments and military technology to “Rogue States” such as Syria,
Libya, Sudan, Iraq and Iran, hostile to the USA and with which has developed
important commercial bonds; it has kept a cordial and tolerant relation with the
Taliban Afghanistan; and it has sought to develop a “strategic concertation” on
Central Asia through the “Shanghai Group”, that gathers China, Russia,
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on a partnership regarded in
Beijing as a ‘model’120.
In the end, so that its goals could be reached, China has skillfully managed
the commercial trade “bait” of a gigantic and growing market with 1300 million
of potential consumers and the mediation of the instability and conflict risks. It
was this joint strategy, indisputable source of some strategic gains after the end of
the Cold War that was jeopardized after the September 11th.
China’s geopolitical and geostrategic situation after the September
11th
The September 11th placed Beijing under a huge dilemma: the expression
of a true international compromise side by side with the USA, could allow China
to obtain advantages in terms of status and image and win some dividends on the
internal anti-terrorist fight, but that would mean to freely accept the super power
to interfere in an area that Beijing considers as part of its own sphere of influence,
without giving any special attention to Beijing’s interests. Maybe this dilemma
explains the ambiguity of Chinese position right in the aftermath of the attacks.
Expressing its condolences and condemning terrorism, the Chinese government
has insisted on the need to establish a firm proof of Al-Qaeda’s fault and of
Afghanistan support; on the interference of the United Nations Security Council;
and on the respect for innocent lives. After the 5th Article has been invoked by the
Atlantic Alliance, Beijing’ spokesperson stated that “China would oppose to any
NATO action outside Europe” and showed concern on sending North American
troops to Pakistan. Simultaneously, President Jiang Zémin was multiplying his
appeals to gain France and Russia’s support on China’s request for the involvement
of the United Nations SC, the only way Beijing had to regain the control of a
situation that would bring serious consequences. In reality, the Chinese ambiguities
and doubts brought into light China’s contradiction that simultaneously claim
120 To a more developed  analysis on the Chinese geostrategic positioning see, TOMÉ, Luís L.,
A Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroeste da Bacia do Pacífico, op. cit,, Parte II – A Evolução das
Grandes Potências, Ch. 8 China imperial ou imperialista?, p.124-160; Parte IV – The new regional
order, p. 267-282; A Segurança na Ásia Oriental, op. Cit.
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for a world power status but is indifferent to everything that is not a threat to
its interest area, on a Chinese-centric logic121.
The huge American pressure after September 11th was felt during the APEC
summit, in Shanghai, on December 2001, when it ended up making the first
political declaration, in 12 years of history, by condemning September 11th attacks
and calling them “terrorist” and considering international terrorism as “a threat
to peace and world security”. But the most significant indication was the American
reinvestment in all Asia, including the Eastern part, which contributed to redesign
all Asian strategic landscape. Submitted to unsolved tensions and unbalances,
Asia is one of the regions were the United States’ weight has greater influence
on the evolution of regional balances. The Asian scene, considered on a broad
sense, from Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, has not
escaped to the chain reaction phenomena induced by the attacks, and today is the
focus of the USA’s strategic concerns. From the great world powers, PRC was
potentially the most delicate “target” for the consequences of American
reinvestment on Asia, the “great war” against terrorism, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the “Rogue States”. To Asia more then
detonator, the September 11th was a “discloser” of the reality of power and
strength relations122.
Just like Moscow towards Chechnya, Beijing immediately tried to gain
compensations and made its thesis about problems in Xingjian, in Tibet and
even in Taiwan prevail.  Yet, in the beginning of March 2002, the USA State
Department made public a document where muslins Uygures from Xingjian, in
Northeast of China, were not recognized as “terrorists”, and stating that the United
States would not pact with any regime using the war against terrorism as a pretext
to restrict the freedom of a people or deny its right to self-determination. This
report on human rights situation in the world also makes clear that “serious abuses
against the human rights in Tibet and in Xingjian persist”. In parallel, Washington
has not diminished the arms supply to Taiwan.
121 Ibid.
122 See NIQUET Valérie, As repercurssões para a Ásia dos atentados do 11 de Setembro,  in
Lessons from September 11th  op. Cit., p. 135-152
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True Beijing support on the war against international terrorism must include
the neutralization of some of the opposition strategies towards the USA that
China has been promoting since the beginning of the 90’s. In particular those
that many times assume the shape of proliferating activities towards States
considered dangerous: from Sudan to North Korea and from Libya to Iran. On
this matter, PRC’s scope of action has been clearly reduced.  It is a paradox that
the USA had denied to stop sanctions against China for having supplied Pakistan
with material susceptible of being used in the prodution of missile and nuclear
weapons – which Beijing denies – when the American have stopped the nuclear
sanctions on Pakistan and India, after the September 11th, in the name of the
fight against nuclear proliferation!
In the Northern flank, the perspective of a “new strategic companionship”
between the United States and Russia is very worrying to China: it could as well
throw down the strategic China-Russia partnership - created to counterbalance
the American hegemony – and it confirms the threat of a anti-missile strategic
defense so harshly criticized by PRC. Indeed, though Beijing tries to involve
Russia on denouncing the risks induced by American positions on the region –
“the will to control Afghanistan will give the United States the possibility to encircle
Russia on the South and China on the West”123- Moscow has radically changed its
geostrategic positioning without consulting its Chinese ‘ally’. On the other hand,
just like the Chinese-Russian partnership, the Shanghai Group fragilities were
exposed by the regional consequences of the September 11th attacks. Again, without
consulting the Chinese partner, the other member countries decided to help the
Americans, allowing them to settle militaries on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and
have logistic and humanitarian support on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
The same consequences occurred in China’s Western flank concerning the
“Chinese-Pakistan alliance”. This alliance that laid on the existence of a common
enemy –India – was the most solid relation that Beijing made with its neighbors.
In fact, the very close military collaboration developed with Pakistan, allowed
Beijing to handle the destabilizing proliferation against the United States. But,
the President Musharraf of Pakistan regime, “pinned to the wall” by the North
Americans, immediately knew that Pakistan would isolate itself if they refused to
123 Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, September 24, 2001 (periodical)
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cooperate and could even be set aside with the Taliban as part of the United States
targets. In addition, this occurred in a scenario where India was ready to give
Washington total support because of terrorism in Kashmir. So, in the name of its
regime survival and to keep Pakistan’s sovereignty, President Musharraf accepted
a place on the American orbit – even because he knew that Washington would
reward Pakistan cooperation. So Pakistan once again became United States’ strategic
pawn, thus making Chinese support less relevant. On its turn India, the old PRC
rival, following an American support tendency, did not hesitate to try to improve
its status as regional power in the fight against terrorism, at the expenses of China
and Pakistan. At the same time, the post-Taliban Afghan regime is under tight
American and international community control, in name of stability and country
reconstruction. Even NATO has turned to that territory with a security assistance
mission – against the Chinese interests.
If after the September 11th Beijing considers its strategic situation over its
Western flank worrying, then, on its Eastern flank the rebirth of a military-
political role of Japan brings new concerns. More specifically Tokyo decided to
authorize sending an AEGIS cruiser to the Indian Ocean and Self-defense Japanese
Forces were able to participate on medical and logistic support to the militaries in
combat. And since the first day of the American-British Afghanistan intervention,
auxiliary human aid support material was sent to Pakistan. Keeping within the
limits of its Constitution, Japan had its ray of action and its intervention level
increased far beyond the previous actions conducted by Tokyo on the frame of
UN’s peace maintenance operations. Besides of a traditional economical help
role, Japan had reinforced its status on the international scene by playing an
important role on the process of making a wide ‘anti-terrorist coalition’. This was
the result of its policy and good relations with the Arabian world that, since the
first petrol crisis, is one of the few aspects that distinguishes Tokyo and Washington
external policy. Finally, the grounds of the USA-Japan Alliance were reinforced:
for example, by the strategic importance of the military basis settled on the
archipelago at the level of force movements and power projection to all Eastern
Asia (Korea, Taiwan and Asia Southeast), Central Asia (Afghanistan) and South
Asia (Indian Ocean). Once again, this is an adverse situation to Beijing’s interests.
In the Southeast of Asia, that is, China’s South and Southeast, there was an
American “return”, quite obvious on sending special troops to Philippines – to
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aid Manila’s government on the fight against the muslin terrorists in Mindanao
archipelago – and on the support given to some local countries on the control or
fight against the Islamic fundamentalism, specially in Indonesia and also in
Malaysia.
The “war against terrorism” has contributed to reinforce old USA alliances
and to enlarge existing partnerships and coalitions, as well as to significantly
reinforce the American military presence on the region. After having struggled
against the Soviet Union’s “siege” whims and having faced the American hegemony,
PRC has much to fear from a share of vigilance and control roles by the USA
and their allies or partners – new and old – around China. Exceptions made to
Myanmar and North Korea124. The consequences of these “siege” are even more
significant because they show a context of strong rivalry China-USA. The United
States have never forgotten the way Beijing handled the EP-3E observation airplane
issue, in April 2001 and the will to humiliate the new President Bush.
As result of all this, after the September 11th, China’s geopolitical and
geostrategic situation has become more delicate and its maneuvering scope more
narrow, towards the new United States strategic expansion. Despite, the Sino-
American relations have met a significant improvement since then, for a special
reason: specially terrorism, but also the nuclear proliferation and the ‘Evil States’
have clearly become the main security concern for the United States, thus
replacing the “Chinese threat” which had been dominant on the analysis of
many North American strategists and ruling classes, during the 90’s. This
extraordinary change – which oddly, seems to have passed unnoticed – caused a
much bigger contention on the mutual criticism between Washington and Beijing
and has, in a way, restarted a new USA-PRC partnership. Above all, the North
Americans have given China the recognition of a global role on the fight against
the proliferation of WMD and, of an indispensable role on stabilizing East
Asia, for example on the control of North Korea – one of the countries of the
‘axis of evil’-, and its nuclear program and missile technology. Then, it is not odd
that the United States have reaffirmed on the polemical National Security
Strategy, approved on September 2002 that “We welcome the emergence of a
124 See TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, 11 de Setembro: as consequências estratégicas para a Ásia-Pacífico”,in
JANUS 2003, op. Cit., p. 174-175
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strong, peaceful, and prosperous China”. Or, that Colin Powell, the US former
Secretary of State, has said “we welcome a global role for China, so long as China
assumes responsibilities commensurate with that role. China’s leaders know all this.
Neither false fear about the future nor the overhang of Cold War enmity prevent us
from cooperating where our interests coincide125.” Considering the present Sino-
American relations as the best of the last decades, Powell defends that “is not just
because the September 11 attacks led us to shuffle priorities, nor only because we
championed Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization; nor is it the result of
the accession of a new generation of Chinese leaders. It is certainly not because we have
ignored Chinese human rights abuses, China’s still unacceptable weapons proliferation
activities, or the reluctance of China’s leadership to match political to economic reform.
We have never downplayed these difficulties. The Sino-American relationship has
nonetheless improved for a reason that transcends all these particulars: neither we nor
the Chinese believe that there is anything inevitable about our relationship any longer
- either inevitably bad or inevitably good. Instead, we now believe that it is up to us,
together, to take responsibility for our common future126.”
The Iraqi crisis
If as a consequence of the September 11th, sensitive changes have occurred
in China’s geostrategic and geopolitical positioning, the Iraqi crisis did not bring
many changes, under that point of view. Still in the beginning of 2004, Collin
Powell said, “Today, however, U.S. relations with China are the best they have been
since President Richard Nixon first visited Beijing more then 30 years ago127.” But the
consequent international polemic and fracture has been used by Beijing to try to
gain back some maneuvering scope on international policy, particularly on the
quest of its anti-hegemonic strategy. Opposite to Russia and France China had
no specific interests on Iraq – unless like any other country, to maintain relations
to benefit from the Iraqi oil and the country and region stabilization. Maybe
because of this, some observers conclude that, like Moscow, also Beijing could
125 POWELL, Colin L., A Strategy of Partnerships, op. cit., p. 32
126 ibid.
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abstain on the case of a second resolution to legitimize the use of force against
Saddam – if China saw itself isolated and “counterparts” up to its main interest
were offered.
Regardless of this type of interest, the truth is that China conceives the
North American gesture as part of a great hegemonic strategy and military
interference – set since the end of the Cold War, more obvious since NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo and now very clear on Iraq. To a country traditionally
defendant of the non-intervention principle, that causes great apprehension: before
and during this period, Chinese leaders have always denounced it publicly. Under
Beijing’s analysis, this crisis proves their thesis. A thesis that is now more visible.
On the other hand, the military intervention in Iraq occurred on the context of
two North American strategic elements that highly preoccupy Beijing: the
pressure against the ‘axis of evil’ – about which China fears some kind of domino
effect on the USA interventions on the States that Washington considers “Rogue”;
and the new doctrine of preemptive and preventive actions  - that the Chinese
leaders consider to be an attempt to arbitrarily and unilaterally legitimize the use
of force on international relations, on the American side.
Nevertheless, China did not seem very impressed with Franco-German
axis opposition to the way the USA behaved. Or, in another way, by not showing
surprise, the Chinese leadership, not only remembered “former cases of
interference” in which, the European either participated or supported, as they
said that they expect “the same type of opposition in similar issues and cases”.  In
the codified Beijing’s language this is an effort so that the Europeans revise their
positions to face the United States, to oppose to any North American whims
towards Syria, Iran and mostly, North Korea and to prevent NATO from being
an interference instrument, at least outside Europe. The reality though is that
Beijing suspects this “Western” crisis to be above all conjunctural. In this context,
Beijing does not see many possibilities to establish any strategic partnership
between Europe and China, in the sense of coordinating anti-USA policies.
About Russia, Beijing has been trying to regain the “strategic partnership” spirit.
But if Iraq crisis seems to show the need of this partnership to counterbalance the
United States hegemonic and unilateralist impetus, the Russian political turnover
after the September 11th has undermined Beijing’s trust in actually establishing
those bonds – even though Russia also has strongly protested against an American
military intervention in Iraq.
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The always very legalist China, shows unquiet on the ease with which
Washington has marginalized the United Nations and the Security Council on
this process.  This is a point of total convergence between Moscow, Beijing and
the Paris-Berlin axis, in the sense that all insist in restoring the United Nations
SC legitimacy and authority. In reality, China, “Europe” and Russia see UN’s
Security Council as the main way to contain the North-American unilateralism.
Because of that any step that the United States give in the direction of marginalizing
and reducing its authority is felt like a threat by the other powers. France, Russia
and China have been adjusting positions so that proposals approved by the SC
about Iraq respect two principles: do not legitimize an Anglo-American
intervention a posteriori and to give to the United Nations the political and
economical leadership on the transition in Iraq.  It is the only way to limit the
North-American dominion over that country.
The Chinese worries lay in another three factors. First, about the technologic
supremacy showed by the North American armed forces during the campaign
“Iraqi Freedom”, that clearly shows the growing distance between the USA and
China’s military capacities – justifying the Chinese bet on the urgent
modernization of Defense. Second, because of the asymmetric processes used by
the Iraqi resistance who have either shown extremely capable of achieving the
American and its allies’ interests or launch “chaos” that favors the subversion
against the coalition presence on that territory. Under Beijing’s logic that can
foment its own “separatists” –Tibet and Xingiang, specially – to prosecute a
similar strategy, laid on this kind of asymmetric process, of “the weak against the
strong”. Third, the Chinese concern about the USA’s intention to put aside certain
regimes and to confront what they call the “Rogue States” is great. Fearing itself
to become in any way a USA “target”, China’s next concern is to include North
Korea, its ally and protégé, in President Bush so-called “axis of evil”.  It is worth to
analyze the issues surrounding the North Korean nuclear weapons and missile
technology exportation programs.
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The crisis around North Korean nuclear program and missile
technology
In the end of 2002 and in the beginning of 2003128, North Korea admits
having a secret program of uranium enrichment to nuclear weapons; suspended
the moratorium about ballistic missile tests; dismantled the sealing and surveillance
equipment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meant to monitor
its suspicious installations; expelled the IAEA inspectors; reactivated the Yongbyon
central and announced to reopen a reprocessing central to begin weapon plutonium
production; declared its own exit of the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT); renounced the agreements celebrated with IAEA; threatened South Korea,
Japan and even the USA to retaliate with nuclear weapons, should they start a
preemptive action against any of North Koreas’ facilities; it was prepared to respond
with a preventive attack to any military American reinforcement on the region;
and it has launched “experimental missiles” that flew over South Korea and Japan.
In short, Pyongyang has violated all the mechanisms meant to stop the nuclear
weapons and missile technology proliferation, that North Korea had joined or
agreed with: NPT, IAEA, Agreed Framework, the North-South Joint Declaration
about the Denuclearization of North Korea, the moratorium about ballistic
missile tests.  North Korea has also announced it “might not have another option”
but to violate the armistice celebrated with South Korea in 1953 and it has
suspended military contacts with the UN Command in charge of supervising
that armistice and the Demilitarized Zone. In April 2003, Pyongyang had already
admitted to have nuclear weapons.
On its turn, the United States have suspended free oil supplies to North
Korea (which reached 500 thousand tons per year) and have moved 24 B-1 and
B-52 long-range bombardiers to their military base in Guam, 3500 km away
from Pyongyang; the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO),
international consortium set within the frame of the Agreed Framework of 1994,
has suspended the construction of the two LWR reactors, that were meant to
supply energy to North Korea; and three of the major donors – USA, Japan and
South Korea – of the World Food Programme (WFP) in North Korea have
128 About a more detailed evolution of the USA-North Korea relations on the past two decades
see, for example, TOMÉ, Luís L., Cronologia Coreia do Norte-EUA”, in JANUS 2004, p. 34-
34.
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drastically reduced their donations: from 340 thousand tons, in 2001 the USA
have donated in 2002 only 100 thousand; in 2001 Japan has donated more then
half of the food aid and in 2002 gave nothing.
Behind of all the rhetoric, the behavior and North Korean threats, there is
an endemic vulnerability complex and an enormous feeling of insecurity, in a
country that has been living under the danger of eminent collapse for over a
decade: in 1995, WFP has created an emergency support to the country - in
2001, it has placed there 800 thousand tons, the greatest food aid in history. It
certainly is one of the greatest world scale tragedies, whose real dimension is
impossible to confirm because of the secrecy of the last Stalinist regime on the
planet. Besides the regimes’ survival, Pyongyang greatest concern is to avoid the
country’s collapse. In large scale, this crisis results from North Korea’s need to
have international aid using the triumph or the blackmail of nuclear weapons
and the sale of missile technology to gain financial, food, energy counterparts
and the suspension/reduction of the American sanctions. It is certainly a very
risky strategy that can become fatal, but the truth is that it had some success
during the 1993-94 crisis with the celebration of the complex Agreed Framework.
On the other hand, the strong insecurity and vulnerability feeling towards
the American pressure is fundamental to understand the North Korean behavior.
Pyongyang fears to be the next American target and hence the manipulation of its
missile and nuclear programs, not only to dissuade a possible preventive/preemptive
United States attack against Korean facilities but also to establish direct negotiations
with Washington and even obtain a non-aggression pact with the USA. North
Korea’s conduct is far more justified by the fear of Bush Administration’s
intentions then by a real intention to attack South Korea, Japan or the USA.
China’s role can be determining to the closure of this crisis, in the sense that
Beijing is Pyongyang only true ally and its national interests end up being at
stake. Mainly, Beijing tries to stop Pyongyang’s regime and North Korea to collapse
because of the predictable negative consequences to China’s own stability and
security. On the other hand, the privileged relationship with Pyongyang gives
Beijing a unique role and status, allowing the prosecution of two other purposes:
to consolidate and develop stronger relations with South Korea and increase its
influence over the Korean Peninsula, that China considers its natural influence
area. But if such purposes do not coincide with the purposes of other regional
powers such as the USA, there are other interests in China that do coincide and
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that can determine the crisis evolution: the Korean regime and system reform –
Beijing has made pressure on Pyongyang to promote profound social and
economical reforms, giving its own model as example; the North-South cooperation
and integration through peaceful measures and social and economical mechanisms,
that in the future might lead to a political unification; and the stability of the
Korean Peninsula and of the Northeast Asian, for example, by ways of a
denuclearized Korea (North and South) and of a Pyongyang’s responsible behavior
on security affairs. This does not mean that Beijing accepts the Peninsula status
quo – it certainly would prefer the reduction or the end of the USA military
presence and influence and the launching of wide reformations in North Korea.
On behalf of its own interests, China has good reasons to assume a determining
role on the peaceful resolution of this crisis. The existence of a nuclear North
Korea might lead to a significant change on the strategic calculations on the
region (and even in the world) and change the scale of power on Northeast
Asian, in the way that South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan might intend to
follow it.  If the USA want to solve the problem peacefully with North Korea it
is not because they fear a Beijing’s military involvement but because they think of
China as a moderating factor to Pyongyang thus leading to a diplomatic solution
to the crisis.
To the USA, Korea’s issue is placed much more to the level of its capacities
and less on the level of its intentions on the sense of appearing as a real, immediate
and direct threat. This helps to explain the ‘whys’ on the American persistence in
a peaceful solution to the North Korean crisis and the “difference” of treatment
as compared to Iraq. The military option is much riskier with North Korea than
with Iraq. Any conflict with North Korea would have serious consequences,
specially to South Korea. The great urban Seoul area, with more than 10 million
inhabitants and also where most of the 37.000 American militaries are, is less
then 80km from the Demilitarized Zone that separates the South and the North.
Pyongyang has at its service more than a million soldiers that are in great majority
near the south border, equipped with more than 8000 artillery units, 3500
armoured vehicles, 500 or 600 aircrafts, 200 helicopters, dozens of submarines
and some hundreds of missiles capable of reaching all South Korea or Japan with
conventional or non-conventional heads – North Korea is since long supplied
with chemical and biological weapons - and probably with one or two nuclear
bombs. This vast arsenal – supported by 6 billion USD budget, which represents
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about 30 to 40% of the North Korean GDP, according to some estimatives –
makes very difficult to set a defense mechanism in case of conflict. When the
Clinton administration pondered about a military operation against North Korea
in 1993-94, the Pentagon has calculated 4 months of intense fights, involving
over 600 thousand South Korean militaries and half a million of American effectives
to reinforce the already present South Korea contingent. At the time, President
Clinton’s councilors estimated 52 thousand American casualties during the first
90 days of war – in perspective, let us say that the Americans have lost 55 thousand
soldiers on 1950-53 Korean War and 58 thousand in Vietnam War, from 1957 to
1975). Some estimates calculated a total of million and million and a half victims,
apart from costs around trillions of USD. Because of all this, the military option
was then abandoned and even today it is not faced as a true option, but as a
nightmare that must be avoided to all costs.
International security misinterpretations and/or dangerous interpretations
might occur because the risks associated to the use of force are often compelling.
To spread the message that North Korea will not be attacked because of its military
power is the same as to invite other countries, namely the called “Rogue States” to
immediately start an armaments race that would make them immune to an
American attack. This would have serious negative consequences to world security
and to the fragile stability in some regions. On the other hand, to condescend
with the obvious North Korean violations of the non-proliferation regimes would
contribute to the effective dismantling of these fundamental mechanisms of
international order regulation – South Korea, Japan and Taiwan could follow but
also Iran, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, and perhaps
Brazil, Argentina and South Africa once again. Within a decade, the outcome
would be a world covered of nuclear States, some deeply hostile between
themselves and other with terrorist groups connections - the worst scenario of
all. Because of all this, and though Bush Administration prefers a peaceful solution
to remove North Korean nuclear weapons, it does not definitely exclude the
possibility of a military conflict. Simultaneously, it seems to hesitate between
continuing to pressure on Pyongyang to go back to the non-proliferation regime
and to NPT, and AIEA and the Agreed Framework in a challenge that might
become perpetual or to accept the inevitability of North Korea becoming on the
next nuclear power, thus focusing its attention on the proliferation Korean
activities and hoping for a better Pyongyang’s collaboration. To condescend or
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to accept the blackmail or to put pressure until a conflict bursts it is a tremendous
dilemma for the United States. Meanwhile, Washington seeks another strategy:
to promote a “power concertation” – USA, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea
and European Union – that is able to solve peacefully the North Korean problem.
Beijing has specific and direct interests and an important role that is trying to
increase.
China’s importance today
With a millenary civilization and having the world’s largest history, China
assumes today a new great international relevance, because of the conjugation of
several favorable factors to its emergency as great power: a fast economic growth
– between 7 and 10% along the past two decades; integration on the world and
regional economies, proved by the adhesion to APEC and WTO and the
exponential increase of its commercial trade; the sensitive modernization of its
military sector and coercive power constant increase, thus promoting respect
and fear amongst Asian countries, specially Taiwan, India, Japan and the ASEAN
countries and making a supplementary challenge that the United States should
not neglect; and an extremely vast population of 1300 million inhabitants with
the benefits it can bring in terms of potential power and virtual consumers.
Chinese economy is the greatest world economy star and the greatest source
of economical international dynamism. The Asian economic-financial crisis of
1997-1998, the world’s economy slow down of the past few years, the crisis caused
by the SARS epidemic (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) at the end of 2002,
do not seem to have seriously affected the impressive Chinese economic growth
that, in 2003 was around 8%. Indeed, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and
a market of hundreds of million of consumers sustain a great part of its economic
growth.  Chinese economy has a growing influence on world trade: in 2002
Chinese external trade represented 5% of the world trade, that is, about 620
billion USD, almost doubling the 2,7% that China represented on the world
trade just seven years before129.  That tendency seems to have continued as in the
129 Numbers quoted by SUTTER, Robert Why does China matter?, in the Washington Quarterly,
27:1, winter 2003-2004, p. 77
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end of May 2003 Chinese external trade had increased 40% when compared to
the previous year.
Inevitably, that situation is quite attractive for foreign investment and has
an extraordinary impact on neighbor countries, although it might be negative. In
the beginning of the 90’s, Southeast Asia was receiving 61% of the foreign direct
investment (FDI) to the developing countries, while China was getting 18% - at
the end of the decade, the situation was already completely reversed130. In 2002,
the FDI has grown 13% in China, a truly amazing figure considering that the
FDI in developing countries fell over 25%. During the first five months of 2003,
FDI in China has registered a 42% increase. According to Beijing estimates, in
2005 FDI in China will reach 100 billion USD131.
Chinese economy is more and more important to the United States, because
China is its 4th largest trade partner and source of great part of the America’s trade
deficit (responsible for over 130 billion USD in 2003). About 11% American
imports come from China and USA’s exports onto the Chinese market are quickly
increasing (22 million USD in 2002), result of the sudden increase of consumers
in China (around several million every year). China’s trade position – considering
the Chinese imports and exports importance as relative towards a certain country
or group of countries – is still the largest one on the European Union and in Asia
it is Taiwan’s, South Korea’s and Japan’s main trade partner.
 The Chinese economic performance affects the production, distribution
and the pricing of some key sectors.  For example, automobile sales in China
have increased 56% in 2002, with over a million and 130 thousand vehicles sold;
it is the largest market for mobile networks and a fabulous potential growth, since
that number is little more than 13.5% of the countries’ population; Boeing
estimates that China will be the largest market for aerial commercial trips outside
the United States within the next 20 years; in 2002, China replaced Japan on the
second largest personal computers market, right after the USA; on tourism it is
estimated that China will become the main tourist exporter in one or two decades.
China is also more and more capable of affecting the world exchange rates and
the commercial trade prices, by accumulating currency reserves: it will have 346
130 DAPINO, Catherin and LIN, Juo-yu, (2003) China and Southeast Asia in Richard Bush
and Catherin Dalpino (eds.), Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2002-2003, Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC p.83.
131 SUTTER, Robert Why does China matter? op. cit, p.78
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billion USD worth in currencies, the second largest right after Japan. It is calculated
that Chinese creditors hold about 9-10% of the United States’ Federal Treasure
on the hands of foreign creditors. Under WTO’s hat the opening of the Chinese
market to the banks and to foreign insurance companies will happen soon. In
2005, great international groups will compete equal to equal. Because of that,
home loans, personal consume loans and the insurance market will become the
most profitable business in China, in the next few years.
This economic growth has not been totally painless, since the economic
transition reformations in China also have caused: thousands of public companies
to shut down; millions of people to be unemployed; millions thrown to misery;
rural migration and a great pressure on the main urban centers; social tensions
and disparity grow; regional differences increase; corruption and crime spread;
difficulties on the fiscal system and state bureaucracy start to appear and are
unable to efficiently respond to such a quick progress; differences between local
and central power grow.  Anyway, the Chinese growth is unquestionable and
some foresee that if the present tendencies continue, China will have the largest
economy in the world within a few decades, between 2040 and 2050.
As far as military power is concerned, despite the Chinese defense expenditure
has a very significant difference of the United States defense budget (from 56
billion USD132 to more than 400 billion USD, in 2003), on the last decade Chinese
military capacities have, not very clearly, quickly increased.  Chinese eagerness
to modernize its military system, has led Beijing to acquire significant amounts of
equipment and technology, since the beginning of the 90’s, in order to increase
its power projection abilities, on missiles, naval and aerial power, for example. In
2003, China alone, received 1,000 million USD in armament and made arms
transfers agreements as a recipient in an amount of 500 million USD133. As a
result of the Western embargo on the arms sale to China because of the Tiananmen
132 Data regarding Chinese budget vary depending on the source used. Usually foreign sources
indicate rather higher figures than those from Beijing, since the Chinese Defense Budget does
not include many of the commercial activities from EPL and other expenses directed to “civil
areas”. The number that is quoted here is from The Military Balance 2004-2005. One of the
highest numbers for Chinese Defence Expenditure was pointed out by the Pentagon on a
report from July 2003, presenting an amount of 65 billion USD.
133 The Military Balance 2004-2005, op. cit., p.359.
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Square tragedy in 1989, it is Russia that supplies most of Chinese requests:
surface fighting ships, submarines, fighter-planes, bombardiers and air-ground
missiles, air-air missiles and ground-ground missiles, apart from ballistic missiles
of short and medium range (specially to refrain Taiwan separatist impetus). It is
estimated that only in four years, from 1999 to 2002, China has bought Russia
more than 2 billion USD in equipment, doubling the average number of that
type of acquisitions on the 90’s134. The same way, China has been increasing the
number and the sophistication of its nuclear weapons.
There is great concern before such increase of capacities and modernization
of the Chinese armed forces, specially, in Taiwan but also in India, Japan and in
the Southeast Asia, among others. Nevertheless these fears are not limited to
China’s neighbors. Despite the confidence in the capacity of controlling China’s
military emergence, the United States still pay great attention and even demonstrate
some concern. In 2003, the USA’s Defense Department alerted on the
consequences for Taiwan of the construction of short-range missiles in China
(450 in 2003), of the modernization of the military aerial and naval resources,
and in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commitment on focusing on
a surprise attack that allows Beijing’s control over Taiwan before any USA
intervention135. Also in 2003 a report136 done by an independent research group
related with the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), predicts that
China will become Asia’s “greatest regional military power”137 within one or two
decades, surpassing Japan; it suggests that the increase of aerial and naval military
capacities will require a sustained and robust U.S. naval and air presence that can
offset the ability of Beijing to leverage future military capabilities into a real advantage
against U.S. and allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty years138”
and alerts that “The Taiwan Strait is an area of near-term military concern139”. CFR
warns that Beijing’s option might be the use of force even though the scale looks
favorable to the United States and to Taiwan and that PLA presently has the
134 SUTTER, Robert Why does China matter?, op. cit., p.80.
135 United States Defense Department (2003) Annual Report on the Chinese military power
136 Chinese Military Power,(2003) Council on Foreign Relations, New York,  electronic edition.
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capacity to air raid Taiwan with short range and intensive missiles and aerial
means, as well as prolonged air and naval attacks140.
Based on its territorial size, its vast population, its strategic localization and
on its growing economic and military power, China has become the most
important Asian power; geographical and interest factors have made Asia the
main arena for China’s international affirmation. It is clear that China has always
preferred Asia, but during the last decade it has been doing it by promoting
economic, diplomatic and military interchanges; participating in the multilateral
Asian organisms and revealing more flexible on territorial disputes.
In reality, China has been quite pragmatic about promoting regional stability
– of which it takes obvious profits in terms of economic growth and political
influence – without compromising its security, territory sovereignty or other
interests. After a 1995-96 more bellicose posture about Taiwan that, has alarmed
all neighbors, in 1997 China has adopted a “New Strategic Concept” that
underlines the Five Principles of the Peaceful Coexistence, mutually favorable
economic relations and an increased dialogue to promote trust and the peaceful
resolution of differences. Beijing has tried to narrow economical, political and
military bonds on the region.  In 2002, China was vital to the creation of the
Shanghai Cooperation Group – which also includes Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan - and has proposed an Agreement to have
a free trade zone and Chinese-ASEAN security pact. Beijing has also been working
closer with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea in the called “ASEAN Plus Three
dialog” that emerged from the 1997-98 financial crisis.
Indeed, Beijing has been more open to multilateral Asian organisms, thus
changing the past posture that interpreted such regimes as opposition to Chinese
interests. China has become an active participant on the dialog about regional
security, in the frame of the ASEA Regional Forum (ARF), and has agreed a
conduct code with other Southeast Asian countries about the differences about
Paracel and Spratlys Islands. Apparently, China understands today the multilateral
mechanisms as a way to promote its influence, of restricting USA’s policy and to
isolate Taiwan from other Asian countries. That is precisely what China tries to
140 Ibid.
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favor while a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, APEC,
ARF, The Shanghai Cooperation Group or WTO.
China’s real importance derives still from other factors, some of them
previously stated. On the one hand, because of the crisis’ “arbitrage” around
North Korean armament program and as a consequence its influence on the
WMD proliferation activities or at the combat to that proliferation. On the
other hand, because it has kept territorial disputes with several neighbors: India,
Japan (Senkaku Islands), Vietnam (Paracel archipelago) and Philippines, Indonesia,
Brunei, Malaysian Federation, Singapore and Vietnam again because of Spratlys
Islands, plus the border delimitations on the Yellow Sea (with the two Koreas and
Japan) and on China Sea and South China Sea. Specially, the greatest source of
potential conflict is the Taiwan issue: Beijing shows willing to make use of force
on the integration of the nationalist island. Many believe that is China’s medium-
term true intention, when it is provided with other military capacities. The
importance of this issue is clear not only because of serious risks of instability to
all Eastern Asia but also because of the possibility of American involvement –that
holds a unilateral defense warranty with Taiwan, since 1979, with the Taiwan
Relations Act that, has replaced the previous Defense Treaty141.
In the end, China’s importance today essentially derives from the huge
potential regarding to what it might become in the future and what that will
mean on the international relations system and on the geopolitical reordering
of the force and power relations - because of its past, of its size, of its emerging
economical and military capacities, of the inflexibility on its national interests
defense, and because of its growing influence on regional and international matters.
Either way, China’s evolution and Beijing’s future behavior as well of other powers
with China, remain a great unknown.
141 About the Taiwan issue see TOMÉ, Luís L. A Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroeste da
Bacia do Pacífico, op. Cit., Parte III – Principais disputas e focos de tensão, p. 221-266.
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The Chinese unknown
If we try to describe China’s attitude since the end of the bipolar
confrontation, we will probably reach the following conclusion: its policies reflect
an ambivalent “double personality”, making more positive, conciliating and
stabilizing policies and attitudes coincide with another posture, clearly more
aggressive, expansionist and dangerous. But this has reflections on the analysis
made about China – referring its muscular diplomacy, force diplomacy or hot/
cold policy – either on the other countries policies and attitudes towards China
which vary depending on the interpretation of Beijing’s goals.
China’s evolution is alike one of the greatest unknowns of the international
system, making the task of understanding if China is or is not a threat to world
and regional stability and security a complex task. The Chinese unknown derives
from two major issues:  on the one hand, to know if China will be able to avoid
its own collapse, like it happened with the USSR, on the other to know if its
ambitions will turn into a threatening attitude to its neighbors and to world
and regional security.  The answer to these questions will determine the world’s
configuration in the 21st century. Because of de duplicity in China’s political
character it is possible to find arguments capable of validating both appreciations.
On the “Chinese collapse”
To those defending the Chinese collapse, China presents all the symptoms
of a country on the brink of a crisis: overpopulation, population ageing, with
negative consequences on the resources production and distribution; struggles
for power, political staff renewal and friction among Chinese CP leaders – about
how much of the central control should be kept over the economy and about the
concessions the party must make; rupture between the political nomenclature and
the other Chinese political classes that demand new roles and rights, which conflict
with CCP policies; instigation of ideals and principles opposed to the traditional
regime’s parameters, like the integration of “other Chinas” – like Hong Kong and
Macao – the contacts with the Chinese Diaspora abroad and with other countries;
increase of tensions between Beijing’s authorities and LPA militaries, with the
sector that insures the regime the monopoly of its less subservient physical strength;
Beijing’s difficulties in keeping the local and regional elites subordinate – conflicts
about the definition of authorities and funds distribution are frequent – and in
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solving differences between the richest cost provinces and the poor inner regions;
discontentment between the farmers; generalized corruption; ineffective fiscal
system and richness distribution; growing criminality; and ideological void that
limits national policy orientation. To this perspective, the most likely scenario to
China’s future is a reprise of the events after 1911/1912 following republic
implementation, when the regional “lords of the war” have cut the country into
smaller pieces and dominated those challenging central authorities. It is to predict
China’s collapse on the best possible way and avoid international crisis. And the
best way to reduce its effects will be through the progress of the democratic
reforms.
In contrast, there are many analysts that do not believe in the Chinese
collapse. Knowing that the Chinese leadership is facing harsh challenges they do
not believe that China’s disintegration is going to be one of them, because nor the
regime nor the party are more vulnerable with the economic reforms since they
no longer have problems in embracing nationalism with a new source of legitimacy
and they can even conduct that over a population that shares a common identity.
And if history serves as example, we can say that China tends more to union
then to disintegration –it is a mistake to use the “lords of the war” argument to
make forecasts about the Chinese collapse because they were fighting amongst
themselves to unify the country under their own power. The territorial divisions
occurred only because they disagreed on whom should make the unification.
Every leader’s ideal in China, and also Chinese people’s ideal is one of unification
and not division. Likewise, this perspective refutes the notion of “China’s
ungovernability”: ideological nationalism increases cohesion and facilitates the
task of working to a common purpose; relations between local and central
authorities are now more institutionalized and the established hierarchies allow
to discipline the subordinate levels; with reformations the central economic control
has diminished in certain areas but the economic growth favors and legitimizes
Beijing’s government; the collapse theory defends that the fiscal system is chaotic
but the governmental revenue has not only increased as its sources have become
more diversified. And also, it rejects migrations as being one of the sources to
disintegration; on the contrary, they will make national integration stronger because
they increase interaction amongst the countries different regions. Even more
important is the fact that migration makes policy stable since it reduces the
unevenness of regional revenues. Under this point of view, political stability is
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the minimum requirement so that China continues to economically grow and
progress on its reforms. That is why usually it is argued about the need of a
politically and economically strong central government, in order that it can impose
financial discipline and make the necessary revenues transfers. This conditions
the growth without hyper-inflation risks so that China becomes able of bearing
the pressures of the quick development and of the economic transition.
Regardless of agreeing or not with the invoked arguments it is necessary to
recognize that the Chinese collapse would throw China into an abyss and that
it would be highly dangerous to stability and security in all Asia and likely all
world. Stability in Asia cannot exist if China is not a tight and stable power.
On the “Chinese threat”
The arguments that place China as threat to regional security starts by
mentioning the fact that PRC follows the military power reinforcement way (as
it is proved by its global defense budgets – from 21,616 million USD in 1985 to
43,551 USD in 2001 and 55,948 USD in 2003 – and by the per capita costs in
armament – from 21 USD in 1985 to 34 USD in 2001 and 43 USD in 2003142),
which happens in a context that Beijing’s authorities consider as the most peaceful
and secure of all times in the People’s Republic history. On the other hand, China
demonstrates a particular interest in acquiring armament systems that allow its
forces to project power much beyond the Chinese borders and it is known its lack
of transparency on Defense related issues143. These factors allow suspecting that
China seeks to acquire a military machine strong enough to coerce its neighbors
to accept its demandings and to respect its interests.
 A second argument sustains that the communist regime’s values are hostile
to peace. Many governments, specially those of the democratic States, recognize
and accept principles as the peaceful resolution of differences, the human rights,
142 See figures and tables in The Military Balance 2003-2004, op. Cit., p. 337  and The Military
Balance 2004-2005, op. Cit., p. 355.
143 On this matter see, for example, CARRIÇO, Manuel Alexandre G. (2003) Lendo folhas de
chá chinês – uma incursão analítica sobre o orçamento de defesa da República Popular da China e
as actividade comerciais do Exército Popular de Libertação em prol do mesmo”, in Estratégia,
Volume XIV, Lisboa:Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, p. 355-418
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international interdependence and cooperation and the importance of the
international law. Nevertheless on this regard, China shows to be highly
conservative, behaving as a 19th century or early 20th century Asian or European
power, with an archaic sovereignty sense, with unsolved territorial claims and
willing to use force to solve differences and to reorganize the scale of powers.
China seems to challenge every modern liberal conception: it has an authoritarian
government that represses the population political freedoms; it holds by strength
an empire of captive people; it threatens to take Taiwan by force and practices
intimidation tactics on China’s Seas; it resists multilateralism on security affairs; it
maintains open breaches on agreements meant to control weapons of mass
destruction; and it wants to benefit from international trade without honoring
the rules. It is assumed that liberal values contribute to peace. Then in this sense,
a Chinese regime that does not follow these values is a threat to peace.
Another justification commonly invoked is related with the historical image
of China, aspiring to be the dominant power in Asia. For centuries the Chinese
have faced their civilization as the center of the universe. Traditionally, the Chinese
do not accept the Westphalia concept of sovereign equality between States, though
today Beijing constantly invokes it specially on its relations with the USA –
international relations were understood under the Confucianism spirit that
prescribed a conduct unequal amongst, in which, China saw itself on the top of
the hierarchy and the other people as inferior or barbarian. China’s role on that
order was to keep stability, gather neighboring States tributes, and to promote its
civilization. The legacy of this point of view is a very strong belief between the
Chinese people that China is the natural and proper Asian leader. With such
intend, PRC tends to elaborate a political agenda and to look to edify an order
without considering its neighbors interests, regarding only its own interests and
goals.
Finally, it is said that all the great powers are dominating and a powerful
China will be no different. If China reaches the potential level it seeks, soon it
can become a power like the 19th century Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the
Nazi Germany, the imperialist Japan or the 20th century USA. Each and every
one of these countries has used its superior power to establish certain hegemony
in order to protect its interests. There is no convincing reason to think that China,
as a great power, assumes a different posture. If the opportunity to establish a
dominant role in the region comes, China will take it.
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In the reverse sense, several arguments can equally be evoked to justify that
China is not a threat to regional security. To begin with, China wants a stable
international environment that allows maintaining the trade and investment level
that so much benefits its economical growth and political prestige. So, it is China’s
interest to contribute to security and stability in Asia and in the world, and the
possibility of reaching its aims by the use of force is diminished.
This perspective also defends that, historically and even on the top of its
power China has not shown commitment on territorial expansion or conquests
in contrast with the Japanese and the European. The common explanation is in
the Chinese culture: on the one hand, Chinese believed the outer world to be
inferior and barbarian and with nothing valid to offer; on the other, they were
also driven by an ethic code that only justified the use of force in extreme and
fair cases.  If China’s present and future leaders are influenced by these historical
and cultural heritage it can be certain that, China will not use its power to make
profit.
Thirdly, Beijing’s leaders insist that its regime is a peace adherent regime
and it will never threat its neighbors and at no time will coerce small countries.
China is proud of distinguish itself from other countries for not having “hegemonic
policies” and for assuring that it will never have the initiative of using nuclear
weapons. Even if very powerful, China will remain a benign and trustful actor, a
force of peace rather than a threatening war machine.
In fourth place, it is also argued that the continuous Chinese military
restructuring and modernization is limited, reasonable and there is no hegemonic
aspiration behind it. Though, presently they represent the world’ second military
budget; Chinese military expenses are quite low when compared with USA’s
expenses –in 2003, China’s global Defense budget was about 56 billion USD, far
from the 405 billion USD the United States spent on Defense; GDP’s percentage
on Defense has also stabilised (from 4% in 1985 to 3.7% in 2001 and 3.9% in
2003); and its effective soldiers numbers has drastically decreased (from 3.900
million soldiers in 1985 to 2.820 in 1999, and about 2.250 in 2003) 144. Still,
some argue that the cost increase in China’s Defense is due to inflation, operational
costs and to the resolution of shortage in some sectors. On the other hand, military
modernization serves more internal political interests – maintaining public order
144 The Military Balance 2004-2005, op. Cit., p.355.
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and keeping armies’ fidelity to the regime – than obscure or perverse intentions
on foreign policy.
In the end, there is not a Chinese threat mainly because China does not
have yet the necessary capacities to favorably change the power scale in the
region thus imposing a Sino-centric order.
To this perspective, the fears expressed towards China are comprehensible
because of two reasons: the rise out of a new great power is always followed with
tension and apprehension which is normal but not justifiable in this case; then
because the other States fearing their own power and status decrease do not
easily accept the rise out of a new power and tend to consider it as status quo and
their own interests “threat”.
Chinese challenges
Considering what was previously stated, apart from the inherent challenges
resulting from a fast economic growth, by the coexistence (some prefer to call it
a “historically unsustainable coexistence”) between market economy and world’s
economy integration with political authoritarianism or the maintenance of its
political and territorial cohesion, China offers a great source of important other
challenges to the evolution of its geopolitical relationship, specially with the Asian
neighbors and with the United States. This happens because the “Chinese
unknown” causes a great dilemma about what is the correct political attitude
towards Beijing:  by promoting China’s integration in regional and international
communities, other States expect to take advantages of the gigantic Chinese market
and to contribute that Beijing becomes more moderate and proceed with other
reforms; but enriching a still authoritarian China is also reinforcing its power,
increasing its capacities to threat the established order and to dominate its
neighbors. No other country is facing this dilemma as directly as Taiwan, which
is one of the greatest investors in China and the main target of Chinese military
threats. But a similar logic works not only towards the USA and Japan, but also to
the weaker neighbors in Southeast Asia.
 As China’s power increases, Beijing gains confidence to make more and
more pressure on international affairs. For now, China seems committed in
continuing to stabilize regional and international environment which insures
good conditions to the economical development – China’s present priority that
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should remain the same within the next two decades, as the new President Hu
Jintao announced. The crucial issue is to know whether China is not going to
develop sufficient power so that in the future it can choose a different way of
facing international relations – eventually a harsher and less cooperative way.
China is the State with greatest potential to rival the Unites States during
the 21st century. This raises two questions. The first is to know if China will
indeed be able to accumulate sufficient power and influence to even the United
States’ supremacy (in short term that will be the intention), and if that will make
Beijing adopt a rivalry strategy towards Washington. The second is to know if
the United States chooses to contain and delay China’s rise out as a great power
or if they will try to develop an Asian structure based on the scale of powers and
collective security, open to cooperation with all the great Asian power – including
China – flexible enough to resist Beijing’s interests. The answer to these questions
will determine a great part of this century’s international relations course.
North American policy towards China is ambivalent, since it keeps
dependent of considerations about China’s internal policy and international
behavior, (since the end of the Cold War) and because it faces China as rival and
partner simultaneously. That is why it has been difficult to overcome the mix of
cooperation and disagreement that, has been the characteristic of Sino-American
relations in the turn of the millennium. Despite having consolidated its economical
relations with China, supporting China’s integration in WTO and normalization
of USA-China’s economical relations, the United States have never defined
convincingly which frame and geopolitical part they want for China.
The issue is not how to name the Sino-American relation but to know what
is its geopolitical content. On this issue there are several variables and dilemmas.
Beijing’s point of view is that the main challenge is not to conquer and domain
neighboring countries but to keep a maneuvering enough to, for example, face
the North American hegemony, and that would allow to become more modern,
rich and with more power and influence. Washington’s point of view is that the
main challenge is not to subvert or to promote a change on the Chinese political
regime, but to integrate China on the international community, thus satisfying to
some extent China’s ambitions without letting it harm American or other Asian
countries interests.
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Cooperation relations exist to the common interests of both and to limit
mutual differences effects.  There are common interests for both – related with
promoting security and stability resulting in better trade and economic
development conditions – and issues enough to test their commitment in
cooperating:  Korea’s situation and future of weapons of mass destruction and
missile technology proliferation allow to test the perspectives of a stable relationship.
Even though China often criticizes the United States “hegemonic attitudes”,
it is not a Chinese interest to provoke the North American and to confront the
greatest world military power during this phase of development and affirmation.
That would divide Asia and would compromise not only its economic growth
and political capital but China would also have to: take the burden of a conflict,
risk to be isolated; take the risk of permanently loosing Taiwan and even other
territories; give other powers and countries of the vast Chinese periphery a much
greater possibility of persecuting its ambitions on China’s expenses and with the
United States support; and Washington would have the possibility to set a wide
coalition and a containment or even conflict strategy towards China. What are
the advantages of a conflict strategy without capacities to win it? What would
China win with such conflict, unless the United States left no other choice? Such
risks can only be taken if China considerably increases its power and/or if its
interests are seriously harmed by the United States.
No matter how much the Americans fear Chinese attempts to dominate
Asia, the USA should calculate the risks of instigating Chinese nationalism. To
confront China would compromise American’s main interests in Asia, namely
those related with the economic development, regional stability and security. It is
obvious that as China is developing its “overall national strength” its power will
become a more significant challenge. Nevertheless, the United States have
diplomatic, political, strategic, economic and military advantages that permit many
other options without entering into conflict with China. Unless Beijing leaves no
alternative, what would the USA win with a confront strategy? On the other
hand, to prevent China’s rise out using containment mechanisms like those used
against the USSR during the Cold War not only would exacerbate Chinese
nationalist spirit but could also turn against itself several Asian countries – besides
seriously compromising a fight against terrorism, the WMD proliferation and
the “evil States”, because in such scenario China would do anything to break the
containment set against it.
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It would be nationalism and not communism to lead China into confront
with the United States, because of the global hegemony in Asia, on account of
Taiwan.  The sensitive Taiwan affair is deeply symbolic because it has to do with
China’s unity and with the defense warranty offered by the United States. But it
is also geopolitical and geo-strategic in the sense that it relates with the power
balance in East Asia and with China’s power projection and influence into the
Pacific Ocean and China’s Seas. The Taiwan affair is, since the proclamation of
the People’s Republic, the most complicated problem on the United States-China
relations. It fits in the category of the problems without a close solution and that
degenerate explosively.  That is why the challenge consists in living with a problem
that should be lightened but that cannot be solved. The nature of the problems is clear
and the self-control it imposes on all parts is even clearer.145 If Taiwan – definitely
stating its independence towards motherland - stops its contention and disturbs
the tacit agreement that has kept peace it will be a casus belli that most likely will
make an unpredictable conflict burst, with very negative consequences to the
island. If Beijing tries unification using military coercion Taiwan will furiously
resist and an American intervention will likely follow – with the inherent escalating
risks. If Washington formally renounces of the “United China” principle a military
conflict is likely to develop. This means that Taiwan will continue to be a ghost
state that in fact exists but that is not in the community of nations. However, the
alternatives are too risky and to the involved parts is better to prevent the worsening
of the problem.
Though, a permanent threat of conflict and the cyclic crisis, the Taiwan
affair has a different shape from the past. Taipei has long abandoned the pretension
of representing all China as it did until the 70’s (to be remembered that only in
1971 People’s Republic of China replaced Taiwan/Republic of China in the United
Nations and right after as a permanent member of the Security Council), now
looking for the international recognition and direct negotiations between equal
parts with China. On its turn, Beijing holds the “three maintenance policy” - to
maintain the diplomatic blockade, maintain military pressure and maintain
commercial bonds -, offering a peaceful integration based in the ‘one country,
two systems’ principle (the same principle used with Macao and Hong Kong) and
simultaneously threatening to use force if necessary in order to promote its
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unification. Either way, Beijing refers to Taiwan more often has one of the two
separate components of China instead of the usual rhetoric about the “renegade
province”. Commercial relationships are growing stronger and trips and contacts
between the two sides are more often. Anyway, the danger of a conflict is real and
many situations can become “the last straw”. Recently, after Taiwan’s president
Chen Shui-Bian has been re-elected stating the intention to make Taiwan adopt a
new Constitution in 2008 – attitude that China regards as formal declaration of
independence – Beijing made again a force demonstration in Hong Kong – the
greatest since the integration in 1997 of the Special Administrative Region, with
8 war ships – to warn the nationalist island: ‘We, the People’s Liberation Army are
always on call, … If necessary, we have the ability to preserve the stability of the
Taiwanese political situation’146 said the Yao Xingyuan fleet’s Vice-Admiral.  Taiwan
is much likely the greatest challenge in the United States-China’s relation - and
it should continue to be. But it is also Taiwan that can calibrate with greatest
precision the relationship and cooperation level in the Sino-American relations.
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PART III
THE WORLD WAR AGAINST TERROR
“The story of the human race is war. Except for brief and precarious interludes,
there has never been peace in the world”
Winston Churchill
For many centuries, the conflicts occurred specially between monarchs –
emperors, kings or princes, tsars, sultans, caliphs or mandarins – who were trying
to expand their power and specially, preserve or increase their domains to other
territories and populations. Even after the coming of the modern international
system with the Peace of Westphalia, that pattern has not been changed. Meanwhile
the national States have consolidated and with the French Revolution the
attachment to the King was replaced by the attachment to the Nation.  In
1793, R.R. Palmer said that ‘wars amongst kings ended; began wars amongst people’.
Then, the Congress of Vienna in 1815, or the second Peace of Westphalia, did
not establish different rules or motivations, it only consecrated the alliance of the
traditional powers which would - in the name of the dynastic-imperial solidarity
- last until the First World War. After that, as a result either of the Russian
Revolution and of the reactions against it or the political and social-economic
post-war situation, the conflict between nations assumed a strongly ideological
aspect: first between Communism, Nazi-fascism and Democracy; than, after
WWII, between Communism and Liberal Democracy embodied in the two
superpowers during the Cold War.
Such as in previous occasions – Westphalia, Congress of Vienna, post- World
War I and post-Second World War – also in the end of the Cold War the definitive
end of war was also longed for as a conditioning element of international
relations. In the beginning of the 90’s there was a great hope and conviction that
never again a conflict between great powers or a world war would occur – if such,
then the ‘wars’ would be perfectly localised and related with phenomena emerging
again, such as nationalisms, separatisms and ethnical and religious extremisms,
besides the conflicts related with resources, specially oil, natural gas and water. In
the last decade of the 20th century, a new geography and a new typology of
conflicts has been much discussed and analysed, with the international community
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and the main international regulation mechanisms committing themselves mainly
on the crisis and conflicts management (previously regarded as secondary).
Though the likeliness of a military conflict between the great powers remained
low, a decade after the end of the bipolar clash not only a new pattern of conflict
has emerged (asymmetric wars), but specially a new world war against “terror”.
That is, the new type of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the “Evil States”.
AL QAEDA’S DECLARATION OF WAR
During the first post Cold War decade, the West grew confident on the
illusion that external threats had virtually disappeared, and that the dangers
now had essentially economic and social origin. Simultaneously, the decrease of
terrorist actions, particularly airplane hijacks, caused many entities responsible
for the fight against terrorism to lower down their surveillance; by the end of the
confrontation between the great powers the task of making a new replacing strategy
was a complex one.
Meanwhile, terrorist groups were appearing and proliferating which
threatened democracies and the regimes of “moderate” pro-West Muslin
countries. These threats were not motivated by the rivalry between superpowers,
nor helped by the secret services of those that neither were behind the Iron Curtain,
nor commanded by policies of specific States. They tended to be based on a
fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, instead of the class struggle, the anti-
colonialism or the anti-imperialism they intended to act against the Western
powers and influences.  These threats embodied in the new terrorist groups,
whose motivations were hard to understand because they were not included in
standard patterns. They were enlisting the great majority of its members based
on a profound hatred towards the West and on the anger, ignorance and despair
present in the middle of “moderate” Arabian regimes, supported by the West.
One of those groups was the Al Qaeda (The Base), founded in 1989 by
Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi millionaire that planned to set a vast pre-medieval
caliphate that could extend from the Middle East and Central Asia to Pakistan
(the reason why Osama claims the title of emir), with a fundamentalist political-
religious-social program, very close to the Taliban’s “program” and their version
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of the charia. Bin Laden was well known to the United States, which had worked
with him in Afghanistan in the fight against the soviets during the 80’s147. But the
threat that he and his group composed revealed only gradually.  From the anti-
Soviet resistance, Al Qaeda started to demand the retreat of either the American
soldiers from Saudi Arabia and Israel from Palestine, later proceeding to total war,
becoming on a flexible, multi-cause terrorist group. Bin Laden, himself, and Al
Qaeda changed goals as time passed.
During the first half of the 90’s the main Al Qaeda’s target were American
soldiers and the pro-Western Arabian regimes – specially the American troops in
Saudi territory, after the Gulf War, was regarded by Bin Laden and by many
Muslims as treason and profanation of Islam sacred place, forbidden to non
believers. In the first appeal to a holy war, in 1992, Bin Laden was encouraging
followers to attack either the American soldiers in Saudi Arabia and in the
Horn of Africa and the “non Islamic governments of the muslim countries”. In
that appeal he hardly mentioned Palestine. In 1993, Islamic fundamentalists
connected to Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center. Because of the American
pressure and because he had become excessively de-stabilizing, in 1994 Saudi
Arabia withdrew Bin Laden’s nationality and the family repudiated him.
In the early 90’s, Bin Laden redirects his fight and clearly aims at the United
States, Israel and the West in general. In October 1996, he made a new declaration
of Jihad appealing to the martyr of Americans “to expel the Satan troops of the holy
places of Islam”. The document, with more than 40 pages, catalogued the atrocities
and the injustice made against Muslims, especially by the Jewish and the Western
powers. In that same year, a bomb attack against general Khobar Towers’
headquarters, in Saudi Arabia, killed nineteen Americans. In 1997, in an interview
with Robert Frisk, journalist of The Independent, Bin Laden confirmed the war
declaration against the United States:  “the war against America is simpler then the
war against the USSR. Some of our men have fought against Americans in Somalia
147 Born in 1957 and graduated in 1979 in engineering in Jeddah (near Mecca and Medina,
Islam holy cities), heir of one of the most important financial clans of Saudi Arabia – the Bin
Ladens of puritan wahabits, next to Saudi’s Home and members of the Arabian elite -, Osama
Bin Laden was one of the few “princes” that, moved by a militant pan-Islamism, left in 1979 to
the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets. Turkin bin Faiçal, brother to the king and chief of the
Saudi secret services (until August 2001), would have introduced Bin Laden to the CIA agents,
in Istanbul who were preparing the anti-Soviet resistance.
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and were amazed with their moral weakness. With the help of God we will make
America a shade of what it is …”148.
The fundamentalist Islamic threat continued to grow as Al Qaeda was
integrating more and more militants running from the Arabian repression. That
increased the number of members and diversified its financial and logistic support
sources; fused other groups in its own net; outspread its men and its cells all over
the world, from the former Soviet republics, to the United States, from the
Southeast Asia to Middle East, from Europe to inner Africa; spread its message of
hatred to the West and redefined as main targets the lives and Western interests,
as well as the Arabian and Muslim traitors; and intertwines with the Taliban in
Afghanistan,  country led by Mohammad Omar “the commander of the believers”,
(friend with Bin Laden since the anti-Soviet Jihad) and that hosted Al Qaeda
since the middle of the 90’s.
Osama Bin Laden became the main Jihad’s banker and instigator against
“the alliance of crusaders, Zionists and their collaborators”, representing to the pan-
Islamic nationalism the “Old of the Mountain”, the dread of the 11th century
crusaders, who send their hashishim (assassins) to kill the enemies of faith wherever
they were – a legendary hero made real149. And Al Qaeda started to include in its
orbit other fundamentalist Islamic groups, such as the Saudi Islamic Renewal
Movement, the Egyptians Islamic Jihad and Al Gama’at Islamiya, the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan and later the Chechen resistance, Bangladesh Jihad
Movement, the Ansar al Islam, based specially on Iraq and Europe, the groups
Abu Syyaf, Laskar Jihad, Jemaah Islamiya, Moro Front of the Islamic liberation
of Philippines, Kumpulns Mujahedine Malaysia, on the Southeast Asia, several
Pakistan jihadian groups and many other. Initially, these groups had their own
purposes, causes and motivations that became adapted and fused within Al
Qaeda, many times as a way to survive but also in the name of a fundamentalist
interpretation of Islam, of an hatred to the Jewish and the Western and of the
Muslim defense.
That was what happened for example with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).
Their original purposes were to fight the oppressive secular leaders of Egypt,
148 MENDES, Maria João, Bin Laden, a Al-Qaeda e o trilho saudita na nova Jihad global, in
Janus 2002- Anuário de Relações Exteriores, Edited by Observatório de Relações Exteriores of
UAL and Publico newspapper , 2001, p.17
149 Ibid.
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turning the country into an Islamic State. But the group started to decline when
its leader, Sheik Omar Abdel Raahman was arrested in the United States and
other EIJ’s leaders were killed or forced to exile. That is why, in the beginning of
the 90’s, Aymari al-Zawahiri decided to reorient himself from the “near enemy”
– the secular rulers of Egypt - to the “distant enemy”, specially the United States
and other Western countries150.  This change allowed EIJ to broaden its
collaboration with other terrorists who wanted to hit West and receive financial
and logistic support from Al Qaeda. As counterpart of the financial aid, Al-Zawahiri
has contributed with about 200 loyal, disciplined and well trained followers that
would become the heart of Al Qaeda leadership and where several members of
the “Shura” came from (Shura is Al Qaeda’s top organ right next to the emir Bin
Laden), and made by members of other terrorist groups.
Another group that has evolved on its initial purposes and has fused into Al
Qaeda was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  Its founding mission
was to oppose the corrupt and repressive post-Soviet dictator, Islam Karimov. But
soon, it would make an alliance with the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar and after
with Al Qaeda, assuming the anti-Western and anti-American agenda, also
condemning music, cigarettes, sex and alcohol – in a new puritanism that has
decreased the support of the original IMU’s supporters, less extremist and less
ideological, in Uzbekistan.
In February 1998, in an evident maneuver to expand his network, Bin
Laden created the International Islamic Front (IIF) to the Jihad against Jewish
and Crusaders, on a scheme of formal alliances with other radical Islamic groups.
Apart from Bin Laden’s groups and Al Zawahiri, the IIF members include the
leaders of Egyptian Gama’a al Isalamya, the general secretary of the Pakistan
religious party, known as Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Bangladesh Jihad
Movement Leader. Later, IIF would include the leadership of the Pakistan pro-
Jihad organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan. Apart from these formal alliances, Bin Laden’s network has also developed
connections with a great variety of groups spread around the world – in some
cases, Al Qaeda has supported these allies by directing them and by giving financial
support; in other cases the groups have shared fields, operations and logistics.
The Al Qaeda became a powerful conglomerate, promoter, and supporter of other
150 See STERN, Jessica, The Protean Enemy, in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003, web edition.
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groups, besides working as a kind of franchising. Likewise, bonds with Palestinian
groups become stronger, particularly the Hezbollah, considered as “the most
sophisticated terrorist group in the world”151, based in the south of Lebanon, back
supported by Syria and Iran and very active in the Paraguay-Brazil-Argentina
triangle. Iran will insure the co-ordination with the Hamas and the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad.
The influence of the radical Al Qaeda’s message and the Islamic myth around
Bin Laden kept spreading. In less then a decade, Al Qaeda has become a gigantic
and powerful pan-Islamic, fundamentalist and radical octopus; a complex
network of terrorist groups and individuals, a battalion of believers that wanted
to fight the regimes of their own countries as much as to destroy the Christian
West and Jews. Their militants come from all the Arabian countries and from all
the Muslim populations moving around the globe in dozens of States.
In February 1998, Osama Bin Laden has issued a fatwa against the United
States, exhorting to a holy war and declaring every American as a legitimate
target - specially, he appealed the “believers” to attack civilians (purpose that
would have had the opposition of some Al Qaeda’s members, who have abandoned
the group152). A little later, in August that year, Al Qaeda’s terrorists driving trucks
loaded with explosives made themselves explode by hitting American embassies
in Tanzania and Kenya. At this point, the United States (involved in the political
turbulence caused by the Bill Clinton/Monica Lewinski affair) have decided to
strongly retaliate, with cruise missiles shot against the Al Qaeda’s training fields in
Afghanistan (Bin Laden has made a tight escape) and against the Al-Shifa’s
pharmaceutical products factory, in Sudan, suspected of producing components
to weapons of mass destruction, financed by Bin Laden (these suspects were never
conclusively confirmed). In October 2000, the American war ship USS Cole
was attacked by suicidal terrorists on the port of Aden, Yemen. This time,
Washington did not immediately retaliate, but the campaign against Al Qaeda
and against terrorism continued to be based essentially in information services, in
judicial actions and in secret operations…until September 2001.
In a new appeal to a Jihad, delivered to the Arabian Qatar Al Jazeera
television, on October 7th, 2001, coincident with the beginning of the American
bombings on Afghanistan, Bin Laden tried to turn the war against terrorism,
151 Ibid.
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declared by the United States, after the September 11th attacks, into a war between
Islam and the West. To do so, he has emphasized elements commonly used by
the Muslim populations such as Israelite occupation of Palestinian lands, the
suffering of the Iraqi children because of the United Nations’ sanctions and the
many humiliations inflicted on Muslims by the Western. To defend Islam with
pride and dignity and to end humiliations, the true Muslims should pick up
weapons and use all type of violence against the Western crusaders, especially
against the United States.
THE SEPTEMBER 11TH AND THE DECLARATION OF
“WAR AGAINST TERRORISM”
“But on the September 11th, 2001 everything changed. The September 11th has
radically changed American policy, which as abandoned isolationism, sketched in the
beginning of Bush Administration in turn to a new interventionism based on “the
war against terrorism”. This American interventionism did not meant the return to
Clinton’s “olimpianism”(even so interrupted by some inconsequent attacks against Al
Qaeda in Sudan), but to a more aggressive posture in which the national American
interest had a predominant part and a prevailing interventionist attitude”
José Pacheco Pereira, Público newspaper, May 20th, 2004153
Though it had been declared before – by words and by actions - by the Bin
Laden’s Al Qaeda, this new world war began with the terrorist attack on the day
11th of September 2001. It was a dramatic human tragedy, broadcasted live
worldwide, but has unquestionably marked a turning point in international
relations and in the world’s geopolitical panorama. America realized not only
that it was a target, but above all that is was vulnerable within its own territory-
“America is no longer protected by vast oceans”154, George Bush would declare – and
it was ready to counter-attack. The United States have experienced before the
cruel taste of terrorism, but that was usually directed to external facilities and its
153 PEREIRA, José Pacheco, Podem hoje as democracias conduzir a uma guerra?(2), in Público
newspapper, May 20, 2004.
154 BUSH, President George W., State of the Union Speech. January 29, 2002. Available at
www.whitehouse.gov/
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impact was essentially symbolic, never questioning the American’s integrity in
their own territory. Before the September 11th, the American response mainly
included some condemnations, some disperse raids and criminal prosecution of
the responsible caught. But the attacks against the World Trade Center and against
the Pentagon were both highly symbolic and perpetrated into the heart of the
world’s greatest military power in history, being also a new challenge to international
security and to the democratic societies’ way of life. The American Administration
immediately abandoned isolationism assuming a new interventionism to respond
to the greatest strategic challenge since the end of the Cold War.
The September 11th was also an attack against humanity and against all
West in particular, an idea well expressed by the French newspaper Le Monde:
“We are all Americans”. Either the United States’ allies or the international
community have assumed an unprecedented combat against this type of
terrorism. At the same time, fearing that these groups could unleash more deadly
means, that combat would involve a much greater commitment on the non
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as a higher and less tolerant
pressure on those States and regimes that would sponsor or support either
terrorism or WMD proliferation. This new challenge was, since the beginning
described as a war - a different kind of war, for sure, but a truly global one in
which it is essential to triumph. The enemies are the terrorist groups and all their
supporters, as well as those who take part in proliferation activities.
September 11th attacks marked the beginning of the “first war of the 21st
century”, according to President George W. Bush. On the Address to the Nation
by the end of the day September 11th 2001, the US President stated ”America
and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world
and we stand together to win the war against terrorism”155 and warned: “We will
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those
who harbor them.”156. On a context profoundly marked by terror and by tragedy,
on the following days formal declarations would follow, repudiating terrorism
and in many cases showing willingness to fight the war against terrorism, since
countries like Russia, China, Pakistan, India or Saudi Arabia to entities such as
155 BUSH, President George W., Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,
September 11, 2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/
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the United Nations, the European Union, OSCE, IAEA, APEC, G-8, the Islamic
Conference Organization, the Community of Independent States, the Arab League,
etc. On that day, the Atlantic Alliance stated that such acts “underscore(s) the
urgency of intensifying the battle against terrorism, a battle that the NATO countries
- indeed all civilized nations - must win. All Allies stand united in their determination
to combat this scourge.”157 On the morning of September 12th, in a meeting with
the National Security Team, Bush was more explicit in the way he was facing the
attacks: ‘The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against
our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.(…) Freedom
and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know that we’re facing
a different enemy than we have ever faced. (…) The United States of America will use
all our resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be patient, we
will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination. This battle will take
time and resolve. But make no mistake about it: we will win. (…) This will be a
monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail.”158. On the day after
the attacks, NATO was equally treating these attacks as an act of war, invoking
for the first time in its half century history the famous automatic collective
defense clause: “The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was
directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack
against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all.”159. Also the Security Council of the United Nations has
adopted on its 4370th meeting, held on September 12th, the Resolution 1368
(2001), where it is stated: “Determined to combat by all means threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts, recognizing the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter (…) Expresses its readiness
to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
and to combat all forms of terrorism”160
After the Senate had authorized on September 14, 2001, the use of whatever
necessary force against the involved, the President of the United States would say
157 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, September 11, 2001, www.nato.int/
158 BUSH, President George W., Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National
Security Team, The Cabinet Room, September 12, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/
159 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, September 12, 2001, www.nato.int/
160 Security Council Resolutions available at www.un.org/ (bold by the author)
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“War was declared”. Also on that day, in a speech at the Episcopal National
Cathedral, in Washington, George W. Bush has stated:  “Just three days removed
from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history, but our responsibility
to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has
been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but
fierce when stirred to anger. This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of
others; it will end in a way and at an hour of our choosing”.161
The most sustained war declaration would occur, though, on the presidential
speech in Congress, on September 20, 2001. On that occasion, the President of
the United States assumed not only a state of war but also clearly identified his
enemies: “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war
against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have
been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the
casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans
have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was
brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where
freedom itself is under attack. (...) Americans are asking, “Who attacked our country?”
The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist
organizations known as Al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted for bombing
American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS
Cole. Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. (…) This group and its leader,
a person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different
countries. (…) There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They
are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in
places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent
back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and
destruction. The leadership of Al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports
the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan we see Al
Qaeda’s vision for the world.”162 In sequence, Bush launched an ultimate to the
Afghan Taliban: “the United States of America makes the following demands on the
Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide
161 BUSH, President George W., Washington DC (Episcopal National Cathedral), September
14, 2001. Bold by the author.
162 BUSH, President George W., Address To A Joint Session Of Congress and the American People,
United States Capitol, Washington DV, September 20, 2001, at www.whitehouse.gov
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in your land.  Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have
unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your
country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure
to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps,
so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to
negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will
hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate.”163 Bush was committed
to show that he does not confound the Islamic radicals with the common Muslim
and Arabian, emphasizing: “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends.
It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and
every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but
it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped and defeated” 164. And he appealed to the international community
saying: “This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just
America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the
fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every
nation to join us.”165. Questioning about the way the Americans would face and
win this war, Bush stated: “Our response involves far more than instant retaliation
and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign
unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV
and even covert secret operations in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn
them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no
rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.”166About
to finish, Bush dramatizes and makes his speech more radical, making pressure
to the rest of the world to take his side. None “non-alignment” would be possible:
“Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or
you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to
harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”167
163 Ibid.
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More than just rhetoric, these words were definitely inaugurating a new
“great war”, with the entire world as a “combat stage”. The opponents are the
new asymmetric actors that use old processes and create a new paradigm of conflict:
the asymmetric war.
ASYMMETRY, ASYMMETRIC WAR AND ASYMMETRIC ACTORS
The tragic success of the suicidal-attacks on September 11th, 2001, as well
as many other acts perpetrated a little all over the world (from Bali to Madrid,
Riade, Casablanca or Groznyy, from Afghanistan or Turkey to Iraq), have re-
launched the debate about the information services efficiency and about security
schemes against a new threat typology.  The unquestionable success of the military
campaigns led by the United States on the Gulf War, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in
Afghanistan and Iraq, show how the American armed forces are invincible against
traditional opponents. But, if it is impossible to defeat the United States when
they are using all their capacities – there is no State or coalition that can rival the
hyper-power – its opponents can look for means to avoid frontal and symmetric
confront instead, as a way to reach their purposes. Americans have felt before the
difficulties of fighting asymmetric actors, in Vietnam for example, in Lebanon168
or in Somalia. In the present context, even the same significant reinforcement of
security measures since the September 11th in most countries and as well as a
much tighter surveillance on suspicious movements and activities, do not prevent
nor the existence of attacks nor asymmetric actors determination in reaching
their goals.  It was always known that security is never absolute – nevertheless
towards the new threats the counter-terrorism and security principles are quite
vulnerable. Since New York and Washington’s attacks, that some qualify as “hyper-
terrorism”, the topic of asymmetric threats and asymmetric war has become
priority to the Western democracies that are trying hard to understand its origins
and to look for means to fight it effectively.
168 In April 1983, a suicidal bomb on the USA’s Embassy in Beirut killed 63 people; in that
same year in October, a bomb attack to a marine quarters killed 299 people.
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Symmetry, Dissymmetry and Asymmetry
In strategic language, symmetry is understood as the fight with similar
capacities, using identical processes - it can be said that it is the paradigm of wars
and “traditional” conflicts, between State actors and/or coalitions, or even groups,
like in many civil wars. The Dissymmetry is the search by one of the antagonists
of a qualitative and/or quantitative superiority, thus trying to make the best of
that advantage to achieve his goals. Dissymmetry is a clear will to implement a
joint strategy that tries to impose superiority, as “means to reach ends”. That is
why dissymmetry needs great investments and great logistical and technical support,
making of it a state-strategy and not a non-state group strategy. On the other
hand, dissymmetry can only be effective if the opponent is using detectable and
predictable means to face it.169 So, the United States have been looking for
dissymmetry towards all their potential rivals, supplying itself with totally out of
proportion capacities. Like in the Gulf War and the interventions in Balkans and
Afghanistan, war in Iraq, in 2003, was a military success of the coalition forces
because they knew the Iraqi capacities and that by their all-level superiority, they
could stop Saddam Hussein’s plans. Yet, when the Coalition opponents’ started to
use asymmetric processes, showing to be effective in that field, difficulties have
increased.
Asymmetry resides in the opposition between adversaries having capacities
and means completely out of balance, thus being the weaker the one using
different processes, exposing its differences, in order to explore all the vulnerabilities
of the opponent. Asymmetry has its origins on the conflicts in Antiquity, of which
the David and Goliath episode is the best portrait. When an opponent voluntarily
chooses to go round that disparity, by using asymmetric means, technology and
superior capacities, as evident as they might be, no longer give significant advantage.
Asymmetry consists of refusing the combat rules imposed by the strongest
opponent, making its own operations totally unpredictable – though of
considerable dimensions - on the basis of more reduced means and capacities.
Asymmetry is the privilege of the weakest trying to defeat the strongest one this
way. It opposes the insecurity of the strongest to the asymmetry of the weakest.
169 See COUNMONT, Barthélémy, A Hiper-potência americana e a Dissimetria, in As Lições
do 11 de Setembro, op. cit., pp. 21-32.
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This “weak into strong” strategy uses technically simple means, different
and innovative (classic armament used in non-conventional ways, like the WMD,
new technologies like biotechnology or genetics; or even by transforming civil
equipment into weapons), or the method (guerrilla, terrorism, suicide-bombers),
and the targets (public or symbolic), aiming at the opponents’ flaws.  The
invisibleness and unpredictability as well as the lack of moral restraints and the
capacity to commit suicide, are the main weapons of asymmetry and it has a
multiple effect: media impact, psychological effect, economic consequences, social
disturbance and politic determination disturbance. Asymmetry is a category that
symbolizes the new way of threat, which is multiple, diffuse, omnipresent and
unpredictable, and that replaces the only and visible threat, thus requiring new
strategies to oppose it.
Asymmetric War
The notion of asymmetric war finds multiple examples in History on how
it can be applied.  On the military treaty, “The Art of War”, written about two
thousand and five hundred years ago, the Chinese Sun Tzu predicted asymmetry
as a strategic concept. In several occasions, Empires have faced that dilemma:
for example, the barbarians that sacked Rome or the rebellion of the Boxers in
China, had means clearly inferior to their opponents. Certain great battles gave
the “weak” the opportunity to defeat the mighty ones: the Portuguese victory in
Aljubarrota facing the Castilians in 1385 or the English victory over the French
cavalry in Agincourt in 1415, are significant examples. More recently we can
recall many difficulties that several colonial powers had to efficiently face some
liberation movements, though there was significant difference in means. We can
also quote many problems experienced by the two superpowers during the Cold
War, towards opponents with substantially inferior means - the USA in the
Vietnam, during the 60’s and 70’s, and the USSR in Afghanistan during the 80’s
- have perfectly demonstrated that difficulty. Indeed, the capacities developed by
the United States and by the Soviet Union during the bipolar period were in such
a manner relevant and symmetric between them, that facing the irrationality of
direct conflict, they have abundantly recurred to asymmetric actors to reach “the
other side”. Palestine’s case is also an example: Israel a military powerful State
opposed to groups that often use asymmetric processes, including terrorism. More
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examples can be found on those several cases in which certain States have
confronted terrorist organizations in its own territory (ETA in Spain, IRA in
the United Kingdom, Tiger-Tamil in Sri Lanka, the Read Squads in Italy, etc),
with guerrilla groups (mainly in Latin America, in Africa or in Southeast Asia) or
with criminal and malefactors associations. Finally, nowadays we may also call,
the numerous difficulties that great powers face when confronting asymmetric
opponents, like Russia in Chechnya or the United States in Somalia, first and
then also in Afghanistan and Iraq, after the victory on conventional military
campaigns.
Using simple processes and means, asymmetric war can be regarded as “the
weapon of the weak” in the sense that it allows multiple actors that do not have
but limited means, to have a considerable destructive capacity. At the same time
that implies the use of unpredictable means to that purpose (civilian vehicles,
commercial airplanes or trains) and especially unsuspected (apparently common
citizens), the use of capacities that the traditional defense means are not adapted
to defend (chemical weapons, bio-bacteriological and nuclear, explosives, air ship
hijacks), the use of methods that refuse conventional war (terrorism, guerrilla)
the choice of unpredictable targets and places that are more difficult to control
(public places, transportation and supply networks) and the surprise effect – this
being the main and most important characteristic. The invisibility and
unpredictable character of the asymmetric attacks directly derive from the
“weaknesses” and from the surprising means used by those actors.
Actually, asymmetric war inverts a lot of the traditional equation: those
who have a great disparity of means cannot use a substantial part of their capacities
(nuclear weapons, for example), as other part of their means is clearly ineffective
to fight asymmetric opponents; and those who don’t have capacities equivalent
with the opponent manage to, via asymmetric processes, achieve huge results
from their opponents, despite the limited means (when compared with the
opponent). So, asymmetry exists in function of the (uneven) confront means as
much as the results gained (un-proportionally). As we have seen before, the
dilemmas related with war and asymmetric processes do not constitute, in
themselves, something new. Yet, those concerns were marginal until the September
11th. In fact, the terrorists responsible for those attacks were few and not very
armed, with very less resources than the opponent and their preparation was
done with little more then some infiltrated elements in the USA and with some
weeks of access to all piloting practice. Incomparably weaker then the United
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States, those terrorists had considerable results, out of proportion and right in the
core of the greatest military world power in history. The news and the new threat
are, essentially, on the new opportunities that the asymmetric actors have,
particularly terrorist groups, opportunities that they did not have in the past. It
has a simple logic: what if instead of a commercial airplane loaded with fuel and
passengers the terrorists had used a nuclear weapon? What if instead of backpacks
loaded with explosives the terrorists in Madrid had used chemical components?
What if…
So, the new and serious risk arising from new asymmetric threats comes
from the junction of two especially worrying elements. First, because asymmetry
always includes the “weaker” trying to get more and better capacities either to
have more equivalent means as the opponent and to have more considerable
results. More specifically, the risks reside in the possibility of asymmetric actors
having weapons of mass destruction - in this case, either the “weaks’” are or not
State or non-State actors, they would have “hyper-means” with potentially
catastrophic consequences. Secondly, because as clearer is the dissymmetry or
the unevenness – as it happens now in favor of the United States – the greater is
the tendency to have its opponents using asymmetric means and processes,
thus avoiding a symmetric confront. Like much before September 11th attacks,
the former American Secretary of Defense William Cohen, saw: “American military
superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack
against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically.”170
Dissymmetric in essence, the North Americans have been trying to impose many
of its goals by superiority – in this sense, the intensification of asymmetry and
the new paradigm of asymmetric warfare can be the great reverse for that
dissymmetry. This is the great paradox: despite having a never previously reached
superiority (dissymmetry), the United States are more vulnerable then ever to
the asymmetric war. The relation between dissymmetry-asymmetry is an obvious
one. In Time Magazine, some weeks after the September 11th, Gary Hart has well
synthesized the new threat:  “America is not prepared, either offensively or defensively,
for the conflicts of the 21st century. We are the strongest military power in the world,
170 The Center for Defense Information, Military Domination or Constructive Leadership? in
Defense Monitor, nº3, 1998, p.8
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but for the wrong century. Conflict is now carried out by civilians against civilians.
Perpetrators belong to no state, wear no uniforms and obey no rules of war (...) other
attacks will follow”171.
 Asymmetry is the only way to contest, contain Western military superiority.
It is replacing the conventional means of war and it might place itself on every
level of a conflict (tactical, operational or strategic), with essentially strategic
purposes. In this sense, “asymmetric war marks the end of the “classic war”, founded
on the relative balance of forces between two poles and on the nuclear dissuasion in its
strict sense”172.
Asymmetric actors
The asymmetric actors can be State or non-State entities and those can be
either independent of States or have bonds and even be supported or instruments
at the service of political objectives and of the strategies of certain governments,
or their intelligence services, within the frame of its regional and international
policy. Asymmetry can come from vulnerable or strategically inferior countries,
who are trying to re-establish a certain parity or avoid an intervention from another
power; from Rogue States involved either in proliferating activities of WMD or
with terrorism; or of non-State actors, like terrorist groups, the “lords of war” or
other criminal, supported or not by States. Nowadays, the tendency seems to be
the proliferation of non-State actors, widely independent from States. These
have new motivations – fundamentalism, organized criminality – and reject the
predictable and ethical rules, thus fading the barrier between politic-ideological
motivations and criminal association – for example, by the confusions of methods
between organized crime, terrorism and guerrillas173.
The asymmetric actors have un-proportional means and have different
military and political purposes. They look for the strategic advantage derived
from their own weaknesses, thus going round its opponents’ technological and
political superiority, using alternative means and solutions.  The asymmetric
171 HART, Gary, in Time Magazine, October 8th, 2001
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actors are “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to
maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative,
or gain greater freedom of action.”174.  Likewise they are looking to produce un-
proportional effects and the symbolic destruction of vulnerable points, with
the purpose of breaking the opponent’s determination. The psychological side
is essential – insecurity and vulnerability are the intended effect.  Asymmetric
actors can reach the national territory of a State, or its citizens, forces and interests
abroad, or its allies’ interests, they can reach civil or military structures. Specially,
they aim to public opinions and the States’ political will, a side on which
democracies are vulnerable due to certain tranquility with their security. The
asymmetric actors totally change the traditional postulates in security issues, to
a point that we can consider that asymmetry has the effect of reinforcing the
general feeling of insecurity un-proportioned.
The disparity of what is at stake and the objectives to attain are also favorable
elements to asymmetric actors.  The aimed one, is usually a powerful State,
always with something vital do defend: territory, population, economy, way of
life, as well as the security and integrity of all its interests. An asymmetric actor
does not have the same type of restraints, nor ethical, nor moral or juridical, not
even in protecting population’s rights. At the most, leaders put into equation
their own situation; the non-State asymmetric actors have no territorial bases,
nor forces or infrastructures that might be dismantled in the classical sense, but
have subterranean networks that are often controlled by a central authority.
On the other hand, towards powers that cannot surpass a wide set of juridical
and moral rules and international compromises, the asymmetric actors, that is,
the Rogue States and especially non-State groups, benefit from a large scope for
action. Things that are not allowed to democracies are often tolerated to
dictatorships; what the armed forces and security services cannot do, certain
disperse groups without any ethical, moral or juridical constrains, can do. In
these circumstances, either it is used by a State or by terrorists and either it is used
under the way of guerrilla or WMD use, the asymmetric war is a powerful weapon,
that is more and more used by some actors.
174 METZ, Steven, JONHSON II, Douglas V., Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition,
Background, And Strategic Concepts, Carlisle Barraks (Penn.), US Army War College (USAWC),
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), January 2001
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Asymmetry and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The relation between asymmetry and weapons of mass destruction,
especially nuclear weapons is, simultaneously, extraordinarily dangerous and
paradoxal. It is a paradox, because, traditionally, nuclear weapons are the weapons
of the “strongest”, they symbolized power – that is why mechanisms such as
NPT restrict the “club” of those who can own nuclear weapons. It also gives
nuclear weapons a more strategic importance, a mean of dissuasion and preventing
the “weakest” from its use. The nuclear weapon is exclusive to States and only to
the strongest ones. Yet, nuclear weapons belong to the domain of symmetry,
according to classical strategic doctrines – in the sense of parity or strategic
balance between two poles, like during the Cold War, between the United States
and the USSR - thus, resulting in nuclear dissuasion, or then to the domain of
dissymmetry, in which the goal is to add a differential of power - either to those
who do not have that kind of weapons as to those who have them in smaller
quantity and quality.
As we have seen before, asymmetry does not lay in equal means and surely
not in the search of power, as such. On the contrary, asymmetry tries to undermine
a much stronger opponent. The essence of asymmetry is in destabilizing an
uncontested conventional superiority by the use of atypical and non-conventional
means, and traditionally nuclear weapons do not correspond to these criteria.
Under this perspective, the incompatibility between asymmetric actors and
nuclear weapons would seem obvious. Indeed, when the relation between nuclear
weapons and asymmetry is put into equation we stand before a great paradox:
the paradox of establishing bonds between “weak” asymmetric actors, who
possess the symbol of power, the nuclear weapon. The paradox is obvious because
its supported on the historical success of dissuasion that combines symmetry with
nuclear weapons.
The fact is that nowadays, one of the greatest challenges of asymmetry lies
on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.
The possibility of asymmetric actors having those weapons is indeed worrying
because, among other reasons, many of those, starting with terrorist groups, are
proven to be “irrational”, difficult to identify and impossible to trace geographically.
This would make the principle of dissuasion invalid, as well as the complex
control mechanisms of both regulations and transfer of fissile materials and
sensitive technologies from the Non-Proliferation Treaty  (NPT) to the Missile
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Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Plus, the possession of nuclear weapons
by asymmetric actors would clearly destabilize the highest point of the “strongest”
who, so far, had not truly put into equation the use of nuclear weapons, except
for “strong ones”. That is, the nuclear as an attribute of the Power-State, with a
military force on the service of politic and “great strategy” in Clausewitz sense.
The sequence of this huge paradox is quite concerning: in order to keep the
necessary conditions so that an actor might be, simultaneously, asymmetric and
nuclear it is necessary that its nuclear conception is totally atypical and non
conventional.  For example, and in the worst case scenario, that it does not see
the nuclear weapons as something which use should be avoided to all costs, but as
something that is an excellent mean (the best one) to cause significant damage to
its stronger opponent. And that means the intention to have that capacity not to
dissuade but to use it as soon as possible.  The alternative scenario is also
concerning – the scenario of the evil blackmail of asymmetric actors over the
Power-States or over the international community. These dilemmas are applicable
to all type of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and even to a significant part
of missile technology – the differences are, on the one hand, that chemical and
bio-bacteriological weapons are of much easier use and proliferation (proved by
the fact that many States have this type of armament and the cases of use of
Anthrax, sarin gas, and mustard gas) than nuclear weapons and, on the other, by
the more significant damages caused by the hypothetical use of nuclear weapons.
About the use of WMD and in particular about the use of nuclear weapons,
it is obvious that the typology of the “asymmetric possibilities” vary as the
actors are State-actors or non State-actors – important element since it implies
the setting of different strategies.  In the case of an asymmetric State-actor, its
identification, location and monitoring forces to enter in the classic nuclear scheme,
where dissuasion and prevention principles and punishing mechanisms might
work – which in that case would “make inadequate to attribute the nuclear its
asymmetric effects”175. Either way, that does not erase the conventional risks
associated with proliferation: the risk of irrational and suicidal attitudes on the
side of States and regimes that are in an asymmetric position towards its opponents;
175 That is the opinion of, for example, GASTELLIER, Laura, Armes Nucléares et asymétrie, in
La Revue Internationale et Stratégique, nº 51, Fall 2003, p.99
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the risk of blackmail of those States and regimes that are about to collapse or in a
desperate situation or are feeling particularly vulnerable; and the risk of giving
that type of means to other actors (States or terrorist groups) in order not to
respond for the cost of such use, thus reaching their own political purposes and
giving other actors those capacities to face common adversaries.
Still, the most concerning affinities between asymmetry and WMD are
within the frame of non-State asymmetric actors, for example when terrorist
networks access WMD.  It is important to underline that the terrorist might gain
access to a nuclear that is a different kind of the State-nuclear. In reality, the
possibility of terrorists setting nuclear heads is rather small, since it would require
far too important resources for non-State actors and specially because of the
complexity of means required is such that would make it too obvious (and total
and utter discretion is fundamental so that the non-State actors can perform their
operations or use the nuclear). Here lay the basis of the myth built around the
Nuclear Suitcase that cannot be easily traced or identifiable, thus allowing its use
by the terrorists under a perfectly asymmetric definition. So, one of the certainties
about the association of non-State actors and nuclear weapons, is in the fact that
the vectoring of such weapons cannot be done but by unconventional ways –
not with the help of ballistic missiles but always looking the advantage through
the use of more surprising vectors – and on the need of previous fissile materials
supply – essential requisite to the existence of this hypothetical relation, but still
a delicate one (despite the rumors about the proliferation of these materials,
specially from the former Soviet Republics, like Russia, as well as China and
Pakistan). At this point it is necessary to distinguish between the highly enriched
uranium (that the terrorists might already have the capacity to turn into a simple
“improvised nuclear weapon”), and plutonium which is much more difficult to
transform into a weapon176.
The terrorists present at least four types of nuclear threats:  those that cause
highly radioactive materials to disperse, using conventional explosives (Dirty
Bombs), or other means; attack or sabotage onto nuclear facilities; that they use
untouched nuclear weapons, like the tactic ones, either bought in the black market,
“given” by other actors or simply stolen; and that they steal or buy fissile materials
176 POTTER, William C., FERGUSON, Charles D., and SPECTOR, Leonard, The Four
Faces of Nuclear Terror and the Need for a Prioritised Response, in Foreign Affairs, May/June
2004. Web edition.
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with the intent of building a nuclear bomb177. The specific issue of the tactical
nuclear weapons is quite sensitive, since they are smaller and are disperse over
several places and in many cases do not have electronic blocking systems that
prevent its unauthorized use178. Besides the international appeals to increase the
security of those weapons and to reduce its number, neither the USA nor Russia
have shown much commitment in doing it – even if important advances have
been done since 1991.
The paradox relation between asymmetry and WMD exists and can occur,
under certain conditions though. Either way, that association is possible and so,
truly terrifying.
NEW TYPE OF TERRORISM
Ambiguity and use of “terrorism”
There isn’t a universally accepted definition for terrorism. It is one of those
concepts that, being identifiable is difficult to give an exact definition. Yet, a
similar definition to the one given by the United States Code is acceptable. In use
since 1983, according to which, terrorism “means premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.179” The
term terrorism is indeed imprecise and polemic - the multiple lists of organizations
and movements considered as terrorists show that ambiguity. Since two centuries
ago the “terrorism” concept is often used to indistinctively name all those who
use violence to try to change political order. We must also recognize that History
is full of moments where terror and violence has been used on “non-combating
targets” with political purposes and that many of those previously called terrorists
ended up as respectful state men – from Michael Collins, Ireland, to African and
177 ALLISON, Graham, How to Stop Nuclear Terror, in Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004.
Web edition.
178 POTTER, William C., FERGUSON, Charles D., and SPECTOR, Leonard, The Four
Faces of .., in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004. Web edition.
179 Terrorism – Definition in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d).transcript
from Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, US Department of State, May 2002
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Asian anti-colonial leaders, from Nelson Mandela to Kadhafi. On the other hand,
it is also important to explain that terrorism is not only Islamic: other types of
terrorism are in activity a little bit all over the non-Muslim world – ETA in Spain,
IRA and Ulster Unionists, FARC and paramilitaries in Colombia, the Tiger-Tamil
in Sri Lanka, the Maoists in Nepal, etc. We could also list several examples of
true state terrorism, in the past and present – from the Jacobin dictatorship in
France (March 1793-July 1794) to the genocide campaign of the Red Khmers in
Cambodia, for example. As a principle of action, terrorism was claimed nearly
by all the political families.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that September 11th was not
the first terrorist act that decisively contributed to a sudden change in History:
in 1914, the assassinate of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, successor to the
throne of the Austro-Hungarian empire, by a Bosnian-Serbian named Gravilo
Pricip, member of the pro-Serbian group Black Hand, hastened the Great War.
The first to propose a terrorism doctrine was the German Karl Heizen. In
1848, on his essay Der Mord (The Death) he considers that all means are legitimate
to hasten the coming of Republic and Democracy: “If you have to explode half a
continent and shed a blood bath to destroy the barbarians have no scruples. The one
that does not gladly sacrifice his own life to have the pleasure of exterminating a billion
of barbarians is not a true Republican”180. But modern terrorism would show up
in the end of the 19th century in Russia, as a way of political action against the
Tsar regime. That was to force the government to increase repressive security
measures in order to raise the opposition between citizens and cause a revolution.
The terrorist acts were then integrated, first in the nationalist fights against
European Empires, especially in the Balkans against the Habsburgs and later in
the fight against colonialism as weapons against the “occupying super-powers”.
In the Liberation wars, of communist inspiration, the terrorist assassinate and
sabotage would be used during the first phases – the called latent or incipient
insurgency – to eliminate local leaders or even civilian populations, thus spreading
terror and fear, undermining the authority and leading the metropolis’ governments
180 Quote from RAMONET, Ignacio Objectivos da Guerra, in Le Monde Diplomatique,
Portuguese Edition, Year 3, n. 32, November 2001, p.1
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to repress181. Terrorism also became a way of fight in the Middle East, where
Palestinian organizations, such as the Yasser Arafat’s The Palestine Liberation
Organization, used terror to affect Israel. As a consequence of the increase of
Israeli military power, terrorism allowed the “weaker” Arabian States to fight
back – supporting and sometimes secretly directing terrorist activities against
Israel – without assuming the risk of conflict in a conventional war. Terrorist
activities were also instigated against Western interests from States as Libya or
Iran. The Western States were also targets of terrorist activities: RFA and Italy
have suffered with the Red Army Faction; Germany with the Baader-Meinhof
group; Italy with the Red Squads; the UK with IRA; Spain with ETA. There were
more terrorist activities in Portugal, France, Greece and Turkey.
Despite the differences – sometimes significant – between that type of terrorist
activities, “traditional terrorism” is, specially, a tactic to draw attention to its
“cause”, usually aiming at political or military targets, in agreement with its perfectly
declared and claimed political purposes. Often, terror is used to force negotiations
either those involving territorial or political claims or the liberation of comrades.
That is why these type of groups are only scarcely involved in indiscriminate
killings, concluding that it would repulse the “social base of support” that they
are trying to attract to their cause – obviously, this paradigm has exceptions. On
the other hand, having very precise purposes and political, social and national
motivations the conventional terrorist groups usually limit their activities to a
certain territory or country. Its members are usually recruited within a delimited
population group according with the group’s specific causes (ideological, nationalist
or religious). There are only few cases of traditional terrorist groups with
transnational characteristics even if they are supported by services of foreign
countries or with connections outside the origin country.
181 CLARK, General Wesley K, Winning Modern Wars – Iraq, Terrorism and the American
Empire, Portuguese edition,  Temas e Debates, Lisbon, 2004, p.128
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Characterization of the “New Type of Terrorism”
The “New Type of Terrorism”182 that as emerged in the last few years is
rather distinct of the “traditional terrorism” and constitutes a substantially more
dangerous threat to international security and to the security of the States. Of the
main characteristics of the “New Type of Terrorism” I would highlight the
following:
• It considers that all means are good and justifiable in function of their
purposes. This means that groups like Al Qaeda instead of using a
commercial airplane loaded with passengers and fuel used as missile or
instead of using explosives on a passenger train, if they could get hold of
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, if they could aim at nuclear
centrals, dams and public supply networks they will not hesitate in using
such means and targets in order to cause the greatest possible number of
material damages and human victims –after all, it is just about “infidels”.
In an interview to the journalist Paulo Moura from Público newspaper,
Omar Bakri Mohammed – considered a jihaidist brain master of Al Qaeda
and of Islamic terrorism in Europe, dweller of London, stated: “We make
no distinction between civilians and non-civilians, innocents and non-innocents.
We only distinguish between Muslim and non-believers. The life of non-believers
has no value. It has no sanctity (…) we are not hypocrites. We do not say “we
sorry, it was a mistake”. We say, “you deserved it”. We assume that the purpose
is to kill as many as we can, to provoke terror. So that in the West you think,
“Look what has happened to us”(…) the divine text is clear about the need
to provoke as much damage as possible. Therefore, the operational has to
make sure that he kills as much as he can kill. If he doesn’t do so the fire of
Hell awaits him”.183 So their actions are always spectacular and particularly
182 I have used the designation “New Type of Terrorism”, for the first time right after the
September 11th, because I could not find a better alternative formula – I prefer this one to, for
example, “Transnational Terrorism”, “Fundamentalist Terrorism”, “Catastrophic Terrorism”,
“Post Modern Terrorism” or “New International Terrorism”. I keep this notion because, though
ambiguous and subjective like others, it is the term that best identifies the specificity that I see
in the terrorism in question. About this designation and characterization see TOMÉ, Luís L.,
O 11 de Setembro e o Terrorismo de Novo Tip, in Janus 2003…op. cit. pp. 116-117.
183 MOHAMMED, Omar Bakri, interviewed by Paulo Moura, published in Pública Magazine
from Público Newspaper, April 18, 2004, pp.28-31. Bold by the author.
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tragic, and they might become even more catastrophic – it is only a matter
of means and opportunities at their disposal;
• Its motivations and causes are multiple and its purposes diffuse and not
always claimed, but are always generically based on the hatred to the
“infidel Zionists”, crusaders, and non-Islamic Muslim traitors, in a profound
feeling of “great rejection” and humiliation inflicted on the Muslims by
the West and their allies, in total repulse for the Western values and way of
life; by the desire to use violence and terror to gain the Muslim dignity
back; the determination in replacing the “moderate” Muslim regimes with
“true Islamic regimes”. They are committed in the jihad against infidels
and motivated by the hope of reconstructing the caliphate.  This way,
the “New Type of Terrorism” is capable of gathering a great number of
groups and individuals whose initial “causes” do not necessarily coincide
(often they have national origins such as political regimes oppressing them);
later they fuse with the generic radical defense of Islam and in the hatred
to infidels.  It is also capable of associating distinct causes such as Palestine
or the military presence in the Middle East, the defense of “traditional
Islamic values”, repulse for modernity, for the intervention in Iraq, Kashmir,
Chechnya, the despise for the “corrupt” Saud or the Egyptian government,
the hatred to the “satanic Western people” or the making of an Islamic
state in the Southeast Asia, etc.;
• Either way, amongst their several targets we can highlight the Americans,
the Western people, the Jewish and the moderate Muslims and Arabians
that are not, in their extremist vision, Islamic.  Towards the democratic
regimes, the purpose is (always by the use of terror) to affect security, well
fare and the stability of the target societies; to foment disagreement and
cause intolerance, as well as to make economy fragile, disturb the way of
life, social tranquility and political environment, question democratic
institutions and condition political decisions.  In the case of Muslim
authoritarian regimes, the purpose is, above all, the subversion and to
dethrone the “moderate” and secular – in the end, to instigate an Islamic
Revolution;
• It does not reveal any type of moral, ethical, ideological or political
restraints when elaborating attacks.  Mostly, it shows total contempt for
human life (other people’s or their own’s). The distinction is only between
Muslims and infidels, both on the track of death:  the nonbelievers either
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convert or die, burning in the fire of hell, because “the propriety and the
life of a disbeliever do not worth a thing”, the Muslims have the duty of
being martyrs, of committing suicide, in defense of Islam, becoming
martyrs is rewarded with paradise. As one of Al Qaeda leaders said: “You
(Western people) love life as we worship death”;
• It grounds its actions, or tries to make them legitimate, on a radical
vision of the Islamic experience, on the strict application of the Charia184
and on a integrist and literal interpretation of the Sunna (The Prophet’s
Tradition) and of the Koran, the “holy” text that teaches everything, has
all answers and that justifies all violence. It acts in name of a faith – the
Islam – but it only takes from it the extremist justifications to political
violence against all infidels. It evokes Maumee’s teachings, but highlights
only passages where radicalism is inspired. That way, this perspective faces
Islam as a total system governing human existence that should be applied
in all time, in all places. The separation between faith (din) and the State
(dawla) is not conceived; it fights for the establishment in a global scale of
the sovereignty of God – to do so, Jihad must allow to suppress all obstacles
standing in the way of Islam’s propagation on Earth; it is understood that
“salvation” implies the return to the “true path” (al-sirat al-mustaqim)
that has inspired the first Community of the Believers, and the return to
the Salaf Puritanism (Maumee’s Companions) whose example should be
strictly followed185;  it has the pretension to expand the concept of Jihad
unilaterally, only related with the “holy war” (thus forgetting that it is also
men’s inner fight to improve himself, to defeat his egoism, dominate
instincts and this way letting the will of God penetrate all his being)186; it
wants to return to a caliphate system and medieval delirium of forced
conversions; it defends the killing of “infidels” and “apostates”; it intends
complete application of the Charia‘s rules; it exalts the martyr, since the
obligation of the Jihad predicts the possibility of martyr (sahid) and of
184 The Charia (Shari’a) is “the law established by God”, that is, the set of rules revealed to
Maumee by God, applicable to Muslims’ religious and social life in the heart of the community.
185 PINTO, Maria do Céu A Jihad Islâmica e o contexto Europeu, in Adriano Correia (Coord.),
Terrorismo, Livraria Almedina, January 2004, pp. 443-445.
186 About the Jihad see KEPEL, Gilles, Jihad, in Pouvoirs, n.104, 2003; PINTO, Maria do
Céu,  A Jihad Global e o contexto europeu, op. Cit., pp.439-459; or ALMEIDA, Eugénio Costa,
Fundamentalismo Islâmico – A ideologia e o Estado, Autonomia 27, 2003
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mujahid, the fighter of the Jihad that eliminates the infidels, makes the
“effort in the path of God” thus, giving his life to sacrifice. It is some kind
of divine terrorism in the name of “Ala, the All Mighty One”. In the
aforementioned interview, Omar Bakri Mohammed stated: “The seculars
say that “Islam is the religion of love”. It is true. But Islam is also the religion
of War. Of peace but also of terrorism. Maumee said: “I am the prophet of
mercy”. But he also said: “I am the prophet of massacre.” The word terrorism
is not new to Muslims. Maumee said more: “I am the prophet that laughs
when killing my enemy”. It is not only a matter of killing. It is to laugh while
you’re killing.”187
• It possesses a truly transnational or internationalized character.  The
supporters are not definable by nationality or ethnics, or by ideologies or
religions, but by the identification with a radical and violent interpretation
of the “Islamic Jihad integrism” with followers spread all around the globe.
The targets of their actions are not restricted to a country, a region, or a
continent. Its members do not have a motherland – “the world is its address
and its field of action”188, their will to attack and to become a threat goes
as far as the limits of their presence. The groups and individuals that fit
into this new category of new type of terrorists are nomads that wander,
act and present themselves virtually, anywhere, from the Philippines to
the USA, Pakistan, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Indonesia, Turkey, Yemen,
England, Tanzania, Germany, Sudan, Egypt, France, Malaysia, Algeria,
Italy, Afghanistan, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, etc. This type of terrorism has
no permanent physical bases, and its groups and cells proliferate either
in the heart of moderate Muslim and Arabian States as in the heart of
“failed States”, unorganized and without law, or in the inner of liberal and
democratic States189 or even in many conflict zones;
• It works within a network, also transnational, by the association of several
groups, cells and individuals - that until recently were relatively isolated
– either by the making of formal alliances or by informal contacts and
187 MOHAMMED, Omar Bakri, interview published in Pública, op. cit., p. 29
188 BISHARA, Marwan, A Era dos Conflitos Assimétricos, in Le Monde Diplomatique, nº 571,
October 2001, p.20. Bold by the author.
189 On the manifestations of this type of terrorism in Europe see, PINTO, Maria do Céu, A
Jihad Global e o contexto europeu, op. Cit., pp.439-459
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supports. The “New Type of Terrorism” is not an exclusive product of a
faction or group, but it results from the coming up of a network connected
by Islamic fundamentalism and by common hatreds. Its members and
supporters might initially belong to groups as divergent as the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad, Ansar al Islam, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, the Uzbekistan
Islamic Movement, Hezbolah, the International Islamic Front, Hamas,
the Bangladesh Islamic Movement, Abu Sayyaf, Laskar Jihad, Jemaah
Islamiya, the Moro Front of the Islamic Liberation of Philippines, Kumpuln
Mujahedine Malaysia or many other groups and pro-Jihad cells spread
around the world. They are connected and they interact informal and
formally between themselves, sharing the same adversaries and the same
“successes”. Its cells can be planted on the opponents’ territory, laying
“asleep” until some order or better opportunity, but can also spontaneously
appear by the association of individuals that, meanwhile, have chosen
their radical message and are now motivated to violence and martyr. The
conglomerate action of Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda is essential in this case,
becoming itself a gigantic federation or confederation of several groups
and militant cells included in its orbit190 and to whom it was giving logistic
and financial support, worth in million of dollars within the sphere of the
Global Jihad. However, the management of this network is not centralized.
It is done by logistic, financial and information support, and specially, by
the “inspiration” and divulgation of hatred messages, of the appeal to
violence and sacrifice; of pro-jihad reasoning and power and strength
examples that now and then are demonstrated against their enemies. So,
Al Qaeda acts directly –using their own active members or members of
other groups gravitating on its orbit, or of cells “planted” or “asleep”- or
using a franchising logic with largely autonomous groups or indirectly
through the concession of all kind of support to certain groups that are
motivated but in lack of capacities or then through the sheer “inspiration”
of individuals, cells and groups that spontaneously assume the initiative.
Such diversity hugely increases the possibility of action and makes the
implementation of security and intelligence schemes more difficult;
190 On this topic see the aforementioned Al Qaeda’s war declaration
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• It has adopted a kind of “virtual organization”, a non-vertical and
hierarchic style like organization but essentially horizontal and
partitioned.  A hierarchic organization is extremely dangerous to its
members because once “infiltrated” it is possible to “follow” their actions,
especially in more advanced societies where electronic surveillance offers
greater opportunities of monitoring and penetration in the structure and
in the chain of command. On a non-centralized or hierarchic scheme,
individuals, cells or groups operate independently, ignoring the existence
of others nor their actions, and they do not always report to a central as if
they belonged a typical pyramid organization. This way, Al Qaeda’s leaders
do not need to permanently give operational indication or orders, and
they do not always venture in directly coordinating or commanding
operations – instead, they just “inspire” certain cells or individuals to act
by their own initiative or to supply the means and the logistic so that
they do it in the best moment. Clearly, this makes the work of watching
every terrorist (or potential terrorists) much more difficult, as well as the
prevention of their actions. In certain occasions, those cells are only
discovered when they ceased to exist because their missions are suicidal
ones. “Each cell has a magnet and two or three more people and a budget.
From that, in the right time they act alone, never contacting anyone”191 as
referred by the theoric jihaidist, Omar Bakri Mohammed. He added: “there
are many freelance willing to set actions just like those of Al Qaeda. The
Madrid attack was committed by one of these groups”.192 Such type of
organization does not need a direct and formal recruitment and becomes
more omnipresent and more immune to actions of infiltration and
surveillance;
• It shows to be gifted with specially unusual, powerful and deathly means:
it counts with extraordinary financial resources, around the hundreds of
million USD193; it uses more and more powerful destruction means,
including ground-to-air missiles launched from mobile platforms, with
191 MOHAMMED, Omar Bakri, interview published in Pública, op. cit. p.30
192 Ibid., p. 31
193 About financial mechanisms and the powerful financial means of the terrorism see further
in this book The Origins of the New Type of Terrorism, specially Terrorism and Poverty and The
action of the Islamic integrists and Muslim diasporas
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known efforts to use certain chemical, biological or even nuclear agents; it
has logistic and operational capacity not only of large scale but it also has
a huge technical complexity. In 2001, terrorists attacked a military
American airplane with a ground-to-air missile, in Saudi Arabia. In
November 2002, two AS-7 missiles were launched by terrorists against an
Israeli airplane, taking off from Mombassa, Kenya, with 271 passengers
on board194. Also in November 2002, the Scotland Yard arrested three
individuals with alleged Al Qaeda connections, suspects of planning to
release cyanide in the London subway (where more then three million
people circulate daily)195. Meanwhile, according to Barton Gellman of the
Washington Post, documents found in Pakistan in March 2003, revealed
that Al Qaeda had already acquired the necessary material to produce
botulinum and salmonella toxins and the chemical agent cyanide, and
was very close to producing anthrax, a much more lethal agent196. There
are still those who consider the possibility of Al Qaeda (in cooperation
with Hezbollah or other jihad groups, the Pakistanis for example) recruiting
scientists with access to sophisticated biological armament or nuclear
programs.
The “New Type of Terrorism” derives from the conjugation of all these
characteristics and not of each one faced individually, because that way we would
always find exceptions. Thus, it should be separated from the “traditional
terrorism”.
Advantages and opportunities that terrorism has or orchestrates
The “New Type of Terrorism” is more dangerous, more omnipresent, more
invisible, more diffuse, more radical and more catastrophic. It has several
advantages and opportunities that turn it into a greater and harder threat to
fight.
194 STERN, Jessica, The Protean Enemy, op. Cit.
195 Autoridades britânicas descobrem plano para libertar gás tóxico no metro de Londres, in Público
newspapper, web edition, November 18, 2002
196 Ibid.
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a) Deterrence does not work against this type of groups: they do not have a
territory or population whose integrity should be defended; their rationality
does not follow a regular pattern measured in terms of “costs-benefits”;
and, lastly, their members do not mind “giving” their lives in the name of
the “cause”, expecting to be rewarded by Ala after the earthly death. More
then anything they want to become martyrs.  In this sense, there will
always be candidates to suicide;
b) In the fight against terrorism¸ those playing defensively have to protect
all their vulnerable points in the entire world. On the other hand, the
terrorist has only to choose and attack the most vulnerable targets or to set
a more surprising action;
c) The costs of a terrorist action are infinitely lower than the costs necessary
to the defense of that sort of attack: to paralyze an entire airport or a
public transport terminal, an Ak-47, a hand grenade or a backpack with
explosives is enough for the terrorist; yet, the defense of that airport costs
many millions of Euros or dollars. The results gained by terrorist actions
are also extraordinarily out of proportions, considering the costs of the
operation -apart of the human tragedies, of course. We know the dimension
of the results of some terrorist attacks and when compared the costs of
those operations are, indeed, very small. According to calculations in a
United Nations report, the costs are estimated to be 30,000 USD, in the
case of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in 1998; between
5,000 and 10,000 USD in the USS Cole attack, in 2000; about 500,000
USD, on the September 11th, in 2001; 20,000 USD in the Djerba
Mosques, in 2002; 127,000 USD in the Limburg attack, in 2002; 74,000
USD in the Bali attack, also in 2002197. The attack against the Twin Towers
was the most important sinister ever to be repaid by insurance companies:
about 40,000 million USD198. The costs directly associated with “the war
against terrorism”, to reinforce security means and preventive mechanisms
197 BRISARD, Jean-Charles, Terrorism Financing -Roots and trends of Saudi terrorism financing
-Report Prepared for the President of the Security Council - United Nations, New York, December
19, 2002, quoted by Adelino Torres, Terrorismo: o apocalipse da Razão?(Islamismo político,
sociedade, economia), in MOREIRA, Adriano, Terrorismo, Almedina, January 2004, p.22
198 TORRES, Adelino Terrorismo: o apocalipse da Razão?…, op. Cit., p.33
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or with the impact in economy and tourism certainly raise to many
thousands of million USD or Euros;
d) Terrorists can take advantage of all the elements produced by the
civilization of progress that they condemn. It is ironic but the globalization
possibilities, specially in terms of transportation and communications199,
allows them to: move from country to country and region to region or to
very easily communicate; to gain access to a certain type of means, growingly
lethal; to spread their network of contacts and supports; to diverse and
increase the complexity of their financing net; to spread their radical
message and promote new recruiting and above all, to become a more
omnipresent, undetectable and diffuse threat;
e) Terrorism also take advantages of vulnerabilities inherent to democracies,
with open, multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies - where often the
presence of important Muslim minorities occurs - and of the freedom of
individuals, warranties that facilitate its circulation, penetration and
approach to the intended targets. Indeed, democratic societies “offer”
those groups a wide variety of opportunities to their invisibility and to the
selection of their targets (and for that, imagination is the limit). Then,
because having an opinion it is not a crime in a Democracy it is also
possible that in the heart of the democratic societies the more radical
perspectives spread more easily - like those of Omar Bakri Mohammed,
living in London, that publicly expresses sympathy and support to the Al
Qaeda, saying that its members “are the best people that have ever lived on
earth (right after the Prophet and his companions)“, or considering as
legitimate the September 11th attacks, described by him as “great work”, or
that “The life of a non-believers has no value”200, etc. On the other hand,
democratic regimes have ethical, moral, juridical and political restraints
that prevent from doing just anything in the fight against terrorism.
Terrorists, instead, have no kind of ethical or juridical limitations to
their actions. The unevenness is obvious. But it is vital to be that way
because it is also about a war of values.
199 See ahead Terrorism and Internet
200 See MOHAMMED, Omar Bkri, interview published in Pública, op. Cit. Pp.25-32
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f ) The Islamic integrism terrorist groups also take advantage of the existence
of a vast network of Mosques, Koranic schools or madrassas, spread in
several countries, and of several Muslim organizations that help the
population in need with education, social work, increasing the sympathy
of those helped by those organizations, as well as the new communication
media, specially the internet - all this is used as a “transmission belt” and
of contact, through which they establish bonds, raise financing, spread
their extremist message and recruit new members. On the other hand,
Islamic terrorism and integrism also take advantage of a wide Muslim
Diaspora, whether in financial terms or to “penetrate” in the non-Muslim
societies201.
g) To their purposes of generating terror, terrorists are beneficiated by the
media coverage that increases their strength and their omnipresence -
gaining impressive effects in some Muslim populations that this way feel
revenged and attracted by this form of fight, or in the heart of the usually
“quiet and secure” democratic societies, now deeply unquiet and insecure.
This means that terrorism is “an instrument of International Policy that has
a visibility and importance that never had before when objectives were local or
regional”202;
h)Terrorism is also commonly associated to poverty, despair and social
exclusion or marginalization phenomena203, including in the heart of
industrialized societies and home to a certain type of emigration, making
that an advantage to increase hatred and to find many candidates to sacrifice
and vengeance. On the other hand, terrorism has beneficiated from a
greater degree of technical preparation of some of their devotes
followers204, sometimes educated in the West, transferring to the terrorist
operation a new capacity with more complex techniques and also more
devastating ones;
201 See ahead The action of Islamic integrists and the influence of the muslin Diaspora in favour of
terrorism
202 LEANDRO, General Garcia, Uma visão militar sobre o terrorismo, in CORREIA, Adriano
(Coord.) Terrorismo, Almedina, January 2004, pp. 332-333
203 See further in this book The Origins of the New Type of Terrorism, specially Terrorism and
Poverty and Terrorism and Social exclusion and marginalization in the Western Societies
204 Ibid., see Terrorism and Instruction.
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i) To self-financing and set the logistics of their operations, terrorism is
correlated with other, more classical, criminal activities – narcotic traffic,
money laundering, human traffic, façade companies, bank assaults,
document forging, money forging, extortion, kidnaps, arms smuggling,
etc – making sometimes very difficult to distinguish the border between
common criminality and the direct or indirect support to terrorists
activities. In reality, at the same time it can be at the service of a political
cause it can also be at the service of strictly criminal purposes. The
requirements are practically the same and “at a certain point it can be
difficult to distinguish what is Political Purpose and what is sheer Criminal
Action, which makes a ambiguity complex to solve”205. On the other hand
there are still reports and suspects of organizations, banks, insurance
companies, that having apparent legal activities are supporting terrorism
secretly206.
j) Finally, the conventional capacities and means of security and defense to
fight terrorism reveal themselves ineffective to face it, in the sense that
terrorism sources are diverse, there are many potential terrorists and of
unclear origin, and their potential acts are never ending. Either way, the
solutions cannot be of a military character only, or gained by less than a
wide and deep international cooperation.
In short, the carrying out of the terrorist action is relatively cheap, with un-
proportioned and tragic effects but diabolically difficult to fight207.
Terrorism and the Internet
The virtual omnipresence of terrorism is increased by the use of the most
modern ways of communication, of which the internet is a paradigmatic example.
It is one of the many cases of modernity at the service of terrorism. In fact, the
internet opens a new field to terrorist action and never ceasing opportunities to
205 LEANDRO, General Garcia, Uma visão militar sobre o terrorismo, op. Cit., p.333.
206 See BRISARD, J.C. Terrorism Financing…, ONU 2002, op. cit.
207See TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, O 11 de Setembro e o terrorismo de novo tipo, in Janus 2003…, op.
Cit. pp. 117
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foment terrorism in several ways. Firstly, because by this mean, terrorists can
potentially interfere with all web related or dependent circuits, causing serious
disturbs in companies, banks, stock markets, health and supply services or
government agencies; either by the installation of virus or by penetrating systems.
Then, the internet is a rather simple, cheap and fast contact form, also between
terrorists, making the exchange of messages or even coordination of operations
easy – which obviously is done in a way to confuse or go unnoticed through the
electronic surveillance systems. Thirdly, the web allows fomenting a true “jihad
culture”, by the diffusion of messages that stimulate hatred and the holy war
against “Jews, crusaders and their allies”, of fundamentalist interpretations of the
Islamic faith or by giving detailed explanations of the humiliations imposed on
the Muslim people by the Western people, always in the sense of justification and
instigation of the use of violence and terror against the “infidels”. Indeed, there
are several jihad web pages and radical Islamic chats available on-line that are
decisive to make known the “radical” teachings. Fourthly, the internet hugely
broadens the field of recruiting, not only amongst Arabian or Muslim populations
that have access to the internet but also amongst the new converted to Islam of
other origins, some and other are seduced by the radical fundamentalism message
and sharing some common hatred or causes - from Israel to the “Western”, the
Muslim “non-Islamic traitors” regimes, the United States or to the violent defense
of Islam opposed to the values of the infidels. This virtual recruitment via net
offers still other advantages: it reaches new layers, young people specially, that
other way would not have access to their radical messages – the internet widely
increases the field of potential recruits, when compared to the traditional methods,
such as Mosques and madrassas- and allows the radical members to attract people
with higher scientific and technical training.  Likewise the suspects on Al Qaeda
attracting and recruiting Western Muslim people growth. This scenario will surely
increase the danger and the difficulties for the surveillance and intelligence systems.
Fifthly, the internet also allows terrorists to obtain precise and detailed
information about several elements – for example, places and schedules of
transport networks, plants and descriptions of cities or other places, topographies
of certain potential targets, exact locations of where guns or explosives can be
bought, etc – that are later used to prepare their operations. In the same way,
terrorists or potential terrorists find in the net many pages that explain in detail
the production and use of hand-made or more sophisticated explosives, or even
chemical weapons of home production, as well as the necessary means to produce
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biologic and nuclear weapons – we all know that there is information just about
anything in the net. There are even Islamic web sites (but not only Islamic) that
offer on-line courses and explanations about the making and the usage of guns
and explosives. Obviously, this makes the task of preparing attacks or the task of
training new recruits and sympathizers much easier. The idea is that, once the
message is received many internauts take the initiative in their own hands, with
the means they can get and the teachings they are able to obtain – in this sense,
the internet has become in a powerful instrument serving terrorism.
The Terrorist Threat
It has been said in several occasions that “The New Type of Terrorism” is
hyper at the results, but not at the means at its service. The greatest fear¸ the
greatest threat is that these networks have much more lethal capacities, especially
weapons of massive destruction. It is undeniable that terrorists are interested in
the acquisition of radioactive nuclear materials and chemical and bacteriological
agents to criminal or blackmail purposes208. But as sophisticated as their resources
can be (financially and technically) they will not have those weapons unless they
have other “help”. In the same way, it is undeniable that some Rogue States are
looking to endow themselves with WMD and missile technology, whether in the
name of self-defense and of the “deterrence” principle, whether to potential
blackmail or even aggression. If the terrorists networks are to be sheltered and
supported by State entities and their services, the possibility of those groups
having and using weapons with greater destruction capacity, in particular new
explosives, missiles or even WMD, significantly increases. It is precisely the
association of these elements – the Rogue States that once having WMD or using
them or making them reach terrorist groups that on their turn will use them
irrationally against their enemies – that consists of today’s “hyper-threat” to
international security.
Apart of the association to WMD and with State support, the terrorist threat
exists at other levels too. For example, by the possibility of this type of Islamic
208 In reality, if the making of nuclear weapons is more complex the use of chemical and
biological weapons is less detectable and its usage is simpler, which makes it in a certain way,
more dreadful nowadays.
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integrism terrorism joining with other non-Islamic groups, coordinating
operations and promoting exchanges of information and resorts, which can mean
the proliferation of “more irrational” attacks and at a greater scale perpetrated by
traditional terrorist groups, such as ETA or IRA – it would be as if these groups
were included on the international jihad orbit, and Al Qaeda having more cells.
This scenario, even if not very likely, on a theoretical point of view, because of the
political-ideological-religious embarrassments, should still be considered since it
is quite concerning: after all, it would give new means and capacities to some
traditional groups and it would add to the “New Type of Terrorism” a significant
quantity of new recruits and new cells, already organized and connoisseurs of the
“environment” and with the advantage of being non-Muslim and thus more
difficult to detect. The hypothesis of association can be tempting to the traditional
groups that are feeling particularly vulnerable or under pressure by the security
services of a State: in the past some contacts were known, between Western terrorists
and Islamic terrorists; and it is known that some Islamic groups have fused into
Al Qaeda in difficult periods, changing or evolving their goals – and that can
happen to non-Islamic groups, Western groups including. The collaboration does
not have to be in the shape of formal alliances, difficult to establish, for sure, but
only by the establishment of bonds and cessions of means, logistics and information.
On the other hand, even if not in close collaboration, and impressed with
the results achieved by the international jihad network, the traditional terrorist
groups might be tempted to follow their modus operandi, leaving behind the
relative rationality on the choice of their targets and on the impact of their attacks,
with the purpose of causing more terror and to reach their objectives.
Finally, the terrorist threat also places itself at the level of the copy effect to
other Islamic groups and individuals,  that even without any kind of relation
with Al Qaeda, but “inspired” by their message and example, spontaneously decide
to take the initiative. The intelligence services are concerned with the phenomena
of  “dormant cells” but also, more and more, with the “spontaneous cells”.
The Origins of the “New Type of Terrorism”
Even though the European and American strategies are trying to converge in
the combat against terrorism, the truth is that it is extremely difficult to establish
strategies and practical measures to fight the deep origins of terrorism. Some
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factors of the causality of the “new type of terrorism” that are usually considered
are indeed, possible causes and can facilitate or exacerbate terrorism; other, though
are only presumed causes meant to discredit or to justify a given political response.
From the most common factors mentioned as the origin of terrorism, it is worth
to ponder on the following ones:
• The relation between terrorism and poverty or underdevelopment;
• The association between terrorism and instruction, or the “manipulated
instruction”;
• The association between terrorism and exclusion and social marginalization
that many Muslims are submitted to in the Western societies;
• The existence of Rogue States and failed States, a fertile land to illegal
economic activity and to the fortification and implantation of terrorist
basis;
• The conflicts recovered by Islamic extremists;
• The action of Islamic integrism and the influence of the Muslim Diasporas
in favor of terrorism;
• And the intimate relations between terrorism and Muslim autocratic States.
Terrorism and Poverty
The relation that has been established between terrorism and poverty is
not a new one. Even after the September 11th, several politicians, including
President Bush, but especially many Europeans, have established a direct relation
between the two phenomena. So, in the International Conference on financing
development, in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, the participant heads of
State and government declared that the fight against poverty was deeply connected
against the fight against terrorism. If, spontaneously we can be led to establish
that relation – because we tend to associate the terrorist actions with the “despair”
in which some operational men are, without “nothing to loose” – a deeper analysis
of the available elements does not confirm that tendency. For example, if poverty
really was the deep origin of terrorism, the great majority of terrorists would
come from the poorest areas in the world, particularly, South-Saharan Africa –
which is not the case.  The same way, if the main motivation of the terrorists was
their despair because of the poverty level they live in, then it would be difficult to
understand how, after consecutive years living with some comfort in the more
developed societies (which is the case of many groups, “dormant” and
194 Luis Leitão Tomé
“spontaneous” cells), are they still willing to sacrifice their lives.  In essence,
Fernando Gil’s words are righteous, when referring that “there is no relation of
need between humiliation and poverty, on the one hand (to note that in many of
its aspects, terrorism is a very sophisticated product of globalization) and the will of
annihilation by other”.209
A 2002 Princeton University study about terrorism in the Middle East,
showed that, on that region, not only the terrorists had a level of life superior to
the limit of poverty, as they also had completed secondary school, at least210. The
information gathered so far, about the antecedents of Al Qaeda’s members, seem
to confirm those results, especially in what concerns skills to adapt to foreign
societies: without much problems to find a job, to rent an apartment, taking a
university degree or to enroll in piloting courses – it would all be more difficult if
they had not a previous preparation and were really coming from very poor classes.
On the other hand, even if some terrorists have rather modest or very poor
origins, generally, the new type of terrorism is not, by no means, “poor”; on the
contrary, it shows to be specially gifted with all kind of means, starting with
financial means. Bin Laden was a Saudi millionaire, with a colossal financial
empire that he has made available to terrorism, and several other Al Qaeda’s
ruling class members come from well-off or high middle class, and even with
university education. Besides, from what is known of the financing schemes of
the integrism terrorism, it is known that it uses funds coming from all type of
illicit activities, but very lucrative ones, such as narcotic and guns traffic, of
significant supports of bankers and business men, of façade companies, of the
Muslim Diaspora, of Islamic bank institutions “Zakat” funds (a legal donation
–a “tax” that is part of the “pillars of Islam”, which objective is to purify from sin)
– assessed in about 10,000 million USD per year and there are proofs that the
Zakat is not only about charity211.In  the executive summary of the Terrorist
Financing  report, presented to the president of the United Nations’ Security
209 GIL, Ferndando A tentação pacifista, in Jornal Diário de Notícias, September 28, 2002.
Bold by the author.
210 KRUEGER, Alan, B., Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal
Connection? in Working Papers, n. 9071, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, May
2002.
211 There are abundant references to the Zakat in several versicles of 30 Suras the Coran. See
TORRES, Adelino, Terrorismo: o apocalipse da Razão?.., op. cit., p. 99
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Council, in December 2002, Jean-Charles Brisard states that Al Qaeda would
have received from Saudi Arabia only, within a decade, “between 300 million
USD and 500 million USD over the last ten years from wealthy businessmen and
bankers representing about 20% of the Saudi GDP, through a web of charities and
companies acting as fronts, with the notable use of Islamic banking institutions”212.
Terrorism had and has important government support also like it happened
before with Libya, Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan, among others, and still today
with Syria and Iran; to that is added the support given by relevant sectors of
countries such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. So, the new type of terrorism (of
which Al Qaeda is the corner-stone), is not poor, it is rich, very rich.
This means that poverty is not the main causal factor of terrorism. Yet, even
if “terrorism” is rich that does not mean that their operational men have not
quite poor origins, or that there is no relation between terrorism and poverty.
In reality, it should be made a distinction between the “origin of terrorism” and
the “origin of terrorists”, considered individually. What we want to analyze here
is the causal vector of terrorism; otherwise, we would have to go into the domains
of psychology, sociology and theology; variables to consider when searching for
individual motivations of each one that perpetrates terrorists attacks.
Still, we must consider obvious that: poverty feeds terrorism and is
orchestrated by it. That happens for several reasons. First, because, poverty – as
well as many cases of social exclusion and marginalization in the Muslim and
Western countries – greatly increases the resent and hatred against those regarded
as responsible for the situation, making a favorable atmosphere so that, in the
poorer means, integrism Islamic terrorism finds echo in its radical message and
looks for recruits. Secondly, the populations in need are specially receptive and
eager of all kind of support that many times ends up being given by solidarity
organisms that function as mechanism to approach integrism members to certain
population layers. Thirdly, we can establish a more direct relationship between
the suicidal-attacks and poverty, in certain circumstances, since, on the one
hand, some of those terrorists have nothing to loose, unless their own life that
they want to offer in order to become martyrs (it should be mentioned that many
212 BRISARD, Jean-Charles, Terrorism Financing – Roots and Trends of the Saudi terrorism
financing, UNO 2002, op.cit.
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studies prove that the will to become a martyr is a much stronger reason to
suicide then the despair of being in a economically difficult situation) and on
the other hand, the families of the perpetrators of these attacks are generously
compensated by several charity works – we can easily imagine how the reward
can attract a poor family. The mechanism of the financial reward of the suicidal-
attacks is common in Palestine, promoted by the Hamas, the Islamic Jihad,
Hezbollah and other groups. Saddam Hussein also offered a significant amount
(first 10,000 and latter 25,000 USD) to the families of the suicidal living in West
Bank and in the Gaza strip. Either way, after making several interviews to suicidal
candidates, the Pakistanis journalist Nasra Hassa, concluded that they were coming
from educated middle class families213.  On the contrary, the researches done by
Jessica Stern, especially in Cashmere, conclude that many suicidal volunteers are
coming from poor families214.
Terrorism and Education
The education level is a supplementary factor to have in account in the
relation between the integrist Islamic terrorism and poverty. Effectively, in some
Muslim countries, poor families (and not only) send their sons to Koran schools
or madrassas, normally funded or free – often students have room and food,
clothes and books at no charge for the families. Frequently, the students are
educated in radicalized madrassas, with a fundamentalist perspective of Islam,
where they are instilled with the “hatred to the infidel” as well as with some
technical ability215. It is worth to remind that many of the taliban that took the
power and hosted Al Qaeda in Afghanistan have attended madrassas in Pakistan.
However that was not the case of the terrorists that made the September 11th
attacks. Interesting to know is that many of the Al Qaeda’s operational staff has
knowledge in science and technical areas, often obtained in Europe and North
America, including at university level. This means there is no exclusive connection
between lack of education or the madrassas orchestred education and the new
213 HASSAN, Nasra, Na Arsenal of Believers. Talking to the Human Bombs, in the New Yorker,
November 19, 2001, pp.36-41, available on the web at www.newyorker.com
214 See STERN, Jessica, Paquistan’s Jihad Culture, in Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, n. 6 Nov./Dec.
2000, web edition.
215 HIPPEL, Karin, Définir les origins du terrorism..., op. cit., p. 106
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type of terrorism – once again in this domain, Al Qaeda enjoys the benefit of
modernity and science obtained in higher education with ancestral education
procedures.
Terrorism, exclusion and social marginalization on the Western
societies
One can say that exclusion and social marginalization suffered by many
individuals and Muslim minorities on the Western societies instill and emphasize
hatred and criminal and terrorist behaviors. One of the main reasons that make
immigrants to join terror groups, such as Al Qaeda, is the alienation and ostracism
they suffer often, as Muslim minorities living in the West. Obviously, this exclusion
and the non-integration frequently happen because the emigrants cannot access
formal structures of the host State due to their illegality. Consequently they search
for aid and comfort in the Mosque and Islamic cultural centers, the same places
where they can find fake identification documents. In many of those places they
get in contact either with “informed” integrists or with a lot of fundamentalist
Islamic literature, that teaches them how to survive among “infidels” and
encourages them to martyr. These individuals are highly vulnerable to aggressive
recruitment campaigns produced by extremist groups operating all over Europe
and America and are specially influenced by radical anti-Western messages.
Anyway, we must say that many of the suicide terrorists or detected terrorists
lived “integrated” within the host societies, with a job and an apparently normal
house and social life. Thus, the marginalization and social exclusion phenomena
do not represent a main source of terrorism (to be so, the “integrated” would
never become terrorists, and other terrorists would appear as there are many non
Islamic outcast) but are many times used by integrism and Islamic terrorist groups.
Terrorism, “Rogue States” and “Failed States”
In what concerns the environment where terrorism is proliferating, is funded
or based, some analysts associate it with “Rogue States” or “failed States”.
However, the distinction between both situations must be done. In the case of
“Rogue States”, as was the Taliban’s Afghanistan, or Saddam’s Iraq, or Libya, and
still is the case of Iran and Syria, terrorism is supported and instigated or
manipulated by the governments according with their political goals for the regional
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or international arenas. Thus, an alliance is established between the State actors
and the terrorist groups, which allow the latter to extend their networks adding
capacities and having territorial bases and to the States “to continue their policy
by other means”. In the case of “failed States”, such as Somalia, Yemen or Sudan
there are several factors that particularly attract terrorist organizations: weak or
non-existent government structures; corruption, crime and generalized scarceness;
the international community’s inability to regulate and oversee, from the trade to
population and goods movements, and landing strips; unguarded coast shores or
borders. In theory, terrorists under these circumstances are able to act with total
impunity, without fearing severe repression from the government or the
international intervention. This does not necessarily mean that these States will
become terrorist breeding grounds, that might also happen, but they are indeed
attractive territories for the implementation and even settlement of terrorist groups,
often pursued in other places. However, we should underline that the mobility of
terrorist groups does not exist only on these States, because many groups and
cells “infiltrate” and settle in other States fully consolidated, whether they have
authoritarian and repressive regimes or democratic and liberal. This makes it
hard to establish as a determining cause of terrorism the existence of “lawless
States”.
Conflicts and terrorism
The relation between conflict and terrorism is very old, as in many occasions
in History terrorism has been used like a weapon by one or both parts in
confrontation. More recently, the Palestine conflict is intimately related with the
terror activity. Conflicts and wars perceived as threatening to Muslims are
exacerbated by the Islamic Integrism and by the participation of “foreign
volunteers”, in a large extent linked to the “new type of terrorism” and Al Qaeda.
This phenomenon approached the past ideological wars that have attracted foreign
recruits, as for instance in the Spanish civil war, 1936-1939. Osama Bin Laden
and many other Al Qaeda members fought against the soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, the period ascribed to Al Qaeda’s creation. Afterwards, there is
information of its participation in several conflicts, namely in Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Chechnya, Ossetia, Dagestan, Eritrea, Kashmir, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan,
Uzbekistan,  Georgia and Iraq. There are suppositions that they also attempted
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to influence Kosovo but the American stopped them216. Al Qaeda’s network
interference may turn conflict territories and bordering countries into terrorist
breeding grounds like it happens in Palestine or like it happened in Sudan or
Afghanistan. The leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and number two in Al Qaeda,
Ayman Al Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s “right hand” wrote that his visit to Chechnya
had the purpose of establishing a new training camp217. The new type of terrorism
might also manipulate and exacerbate existent or latent conflicts. Ultimately,
we see the direct association between terrorism and conflict currently in
Afghanistan and Iraq, lands turned into breeding grounds and magnets for
terrorists, being the violence cultivated and manipulated by terror.
Integrist Islamic action and the influence of Muslim Diasporas in
favor of terrorism
The financial support that promotes the Islamic terrorism comes from
multiple sources. Special attention is attached to the role and significance of
some Islamic charity associations. Effectively, one of Islam tenets is charity that
should be done in a way without humiliating the receiver. Nevertheless this way
of doing charity considerably complicates the superintendence on this domain,
being difficult to determine how a few Islamic organizations inclusively supported
by governments, propagate their extremist ideology through the aid they provide.
To this regard, Rohan Gunaratna noted “according to the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) a fifth of all non governmental Islamic organizations around the world have
infiltrated from Al Qaeda and other groups supporting terrorism”218 A report from
the International Crisis Group (ICG) underlines that “the quick progress of integrist
movements in Somalia since 1990 is less associated with its popularity rather to the
access to an important external funding” 219.
216 Ibid. P. 109
217 WRIGHT, Lawrence, The Man behind Bin Laden: How an Egyptian Doctor Became a
Master of Terror, in New Yorker, September 16, 2002, pp.80-81
218 GUNARATNA, Rohan, Inside Al-Qa’ida: Global Network of Terror, Hurst and Company,
London, 2002, p. 6
219 ICG, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, in ICG Africa Report, n. 45, May
23, 2002, p. 13.
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In a great extent, the inflow coming from the Muslim Diasporas circulate
among these charity networks, subsidizing and promoting either the integrism
and its radical anti-West ideology expansion or the Islamic terrorist activity
itself. On the other hand, the Diaspora is also important as it facilitates the
infiltration of terrorist groups in many non-Muslim societies, like with European
or American “cells” in the host countries.
Hence not being right to say that the Diaspora is in the origin or cause of
terrorism, in reality it facilitates the action of integrists – that has been happening
since a long time, although independent of their interaction with terrorist activities
– and of terrorist networks such as the Al Qaeda.
Terrorism and autocratic Muslim States
I am forced to agree with Karin von Hippel when he refers those autocratic
States with large Muslim majorities and with serious lack of democracy and
government accountability are maybe the biggest “new type of terrorism”
breeding grounds. Effectively, the terrorists that took part in the September 11th
attacks and most of Al Qaeda’s members and affiliated groups, who collaborated
or have been arrested for other terrorist acts come from these States. They oppose
to what is considered repressive or profane in their own countries and accuse
their leaders of not being truly Islamic and of being corrupted by Western
influences. So they intend to establish “true Islamic States” to allow those countries
to return to the “holy path” and find the ancient glory. These individuals anger is
primarily directed against “non Islamic regimes of Muslim countries”; however
since they are unable to express it in a constructive way and of raising changes
locally they redirect their hatred against Western countries, starting by the USA,
that support non representative “corrupts” and mantain the Muslim humiliation221.
Among those countries we may name Algeria, Egypt or Pakistan. But the
most eloquent case is Saudi Arabia. In the official report “Financing Terrorist”,
published in October 2002, the New York’s Council on Foreign Relations stated:
“it is worth stating clearly and unambiguously what official U.S. government
spokespersons have not. For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia
have been the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda; and for years, Saudi
221 Ibid.
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officials have turned a blind eye to this problem.222” Also in a book published in
2001, Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié wrote, “almost all Islamic
networks settled in the Near East, Africa and West would be financed through Saudi
State and economic international institutions controlled by it: the Islamic Conference
Organization (created in 1970), the World Islamic League (non-governmental
organization with missionary goals, created in 1962), and mainly the holdings and
Saudi banks such as the Faisal Islamic Bank, Dar al-mal, Dallah Al-Baraka”223. In
the 90’s, the Saudi still offered “to Osama Bin Laden all means he ambitioned at the
financial and operational level. And this relation would subsist, no matter what Saudis
might affirm, until very recent times, beyond Sudan exile and many other attacks that
might be ascribed (…) Osama Bin Laden would affirm in an interview not published
agreed with a French periodic, that “Saudis have chosen (him) to be their representative
in Afghanistan””224. Many elements collected allow them to affirm “there are many
references to “state terrorism”, when we talk about Libya or Iran. Saudi Arabia is
spared from the black lists for the simple reason that it is very important in the world
oil stage. Without such wealth it would probably be well positioned in that lists”225.
Osama Bin Laden represents a symbolic character of religious moves and interests
that “lay under the Saudi regime”226.
In the same way, the report Terrorism Financing - Roots and trends of Saudi
terrorism financing, by Jean-Charles Brisard for the United Nations Security
Council, December 2002, includes a list of names of seven important Saudi
personalities (Khalid bin Mahfouz, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Abdullah Suleiman al
Rajhi, bankers and Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee, Mohammed Hussein al Amoudi,
Wa’el Hamza Julaidan,  Yasin al Qadi, businessmen) and important Saudi charity
organizations (Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Benevolence International
Foundation-Al-Bir Society, International Islamic Relief Organization-IIRO,
Muslim World League-MWL, Rabita Trust and World Assembly of Muslim Youth-
WAMY) that have financed the Al Qaeda.227
222 Quoted from TORRES, Adelino, Terrorismo: o Apocalipse da razão?, op. Cit., p. 100
223 BRISARD, Jean-Charles, DASQUIE, Guillaume, Ben Laden: La verité interdite, 2001, p.
109, quoted by Adelino Torres, op. cit. p. 101
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid. , pp.99-100
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Perceiving a warfare, and considering themselves as the preferred target of
terrorist attacks and of “Rogue States” hatred, and facing the shock of their
vulnerability before the asymmetric processes that are or might be used against,
in the aftermath of September 11th the USA decided to establish a confrontation
strategy and eradication of these asymmetric threats, being followed by a major
part of the international community, although sometimes in different directions.
NEW STRATEGIES FOR NEW THREATS
“Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense… The gravest
danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When
the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile
technology — when that occurs, even weak States and small groups could attain a
catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention,
and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to
blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends — and we will oppose them with
all our power.”
President George W. Bush,
West Point – Graduation Speech, New York, June 1, 2002
After September 11th attacks, the USA government, the European
governments, the European Union and the United Nations, as well as other
international organizations and States, responded to the war against terror with
the adoption of new and reinforced strategies that aim the step-up of political-
diplomatic, economical-financial, police, military and intelligence activities and
the implementation of new juridical and financial tools. The “solutions” and
adequate answers to fight the new threats – mainly terrorism and the weapons of
mass destruction proliferation -, are generally unanimously known and recognized
by all powers and specified in official documents produced on this subject. They
all refer the need to prevent and “anticipate” attacks and control the traffic of
materials susceptible of producing nuclear, chemical and bio-bacteriological
weapons, which depends of good information systems and of the extraordinary
collaboration and complicity among several Intelligence services. Therefore,
supervision, control, prevention and international co-operation are vital.
Everyone also recognizes that the “war against terror” implies a wide range of
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activities: diplomacy and political pressure, aiming to reduce support to dangerous
groups, raise a large international cooperation among States and within multilateral
mechanisms, isolate terrorist supporting and/or sponsoring regimes, control WMD
traffic and “proliferation” activities, prevent or solve conflicts and pacify certain
regions that often attract terrorism; economical-financial measures, to “close”
sources and dismantle terrorist groups’ funding networks; measures for
“development aid”, to limit phenomena of poverty and exclusion of populations
in need that are often manipulated by terrorism and supply the ground for
recruitment. On the other hand secret and military actions might turn into an
option, by three ways: eliminate physical bases or “training and operational camps”
of terrorist organizations; use the threat of force and pre-positioning of troops to
“dissuade” some regimes of continuing proliferation and terror supporting
activities, denying those networks the “sanctuaries” from which they operate under
governmental support and their lethal means; or even “to punish” those regimes
that are illegally committed in gaining and /or spreading weapons of mass
destruction and missile technology that are clearly sponsoring or propagating
international terrorism.
Divergent strategies between European and American
Nevertheless if the majority of “solutions” and “answers” do not generate
great international controversy (the difficulty is their effective implementation)
mainly in what concerns terrorism and WMD proliferation, there are however
other essential components of the USA’s strategy for the “war against terror”
that raise polemics among the international community and are even opposed by
many of their European allies. Besides, as recognized by the European “Mr.
Terrorism”, Gijs de Vries, in a speech in Washington, on May 13, 2004: “The EU
and US strategies to combat terrorism have a lot in common. We do not only see the
same threat. We both believe that no country can win this fight alone, that international,
especially transatlantic co-operation is key in the fight against terror. We agree that a
wide range of measures is necessary in this global campaign. Richard Armitage recently
named five fronts for the US: diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, and law
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enforcement. Our security strategy is similar. We are in it together, but that does
not mean that our response is or has to be exactly alike.”228
These polemic vectors of the North American strategy, that are described
in documents such as the National Security Strategy of September 2002, and the
National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism published in February 2003,
are the following:
- Coercive pressure upon the “Rogue States”,
- Possibility of formal multilateral mechanisms alienation,
- A new perception about preventive and preemptive actions.
Those vectors are added to the new American principle of “floating
coalitions” or “will coalitions” which may imply the alienation or exemption of
traditional alliances if necessary.
Coercive pressure upon “Rogue States” and multilateralism
One of the divergences in the fight against new threats between European
and North American is the treatment given to the so-called “Rogue States” or
“evil”; another controversy refers to the use of force in the “war against terror”
and the importance given to the formal multilateral mechanisms. To simplify, let
us use as examples the documents produced together by the European Union and
the USA. In a document entitled European Security Strategy – A secure Europe
in a Better World presented at the European Council, in Brussels on December
12, 2003, by Javier Solana, it is stated, “Large-scale aggression against any Member
State (EU) is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats, which are more
diverse, less visible and less predictable”229 While listing the main threats the
document explicitly refers to terrorism, affirming “Europe is both a target and a
base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical
228 VRIES, Gijs De, European Strategy in the fight against terrorism and the co-operation with the
Unites States, speech in CSIS European dialogue lunch, Washington, May 13, 2004, p. 3.
Available on the internet at www.europa.eu.int
229 European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World, document presented by the
CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, European Council in Brussels, December 12, 2003,
p. 3, available on the internet at www.europa.eu.int
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bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and
Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable”230 – and the proliferation of
weapons of massive destruction, described as “potentially the greatest threat to our
security”231. Alike the North Americans, the European Security Strategy assumes
that “The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons
of mass destruction”232. Even so, this real “European Strategic Concept” only relates
terrorism and WMD proliferation with the regional conflicts, “failed States” and
organized crime, or, it does not refer the relation between those threats and
“Rogue States”.
Well, the USA’s references to threats not only mention “Rogue States”,
“outcast” or “evil” but also affirm to fight against them. Although in their
National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the USA affirm: “we will not
have a single, inflexible approach to handling the recognized state sponsors of terrorism.
Each case is unique, with different interest and legacy issues involved. Each situation
demands specifically tailored policies”233 they consider acting “independently” to
change the behavior of those countries: “when States prove reluctant or unwilling
to meet their international obligations to deny support and sanctuary to terrorists, the
United States, in cooperation with friends and allies, or if necessary, acting
independently, will take appropriate steps to convince them to change their policies
(…) Of particular importance is working to prevent terrorists from acquiring the
capability to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, or high-yield
explosives”234.
On the other hand, the North American government states “The United
States does not propose to undertake this difficult challenge (war to terrorism) alone.
The United States has neither the resources nor the expertise to be in every place in the
world. (…) Our friends and allies face many of the same threats. It is essential for
America to work with its friends and allies in this campaign”235. This principle of
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid., p. 4
233 National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 18. Available on the
internet at www.whitehouse.gov
234 Ibid., p. 17
235 Ibid. p. 23
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attempting to cooperate with its “friends and allies” is constant in all American
speeches and documents that also highlight the American commitment in acting
under multilateral organizations’ scope. Regardless, they also end to equally admit
the possibility/necessity of USA’s isolated initiatives outside of official multilateral
mechanisms. This attitude is clearly distinct from the Europeans’, which always
appeal to official multilateralism and international organizations. For instance,
the here-referred European Security Strategy says “the end of the Cold War has left
the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single
country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own”236 and adds “Our security
and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. (…) The
fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter.
The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations,
equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.
We want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting
threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when
their rules are broken”237.
Like the North American, the European countries are considering to act
military on war against terrorism and against weapons of massive destruction
proliferation, but unlike them they express determination in only doing it under
the scope of official mechanisms, in particular the United Nations. This idea is
expressed, for instance in the EU Strategy Against Massive Destruction Weapons
Proliferation, of December 2003: “Political and diplomatic preventative measures
(multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent
international organizations form the first line of defense against proliferation. When
these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed,
coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law
(sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the
use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central
role”238.
236 European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a Better World, op. cit. p. 1
237 Ibid. P. 9 Bold by the author
238 European Union, EU Strategy against Massive Destruction Weapons Proliferation, December
2003, Chapter II, paragraph 15. Bold by the author. Available on the Internet at
www.europa.eu.int
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The use of military force in the war against terrorism and WMD proliferation,
specially to coerce and punish “Rogue States” – despite their ability to sponsor
terrorism and take part in proliferating activities – is highly polemical, in the
extent that it contains “interference right” and “attempts on State sovereignty”
that are not widely accepted. Still, Bush Administration went even farther when
announced as part of their strategy of fight against new threats the “preventive
and preemptive actions” and “will coalitions”. Actually, the prevention and
preemption strategy is not new. The news is how the USA are emphasizing it and
the emergence that the North American new strategic doctrine gives it in the US
National Security Strategy, approved in September 2002.
Preventive and Preemptive actions
With the September 11th attacks very recent in everyone’s memories, President
Bush started indicating a change in the USA’ strategy, in his State of the Union
speech, on January 29, 2002, by two expressions used: “we must prevent the terrorists
and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the
United States and the world (…) I will not wait on events, while dangers gather”239.
In the same speech, Bush refers to the “axis of evil”, mentioning Iraq, Iran and
North Korea. Afterwards in another speech at West Point, on June 1, 2002, the
American President clarified the implications of his new strategic doctrine,
comparing the current situation with the Cold War period: “For much of the last
century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and
containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply.(…) If we wait for threats to
fully materialize, we will have waited too long (…)We must take the battle to the
enemy(…) and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have
entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act”240.
Not long after, Vice-president Dick Cheney has quoted the Israeli bombing to
Iraqi nuclear premises in Osirak, built with the French support, near Baghdad,
239 Bush, President George W., State of the Union speech at the Congress, January 29, 2002.
Available on the internet at www.whitehouse.gov
240 Bush, President George W., West Point Graduation Speech, New York, June 1, 2002,
Available on the internet at www.whitehouse.gov
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on June 7, 1981, as an example of necessary actions to be taken against those who
have nuclear ambitions like Saddam Hussein241. More explicit was Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, when he intervened in the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), on December 2002: “The notion that we can wait to
prepare assumes that we will know when the threat is imminent (…) When were the
attacks of September 11th imminent? Certainly they were imminent on September
10th, although we didn’t know it (…) anyone who believes that we can wait until we
have certain knowledge that attacks are imminent, has failed to connect the dots that
led to September 11th”242.
Meanwhile, on September 17, 2002, the Bush administration introduced
the new US National Security Strategy (NSS) one of the most controversial
documents in the post cold war USA. The fundamental meaning of this document
is found on Chapter 5, entitled Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening us, Our
Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction. It begins by explaining
the USA’s need of adopting a new strategy: “We must be prepared to stop Rogue
States and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass
destruction (…) We cannot let our enemies strike first. In the Cold War... Deterrence
was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is
less likely to work against leaders of Rogue States (...) For centuries, international
law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take
action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack
(...) international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence
of an imminent threat (...) We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries”243. Right after, the document
expresses the new strategy in one of the most controversial phrases: “The United
States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient
threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction
— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
241 Cheney, Vice-President Dick, Speech to the Veterans of the Foreign Wars in Nashville,
August 26, 2002. Available on the Internet at www.whitehouse.gov. Bold by the author.
242 See www.dod.gov/speeches/2002/s20021202-depsecdef.html. Bold by the author
243 US National Security Strategy, Chapter 5 - Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening us, Our
Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction, September 2002. Available on the
Internet at www.whitehouse.gov. Bold by the author.
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even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively (…) We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the
consequences of our actions” 244.
The long quotation here referred is quite clear about the reach of this revision
and the USA’s motivation for “actions” they are willing to undertake in the “war
against terror”, as well as about the controversy it has triggered (we shall return to
this subject later in the book).
However, their new strategic doctrine about “preventive and preemptive”
actions is still “in progress”245, showing some ambiguity on the concepts of
“prevention” and preemption”. The concept of “imminent threat” is also closely
attached to this concepts redefinition.
“Prevention”, “Preemption” and “Imminent Threat”
Confusion and controversy between “prevention and “preemption” is nothing
new, specially when the objective is to have legitimacy for an action, for creating
domestic or international law or defining a specific action in a specific case. Anyway,
on a strategic speech the “prevention” notion makes reference either to crisis or
conflicts management or to strengthen a pre-positioning, before an eventual
threat. Hence, the “preventive action” should be carried out to avoid the
confirmation of a threat or aggression that would request the use of major
strength. On the other hand, the “preemptive action” notion has been used
within the frame of “legitimate defense” to designate an anticipated military act
before a direct and imminent threat; the aggressor is attacked on the precise
moment that he is thinking of attacking us – as in 1967 when Israel started the
“Six-day war” in the imminence of an Arab attack. That means that apparently
the “preemptive action” implies the use of lethal force anticipatorily, while the
“preventive action” might be faced as an alternative to major strength. To some
degree, this is the interpretation, when the USA National Security Strategy affirms,
244 Ibid.
245 Following the expression of HEISBOURG, François, A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine
and its Consequences, in the Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003, pp.78-88.
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“to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively”.
Similar expressions to this one (and to others already referred) are written in
other countries’ strategic defense concepts without raising any polemics. That is
the case of France’s Programming of Military Law 2003-2008, also approved in
September 2002. This document redefines the French strategy post September
11th, based on the four traditional pillars: deterrence, prevention, force projection
and protection. Nevertheless, on the Chapter 3 – Strategic functions, the resort
to preemptive action is admitted: “Outside our borders, within the framework of
prevention and projection-action, we must be able to identify and prevent threats as
soon as possible. Within this framework, possible preemptive action is not out of the
question…”246. A bit further, on the detailed description of strategic functions,
the need for prevention is reasserted. “Prevention is the first step in the implementation
of our defense strategy, whose choices have been confirmed by the appearance of the
asymmetric threat phenomenon. (…) Through intelligence, it must have the
capability to anticipate and assess any situation autonomously”247.
For all that, how can we understand all polemics and quarrels about this
subject between France and the USA? The explanation lies on two short phrases
of each of the documents analyzed. In the French, “…possible preemptive action is
not out of the question, where an explicit and confirmed threat has been
recognized.”248. On the other side, the US National Security Strategy defends
“taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy’s attack”249. So, the American new strategic doctrine
foresees the possibility of undertaking a preemptive action, using lethal force in
the scope of “prevention” or, before the threat is effectively imminent  - as in
1981, when Israel bombed the Osirak nuclear reactor. This means that instead of
a preemptive action being exclusively triggered as self defense mechanism before
an imminent threat, the USA begin to consider using it priory and offensively in
246 Loi de Programmation Militaire de la France 2003-2008, Chap. 3 – les Fonctions Stratégiques,
available on the internet at www.defense.gouv.fr. Bold by the author.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
249 US National Security Strategy, op. cit
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the field of prevention. In the case of France and other countries the possibility
of acting preemptively depends on the occurrence and recognition of an evident
direct and imminent threat.
Preemption and Iraq
The concept of “imminent threat” and the resort to preemption, in particular
to face new threats (that are inherently diffuse, “invisible” and unpredictable) is
deeply subjective being the reason for most of the divergences. However, the
question might be even worst if the potential threat comes from a “Rogue State”
– because it implies a judgment about “good or bad” government, regime or
behavior and about the emergency of preemptively resorting to force. Well, this
judgment is seldom coincident among great powers, as was seen in Iraq.
It is worthwhile to stop and quote some passages of the controversial
Resolution 1441, unanimously approved by the UN Security Council in the
4644th meeting, on November 8, 2002 (see Annex 2). Using a specially serious
language, after recalling to successive resolutions referring to the Iraqi armaments
program, the Security Council
 “(...) Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and
complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programs
(...)
 (...) Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional,
and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)(...)
(...) Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international
monitoring, inspection, and verification (...)
(...) Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without
conditions or restrictions with its obligations (...)
1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations
(...)
2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this
resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under
relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced
inspection regime (...)
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 3.Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in
addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq
shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from
the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all
aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, and other (...)
4.Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq
pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate
fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach
of Iraq’s obligations (...)
5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate,
unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access (...)
10.Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA
in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to
prohibited programs (...)
13.Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that
it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations
(...)250
In a large extent, the Coalition’s military intervention in Iraq was driven by
the conviction that if Saddam had weapons of mass destruction –having possessed
it and used it before, it was a serious threat for the world’s security and specially
for some of its neighbors (Iran, Kuwait, Israel and Saudi Arabia) and for the USA
(specially through terrorist groups to whom he might supply those weapons).
Consequently and even with remaining doubts about the existence and location
of those WMD in Iraq, Washington decided to act “preemptively”, without
express authorization from the UN Security Council, to “prevent”/stop Saddam’s
regime access to those weapons. Thence, the American and British emphasis on
the UN Security Council resolution 1441, where it demanded Saddam to “prove”
having get rid of all that armament, and the unconditional cooperation with the
UN and IAEA inspectors or he would “suffer serious consequences”. Per contra, the
French-German axis, Russia, China and others non-recognition of Saddam’s
250 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002) available on the Internet at
www.un.com. Bold by the author.
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Iraq as direct and imminent threat (although admitting the possibility of
disposing of those weapons), could not consider the use of force. So they left to
the USA to “prove” that Saddam was an imminent threat, namely through the
unequivocal demonstration of his illegal possession of weapons of massive
destruction – subverting the formal request on the text of the resolution 1441,
which they approved -, and insisted on the continuing of inspections until a de
facto confirmation of his possession of those weapons. Opposing considerations
led to the known impasse.
In fact, it is extremely complex to integrate the new preventive/preemptive
actions amplitude and the renewed concept of “imminent threat”, as defined by
the new North American strategic doctrine, within the scope of the International
Law and the frame of the United Nations. Not only because it depends from a
delicate analysis of each case, but also because the threats perception and its
“imminent” character change according to the analysis and interests of each of
the powers involved. Consequently, referring to the events around Iraq we have
to admit that this subject has become even more complex and ambiguous. In
fact, having created a new strategic doctrine, which spread the possibilities of
resort to preemptive acts on the field of prevention – having Iraq at sight -, the
USA invoked the successive violations of several (seventeen) UN resolutions to
“punish” Iraq’s behavior.
Hence, the military intervention in Iraq was simultaneously “preemptive”
– as an anticipatory act to prevent the threat of its alleged possession of weapons
of massive destruction - and “punishing” – to sanction Baghdad for not complying
with the UN SC resolutions, aiming to dissolve Saddam’s regime.
Maybe for all ambiguity and polemics raised by the real meaning and
amplitude of the new US “preemptive acts”, the former Secretary of State Colin
Powell in an above referred article published in early 2004, (long after the
intervention in Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s removal) regrets that “some observers
have exaggerated both the scope of preemption in foreign policy and the centrality of
preemption in U.S. strategy (…) The discussion of preemption in the NSS takes up
just two sentences in one of the document’s eight sections”251 and clarifies that “as to
251 POWELL, Colin L., A Strategy of Partnerships, op. cit. p. 24
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preemption’s scope, it applies only to the undeterrable threats that come from
non-State actors such as terrorist groups. It was never meant to displace deterrence,
only to supplement it (…) The United States’ National Security Strategy does commit
us to preemption under certain limited circumstances252. So, it is now public -
after the intervention and all controversy, and at times when instability in the
territory and uncertainties for Iraq’s future grow - that preemption is not a strategy
to use against States but only against “non-State actors”. However, apparently
that was not the vision until Iraq’s intervention.
Regardless of other considerations we might do about preemption and its
relation with the Iraq crisis, it is worth to recall an essential paragraph of the US
National Security Strategy that is seldom referred: “The United States will not
use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption
as a pretext for aggression (…) The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force
measured, and the cause just”253.
UNI-MULTILATERALISM, “FLOATING COALITIONS”
AND “WILL COALITIONS”
Although some affirm it, the USA’s interventions after the Cold war have
not really been “unilateral”: Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia have occurred under the
United Nations hat; in Kosovo they were accompanied by the remaining NATO
countries. In Afghanistan, although they opted to do it with British allies only,
they priory gathered an impressive international coalition against terrorism, which
isolated the Taliban regime since the beginning; they had NATO’ support - that
for the first time had invoked the collective defense system included on the 5th
paragraph; and obtained a UN Security Council’s resolution that legitimized their
“self defense” right. Finally with Iraq, they had other countries’ military
collaboration and assembled a coalition of supporters (44 countries, according to
the White House) that politically helped carrying the burden. Nevertheless, every
time that their vital interests are at stake and are not sufficiently protected within
252 Ibid., pp. 24-25, Bold by the author.
253 US National Security Strategy, Chapter 5, op cit. See Annex 3.
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the multilateral mechanisms and formal treaties and conventions, Washington
easily opts by the unilateralism – as demonstrated the Kyoto Protocol and the
International Penal Court boycotts, non signature or ratification of several
international armaments conventions (for instance, anti-personal mines, biological
and chemical weapons), abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the military interventions
in Afghanistan and Iraq (simultaneously and contradictory “unilateral” and
“multilateral”), etc. The permanent and vehement American reference to “allies
and friends” also says implicitly that although preferring to act within multilateral
mechanisms, if possible, they can also act alone, if necessary, but they would
prefer to do it with traditionally close countries, that must colligate with them.
On the USA’ strategy, unilateralism and multilateralism do not mutually
exclude each other, proceeding with the formula “multilateralism when possible,
unilateralism when necessary”254. Actually, “instead of the heavy alliances architecture
inherited from the cold war period, the American leaders started preferring “floating
coalitions”, defined each case for each specific mission”255 for the campaign against
new threats, “to surpass inherent limitations of the formal multilateral mechanisms
and alliances”256. Using an innovative formula “missions determine coalitions”,
the USA take the initiative and the followers will access the “will coalitions”.
The examples succeed: a “coalition” for the campaign against the Taliban (USA,
United Kingdom, Australia, NATO group, Pakistan, India, Japan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan and Russia were in the front line), another to stabilize Afghanistan
(NATO mission under the auspices of the United Nations, with the military
collaboration of countries like Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland,
Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukriane); a great coalition
for the war against integrist pan-Islamic terrorism (USA, Russia, European Union,
NATO, Israel, India, Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines, Japan, Pakistan and others); a coalition for the military campaign
against Saddam’s regime (mainly the USA, United Kingdom, Australia, Poland,
Spain, Denmark, Kuwait and Qatar) and another, broader for the “stabilization
254 On this subject see ALMEIDA, João Marques de, Hegemonia Americana e Multilateralismo,
in Janus 2003, op. cit., pp. 106-107
255 See GASPAR, Carlos, O Regresso do Realismo, in Janus 2003, Op. Cit. pp. 104-105
256 Ibid.
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phase” of Iraq; a coalition for the resolution of Palestine issue (USA, UNO, EU
and Russia – the main actors of the Road Map); another to solve peacefully the
problem of North Korea armament program (USA, China, South Korea, Japan
and Russia, besides the ONU and the IAEA); another to pressure Iran to give up
on its nuclear program (UNO, IAEA, EU, Russia, China and the USA); a coalition
for the effective fight against weapons of mass destruction proliferation
(Proliferation Security Initiative), etc. Well, one can say that this is the height of
the uni-multilateralism.
Let us now analyse some recent examples of this uni-multilateralism in
which the USA take the initiative and the leadership, to be afterwards broaden to
“allies and friends”.
One is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) formally announced in
Poland on May 31, 2003 by George W. Bush, in the peak of Iraq crisis. The PSI
is a rather unformal “coalition” between 14 countries, for now – Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom and the USA – having other 60 countries
endorsed this initiative. Recently the USA has celebrated treaties with Liberia
(February 11, 2004), and Panama (May 12) to strengthen the PSI. Being justified
by the new threats and answering to the UN’s appeal to effective efforts against
the proliferating activities, the main goal of the PSI is the “preventive and, if
necessary, preemptive interdiction of proliferation”, or to harmonize and
coordinate efforts to control weapons of mass destruction traffic through the
exchange and analysis of information, group exercises, and a biggest collaboration
in the detention and inspection of suspect vessels and aircrafts entering in the
territorial seas or airspace of member countries. For instance in October 2003,
the USA, the UK, Germany and Italy acted under the auspices of the PSI by
intercepting an illegal cargo of centrifuge pieces for uranium enrichment in Libya.
Currently, there are several exercises on the scope of the PSI, in the Mediterranean
and Pacific and the members have launched a campaign for the adherence of Asia
and Middle East coastal countries. The PSI fifth meeting was held in Lisbon’s
Palácio Foz, on March 4, 5, 2004 proceeding with former meetings deliberations,
of Madrid (12/06/2003), Brisbane (09/07/2003), Paris (3-4/09/2003) and London
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(9-10/10/2003). To celebrate the PSI’s anniversary Poland has offered to host this
year’s meeting in Krakow 257.
Another example of this multilateralism – different from the former, as it
happens within a formal alliance, NATO – is the brand new NATO Response
Force (NRF). An American initiative launched on November 2002 during the
Prague Summit, the NRF was conceived to have great flexibility, technologically
advanced and with fire power, high readiness, high interoperability integrating
sea, land and air capability aiming to face more effectively the current asymmetric
threats and answer to new challenges. By 2006, when the final Operational
Capability will be reached, the NRF will “only” have a contingent of 21,000
militaries (a small figure, if we remind that NATO disposes of 4 million and
300 thousand troops), ready within 5 days and self-sustainable for 30 days,
being these forces available for quick deployment wherever is necessary supporting
long distance operations, including war theatres of chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons. These capacities will likely end the out-of-area debate that
has contributed to undermine the transatlantic relations, since the Alliance will
be able to lead missions outside of the European continent (as already occurs in
Afghanistan), though there are still adversaries to what they call an effort to
“globalize” NATO.  Notwithstanding the kind of force, capacities, schedule
and command structure being conceptually defined, some ambiguity remains
about the missions, thus revealing the Euro-Atlantic divergences about the
amplitude of “preventive/preemptive actions” that NATO Response Force should
undertake258.
The way in which the USA have dealt with Iran and North Korea, the other
members of the “axis of evil”, is also uni-multilateral – demonstrating that Iraq
was an exceptional case. Taking on the confrontation initiative and at the same
time imposing or maintaining sanctions and implicitly threatening with the use
257 On this subject, see for instance The Proliferation Security Initiative – An Interdiction Strategy,
in Strategic Comments, IISS, Vol. 9, n. 6, August 2003, available on the internet at www.iiss.org,
or the governmental websites of the member countries
258 See TOMÉ, Luís L., A omnipresença militar norte-americana e a nova NATO, in Janus
2004, op. cit. pp.24-25. More detailed information on the NRF is available on NATO’s website
at www.nato.int
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of force, to prevent Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and
make them give up on their nuclear armament and missile technology programs,
(although exhibiting military force) the USA’ strategies in both cases go through
a traditional multilateral diplomatic approach – either in connection with other
powers (specially Russia, China, and the EU) and with international regulation
institutions, the UNO and IAEA -, to change Teheran and Pyongyang behaviors
and reach the conflicts pacific resolution.
THE USA, THE UNO AND THE IRAQ AFFAIR
The US relationship with the United Nations is maybe the most
paradigmatic case of uni-multilateralism here described. Most States act both
unilaterally and multilaterally: the former in defense of their national security “or
influence zone” and vital interests, the latter in pursuit of global and international
causes.
The larger a power influence zone and capacities, however, the greater the
tendency to act unilaterally and the greater the number of countries affected –
this is the USA’s dilemma.  In fact, despite being able to act unilaterally and
sometimes doing it, the USA also look for the benefits of multilateralism.
The United Nations is the multilateral institution in excellence. In this
organism, and others, the North American search for “the power of legitimacy”,
once they prefer to act in the name of Law and “International Community”
rather than to act in the name of the national security259. On the other hand,
articulating policies and strategies in the scope of multilateralism allows the
United States to maximize its “soft power” attracting and persuading others to
adopt the American agenda. Finally, only through truly multilateral mechanisms,
particularly under the sphere of an authority such as the United Nations, might
some issues be considered as global challenges and threats and the financial and
political costs of stabilization projects be shared. On account of these advantages
Washington plays many of its strategies within the mechanisms and procedures
of the United Nations, and not just because they reject the unilateralism in
259 See THAROOR, Shashi, Why America Still Needs the United Nations, in Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2003.
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favor of the multilateralism. Similarly that is the base for the USA to have
always kept open the way for the commitment of the UNO, despite having
acted unilaterally against Iraq.
Except that, in many occasions the United Nations consists of “disunited
nations”. Being founded in a substantially different context in 1945, the UNO
is not made of neutral or impartial entities but of sovereign States with national
interests that are often in conflict. This reality starts in the Security Council five
members, which possess the exclusive right to veto. We may note that through
“veto”, the United States, France, United Kingdom, Russia and China, or their
protected and “friends” will never be under an hostile resolution of the United
Nations Security Council. This helps to clarify many of the ambiguities and
contradictions of the UNO functioning and its relation with international
“legality”. As we saw with Iraq crisis. In this case, the security concerns had
rather different levels among Americans and some Europeans, Russians and
Chinese; the interests related with the exploration of Iraqi oil were clearly
contentious – the French and Russian were the most involved in Iraq oil
exploration, being their biggest commercial partners and investors (they
inclusively had celebrated huge contracts with Saddam to reinforce the
exploration in a post sanctions period), and the American were not indifferent
to those resources, which they also wanted. Consequently, the UNO’s “disunited
nations” agreed in the threat identification, and as recognized by the UNO’s
Secretary General Koffi Annan, “it seems that, where we disagree is in the way to
answer to those threats”260.
The evolution of the controversy around Iraq led the USA to opt for the
“unilateralism”, deliberately surpassing the United Nations to act against Saddam’s
regime – since the other powers did not allow doing it with an explicit mandate of
the United Nations’s Security Council. However, we should recall countless cases
where force have been used against the political independence and territorial
integrity of States, by many actors, have not been authorized by the Security
Council, and cannot be placed within any reasonable conception of self-defense:
260 ANNAN, Koffi, Opening speech of the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the UNO,
September 23, 2003, available on the internet at www.un.org
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Anthony Clark Arend elaborated the following list: the Soviet action in
Czechoslovakia (1948); the North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950); U.S.
actions in Guatemala (1954); the Israeli, French, and British invasion of Egypt (1956);
the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956); the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion (1961);
the Indian invasion of Goa (1961); the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic
(1965); the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968); the Arab action in the
1973 Six-Day War; North Vietnamese actions against South Vietnam (1960–1975);
the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (1979); the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
(1979); the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda (1979); the Argentine invasion of the
Falklands (1982); the U.S. invasion of Grenada (1983); the U.S. invasion of Panama
(1989); the Iraqi attack on Kuwait (1990); and the NATO/U.S. actions against
Yugoslavia in the Kosovo situation (1999)261. In such a roll I cannot resist to include
at least Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor (1975). And, one could add to this list
numerous acts of intervention in domestic conflict, covert and secret actions. In
short, the most powerful States have used force in violation of the basic UN
Charter.
Since the Gulf War Saddam Hussein has disrespected the UNO, violating
17 Security Council’s resolutions (including 1441) and contributing to the
institution impuissance. In the beginning of this crisis, President Bush was
peremptory affirming that the UN SC should be able to enforce the resolutions
or the USA would do it: “But the purposes of the United States should not be
doubted… The Security Council resolutions will be enforced … or action will be
unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy (Saddam’s regime) will also lose
its power. …”262. One might think that this determination and unilateralist impetus
are exclusive of Bush’s administration. However, in 1994, Madeleine Albright,
then USA’s ambassador in the UNO, declared with similar spirit: “the new policy
aims to avoid requesting to the UNO accomplishment of missions that it has no
261 AREND, Anthony Clark, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force, in the
Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003, p.100.
262 BUSH, President George W., Speech on the General Assembly of the United Nations,
September 12, quoted by SACHETTI, António Emílio, Estratégia e Relações de Poder, op. cit.,
p. 442
263 Quoted by JENKINS, Tony, Nova Desordem Internacional, in Expresso newspaper, May 7,
1994.
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tools to perform and that we will help it to be successful in the missions that we would
like to be accomplished”263. Following this line and aware of the constraints inherent
to the UNO’s possibilities of efficient accomplishment of its missions and
imposition of resolutions Boutros Boutros-Gali, former UNO Secretary General,
said, regarding to the “Agenda for Peace” initiative welcomed in the Security
Council and applauded in the General Assembly, referring to several possible
modalities of action for Peace defense, including the “compulsive disarmament”
(essentially dealing with Iraq disarmament): “The United Nations does not have
or claim a monopoly of any of these instruments. All can be, and most of them
have been, employed by regional organizations, by ad hoc groups of States or by
individual States”264. In fact, referring to Iraq the USA has formed an “ad hoc
group” for this purpose.
Naturally a great defender of multilateralism, Kofi Annan, on September
23, 2003 in the opening speech of the 58th General Assembly of the UNO,
following to the crisis and the American intervention in Iraq, showed displeasure
towards the Bush administration considering “This logic represents a fundamental
challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability
have rested for the last fifty-eight years”265. Although he has a point, we must admit
that the challenge comes “from this logic” as much of the new threats and the
UN unreadiness or inability to answer them. Effectively, this logic leads to the
other. Being unable to obtain a second Security Council’s resolution expressly
authorizing the use of force against Iraq, the USA moved forward “unilaterally”,
according to their interests and security but also to put in force the UNO Security
Council’s resolutions, continuously violated by Saddam. It is a cruel paradox: to
impose the respect on international law, the USA have acted above that law.
The existence of weapons of mass destruction has not been proved therefore
harming Bush Administration and Tony Blair government’s credibility. And, in
general it also harms the confidence in the West secret services compromising
264 BOUTROS-GALI, Boutros, Agenda for Peace, 2nd edition, Information Dpt., United nations
Information Center, 1995, p. 13, quoted by SACHETTI, António Emilio, Estratégia e Relaçoes
de Poder, op. cit., p. 443
265 Annan, Koffi, Adress to the General Assembly, September 23, 2003, Available on the
internet at www.un.org
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those who have supported the intervention on that basis. By the way, I recall an
interview of Hans Blix, former UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC), for Iraq disarmament, on middle April 2003, or
after Saddam’s removal. He was interviewed by Expresso newspaper, where he
affirmed that weapons of mass destruction were the fourth reason that made
the American go to war because “it had left behind the terrorism, the war against
an immoral regime and the change of regime, but the American wanted a guaranty.
They feared that Iraq had kept weapons of mass destruction, and that together with
the September 11 experience and the fear of a terrorist operation (…)266. When asked
if the USA were willing to cancel the invasion, he gives a laconic reply: “Yes. I
think they were always willing to cancel any preparations, if the Iraqi were decided to
enter into a broader cooperation”267. About Iraq uncooperative behavior he said:
“If they did not have it (WMD), or if they only had fragments and remains of the past,
we should ask why have they not acted differently (…) I confess that I meditate a lot on
that and wonder. One of the reasons that I always though of is pride. Would there have
been a wish to defy the USA and UNO? If this is not the reason then it is hard to
understand”268. In what concerns the reasons for the war (WMD), Hans Blix,
former UN Chief-inspector refer “I think that an authorization of the Security
Council would be enough justification for an armed intervention, indeed. After
all, Iraq had violated a non proliferation treaty and also failed cooperation for fulfilling
of 687 Resolution”269.
Currently, more than a year and a half after President Bush has declared
“the end of war” in Iraq, the USA heighten the pressure to involve the United
Nations on the resolution of the multiple problems related with the current
and future situation of that country. Obviously, the environment was also very
pressured by the American presidential elections; by the successive errors during
stabilization and reconstruction phases in Iraq; by the serious insecurity atmosphere
in the country made of daily attacks and confrontations; by the unstoppable
increase of “casualties” among North American and Coalition militaries (having
266 Interview by JENKINS, Tony, Expresso newspaper correspondent in New York, published
in Unica magazine, April, 18, 2003, p. 72
267 Ibid., p. 70
268 Ibid., p. 71
269 Ibid., p. 70
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270 Data quoted in Bush Prisioneiro de Guerra, in Visão magazine, nº 585, May, 20 to 26,
2004, p. 85
271 Resolution 1538, approved by the UN Security Council in the 4946th session, on April
2004. Available on the internet at www.un.org
the large majority deceased during “stabilization”); by the meaningful decrease of
domestic support to the North American military presence  in Iraq (before most
of the North American said that the USA were right to go to war; in April 2004
53% still had the same opinion; in May that number drop off to 48%, and 46%
affirmed that war was a mistake270); or by the scandal around abuse of Iraqi
prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, Baghdad. It is also true that on and on the White
House has requested the approval of additional budgets from the Congress (in
September 2003, in the amount of 87 billion USD – 66 billion USD to support
the ongoing military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other aspects of the
“war against terrorism”, and 21 billion USD for assistance in the reconstruction
of Afghanistan and Iraq – request that has followed the supplementary 70 billion
USD approved in April 2003) and is loosing space on this issue. Also important
is the “return of power to Iraqi” and a new transitory period that should hold
elections (January 2005), expected to have great turbulence and new problems.
In effect, to be able to declare the “mission accomplished” soon the American
would like to withdraw their troops from Iraq, and if possible to leave a democratic,
safe, wealthier and non-hostile country. Thus the intuition that the USA are
only involving the UN to detach themselves and not be liable for “Iraq muddle”
is understandable. However and independently of the existing divergences about
the military intervention in Iraq, today the situation demands good sense and
hard work to find the adequate alternatives for the solution of many problems.
Evidently, these alternatives will always pass through the United Nations. To
avoid aggravating Iraq situation and worsening of international atmosphere is
fundamental. We should also notice that UNO is involved in a fraud and
corruption scandal related with the management of the “Oil for Food” program,
with allegedly involved UN officials in business (making the Security Council to
deliberate on this matter in Resolution 1538, approved on April 21, 2004271).
The bottom line is to find out if the “disunited nations” of UNO have overcome
their squabbles, allowing the organization to arrogate its role in Iraq stabilization
and reconstruction – for the benefit of the Iraqi people and safeguard of the
collective action defense.
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Conclusions
“No nation can build a safer, better world alone”
US National Security Strategy, September 2002
“I think that the main difference between European and American is the September
11th”272
Hans Blix, former UN Chief of inspectors for the Iraq disarmament
(UNMOVIC), April 2003
“We must show that those concerns (security in response to the threats) can, and
will, be addressed effectively through collective action”.
Koffi Annan, UN the Secretary-General, September 2003
The new world’s geopolitical outline derives from the effects caused by
two “detonator” events – the end of Cold War and the September 11th – and by
other “revealing” event – the Iraq crisis. Detonators have produced deep changes
in the international system and led to substantial changes in the world’s power
structure, in the extent that both were seized by the USA to expand its strategic
sphere. However, if the superpower relations with China and Russia have
improved significantly in the aftermath of the September 11th and the “war
against terror”, the transatlantic relations had a descendent movement, due to
the aggravation of divergences about adequate strategies to face new threats. The
crisis around the military intervention in Iraq was mainly a ”revelation” of
those squabbles between American and European, with tremendous consequences
for the authority and prestige of the United Nations, Atlantic Alliance and
European Union cohesion. On the other hand, the Iraq affair also disclosed the
United Nations inability of imposing the international law with respect, and the
USA’s propensity to act “unilaterally” if that is considered to be useful or necessary.
Notwithstanding, after a fast and successful military operation that removed
Saddam’s regime, Iraq’s situation evolution demonstrated to American the risks
of unilateralism and the crucial role developed by the allies in security,
reconstruction, stabilization and imposition/peace keeping management.
272 Interview by JENKINS, Tony, Expresso newspaper’s correspondent in New York, published
in Única magazine, April 18, 2003, p. 72
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Following to these events, the uni-multipolarity that currently distinguishes
the world’s power structure gets along with two large geopolitical movements:
the game of “multiple containment”, between the USA’s hegemonic pressure
and those striving to contain or even oppose that hegemony; and, on the other
hand, the new world war between the “new type of terrorism” and those
determined to make the “war against terror”.
One can argue that the terrorist threat is not new in this era, as it exists since
long. The truth is that the “new type of terrorism” has specific characteristics,
enjoying of important advantages and resorting to “hyper-means”, which makes
it different from the “traditional terrorism” and considerably more dangerous.
Actually, the dangers coming out of terrorism are dissociable of the weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) proliferation: the coincidence of these two threats –
terrorism and WMD – exponentially increases the danger. These are not merely
“challenges”: we should be aware that new asymmetric actors that we face might
dispose of extraordinary lethal means, capable of violence of apocalyptic
dimensions. Those threats are not exclusive of States and militaries – on the
opposite. Among other things, this conditions the change of strategic and
geopolitical behavior patterns, the re-evaluation of defense and security doctrines
and mechanisms, the re-thinking of mediation in the sense of “avoid war” or
“make peace”… If a part of threats and risks do not come from States and if there
is a type of “war” going in which one of the sides is not a State or a coalition of
States, this will change many things. For instance, deterrence will not work for
the containment or prevention of certain kind of aggressions. It might be worth
between States but it will not be valid for several “lords of war”, against radical
groups or organizations such as the Al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the opposite might
happen: there is a tremendous risk of a State or coalition being dissuaded (or
blackmailed) by any terrorist group or a “lord of war”. Besides, the preparation of
an aggression does not disclose the aggressor, as the traditional concentration of
forces does not exist nor the “early warning” is similar. Finally, the relation with
this type of threats and aggressors does not include the appeal to preventive
diplomacy or negotiated solutions. Hence, there is an important remark: the
main responsibility to eliminate, reduce or weaken those threats and risks belongs
to each State individually and above all, to the concert of States through collective
action. The States are still the guaranty of domestic and international security, no
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matter how asymmetric and diffuse the threats are. Apparently not all of them
take it in the same way.
Threats like the “new type of terrorism” and weapons of mass destruction
proliferation cannot be duly prevented, contained and eliminated unless there is
large international cooperation, the effective commitment of great powers, the
engagement of multilateral mechanisms and collective action. This means that it
is impossible for one country alone, regardless how strong and endowed it is, to
take over the task of turning the world into a better and safer place, as also
recognized by the USA.
Anyway, the current huge controversy going on the international system,
particularly between European and American, is not about the identification
and recognition of threats (although there is a distinction also) but on the strategies
and adequate actions to face them. Moreover, if on the one hand, there is the
question of military action and on the other, if the target is a State, some persevere
on the exclusivity of actions within the scope of treaties, international conventions
and formal multilateral mechanisms – particularly the United Nations -, while
others underline the obstacles and limitations inherent to these procedures,
considering independent action.
The “unilateral option” is clearly part of the USA’ strategy if the vital interests
are in cause and are not properly protected through formal multilateralism. From
the beginning, the USA’ singular position at the top of the world’s power hierarchy
created unilateralist tendencies, because “they can act alone” – and the geopolitical
logic makes them preserve maximum capacity to be able to do it. This tendency
is not entirely new, as it already existed since the first half of the 90’s. Meanwhile,
the brand new factor was the September 11th, which has underlined the reality
and dimension of the “new type of terrorism”, has disclosed the powerful USA’s
vulnerability before their adversaries’ asymmetric processes, and made the
superpower determinedly predisposed to fight and eliminate new threats.
Feeling vulnerable and a preferred target in the asymmetric war, the USA
developed a new strategy, in the scope of the “war against terror” that includes
some especially polemical questions. Of these, we can highlight, on the one
hand, the principle stating that the mission determines the coalition, conditioning
the implementation of the “floating coalitions” or “will coalitions”, and on the
other, the revision of the “direct and imminent threat” concept putting in the
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“prevention’s” ambit the possibility of preemptive actions. Just very recently, and
after the intervention in Iraq, have the American leaders clarified that their
perception of “preemption” is only applicable against non-State actors, such as
terrorist groups and not against States.
However, multilateralism and unilateralism are not self-excluding and may
even be complementary for the USA. The difficult part is finding the right balance
that allows associating the power of force and the power of legitimacy and engaging
other powers, specially their allies, in the decision about global questions without
disregarding their vital interests. This balance is not compatible with running
over the International Law and international organizations whenever the partners
and allies put obstacles to their objectives. The frequent use of hard power makes
the American lose legitimacy before third countries, increasing the mistrust, the
anti-Americanism, and even the hostility, thus reducing the USA’ scope of action
on the international relations, and ultimately harming their own security. After
decades of a powerful presence looked upon as benign, nowadays seems that not
even the allies are very sure of the American intentions. The appropriate strategy
for the USA must be to emphasize the collective power and the security
architecture grounded in unprecedented cooperation level or the support for
the war against terror might fall off. Hence, soft power is not only a way to
regain popularity, but is mainly the proper way for the USA to obtain from
other countries the requested cooperation. It is obvious that other countries
cooperate in the extent of their own interests, but this cooperation might be as
big as the “attraction power” of the USA. If by chance the USA insist on
undervaluing the formal multilateral frames, particularly the transatlantic link,
or on imposing a really unipolar rule of the world they will push back crucial
support that they now enjoy and need and will also promote an antagonist strategic
axis, for instance, such as China-Russia coalition and/or between Russia, France
and Germany.
To other powers the dilemma of the relationship with the hyperpower is
also very delicate. Feeling often “contained” by the USA’s policies, the European
Union, Russia and China search for the recognition of bigger international and
regional status by Washington. On the other hand, being unable to coerce the
USA due to its enormous power, all they can do is to oppose the American leaders
determination – above all when there are population support and vital interests in
question – increasing their preference by the unilateralism. On that account,
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great powers like the European Union, Russia and China carry out anti-hegemonic
strategies – although they are all different and hazard of each other – simultaneously
with policies to “multilateralize” the United States. In this sense, they look at
Treaties, Conventions, International Law and formal multilateral mechanisms
as the main way for “containing” the USA and to the United Nations’ Security
Council as the mean to “multilateralize” the American actions. Sometimes, for
those powers the multilateralism represents an end in the relation with Washington.
Dilemmas in the USA’s relationships are sharper with Europe because it
implies both the transatlantic relations, between allies, and inter-European
relations. In general, lately the European have become fierce defenders of
multilateralism and soft power strategies. However, this clear commitment seems
to be less concerned with finding appropriate answers for new threats than with
attempting to mitigate their own inability and mainly to contain the USA’s
unilateralism and hegemonic practices.
Europe’s appropriate strategy in the relationship with the hyperpower must
be to prevent that the “eagle flies alone”, trying to influence America’s decisions
and use the so much self-admired soft power. This is incompatible with the anti-
American crusade spirit, with the growing disparity of forces and abilities, and
persistence of different perceptions about the threats level. On the other hand,
Europe should invest more on the strengthening of its abilities than on its
“autonomy” and should stress out the complementarity in detriment of the
rivalry with the USA. If Europe and the USA are not truly complementary and/
or if NATO and the European Union are not efficient in the management of
their relation and tasks split, then many changes will occur: the Atlantic Alliance
would lose political and military effectiveness, no longer being a corner stone of
the Euro-Atlantic security, or even taking the risk of diluting; the European Union
will face even more difficulties to carry out an external policy and a common
security and defense policies, also taking the risk of fragmentation; and, the
international system would no longer count with the cohesion of the “Western
light”.
If Europe insists on the weakening of the transatlantic link it might definitely
push the USA to unilateralism and/or to look for other great strategic partner
that can eventually be Russia. Remains the comfort that even in a specially tense
and difficult period such as this we have lived with Iraqi crisis, it was possible to
launch initiatives with a great extent like the NATO Response Force, the Proliferation
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Security Initiative, to have EU led missions in the Balkans, or making Eastern
enlargements either in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union. The
work accomplished must not be thrown away. In cause is the cohesion of the
“transatlantic community” until now fundamental for the security and stability
of Europe and the world. The end of the Euro-Atlantic cohesion and solidarity,
as it seems sometimes, through the “new type of terrorism”, the weapons of
mass destruction proliferation or some “evil State”, that would be tragic. That
is why it is necessary to show that security concerns and answers to threats may
and will be dealt with through the collective action and the transatlantic
cooperation. Thus, the possibility of assistance to NATO’ security mission in
Iraq, similarly to what happens in Afghanistan, with the duly and explicit cover
of the United Nations and the participation of other countries, namely Arabs,
should be seriously considered as a way to reduce transatlantic divergences, help
to restore the confidence in the collective action, support the United Nations
and, fundamentally help the Iraq’s pacification and reconstruction.
After all, as defended by Condoleezza Rice, quoting the German chancellor
Gerard Schroeder, “we certainly all agree that we only need a pole for the global
policy by which we are guided, the pole of freedom, peace and justice”274
274 RICE, Condoleezza, President Bush’s counsellor for National Security at date, quoting the
German Chancellor Gerard Schroeder – in the end of her speech Responsibilities of Freedom, in
the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Arundel House, London, June 26, 2003.
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Annex 1
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept
Approved by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.
on 23rd and 24th April 1999
(...)
Part I - The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance
NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is
to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military
means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law,
the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful
order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put
at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The
Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to
peace and stability in this region.
The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North
America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression
of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common
interests.
The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of
common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support
of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity and cohesion
within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military
spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts
alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states
of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of
defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential
national security objectives.
The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance,
regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military
capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does
not seek these benefits for its members alone, but is committed to the creation of
conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with
others who share its broad political objectives.
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To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the
Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the
following fundamental security tasks:
Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-
Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions
and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country
would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of
force.
Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty,
as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect
their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’
security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common
concern.
Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression
against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the
Washington Treaty.
And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:
Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in
conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective
conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis
response operations.
Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue
with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing
transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.
In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will
continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful
resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance
will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic
institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country’s adversary.
Part II - Strategic Perspectives
The Evolving Strategic Environment
The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments
in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain
which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has
played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of
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the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military
partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia,
Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the
accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations;
its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis
management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its
determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability
of the Euro-Atlantic area.
(...)
Security challenges and risks
Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and
the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly
unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The
security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-
military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These
risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and
the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could
evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious
economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial
disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and
the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting
tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering,
and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by
spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other
ways, and could also affect the security of other states.
The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes
a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and
stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.
The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a
matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening
international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to
proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite
efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies’ populations,
territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO’s periphery and in other
regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means.
Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass
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destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection
and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be
difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of
these weapons.
The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of
weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities,
permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land,
and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition,
state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance’s growing reliance
on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such
systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO’s
superiority in traditional weaponry.
Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction,
would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance
security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests
can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism,
sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.
The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a
consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability
affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation
among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate,
co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.
Part III - The Approach to Security in the 21st Century
The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises
the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition
to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for
the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its
increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-
Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to
build a European security architecture in which the Alliance’s contribution to the
security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these
other international organisations are complementary and mutually reinforcing,
both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises.
NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the
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forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments
of its members under the Washington Treaty.
The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security
and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of
effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil
the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and
Defence Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises
successfully; its continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit
of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of its co-
operative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control
and disarmament.
The Transatlantic Link
NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe
and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security
of Europe and that of North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance’s
commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of
its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of
the Euro-Atlantic area.
(...)
Part V - Conclusion
As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to
meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept
reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security
tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security
environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared
commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic
Concept will govern the Alliance’s security and defence policy, its operational
concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence
arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security
environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains, but
in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of
every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering
the vision of a Europe whole and free.
(...)
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Annex 2
Resolution 1441 (2002)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on
8 November 2002
The Security Council,
Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661
(1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2
March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707
(1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14
April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements
of its President,
(...)
Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and
complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its
programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a
range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such
weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all
other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not
related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,
Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional,
and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons
inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,
Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international
monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated
demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
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(UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization
to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the
crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,
Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its
commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant
to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide
access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance
in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to
return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals
wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by
Iraq,
Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire
would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including
the obligations on Iraq contained therein,
Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without
conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and
other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council
constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,
(...)
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations
under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through
Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to
complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);
2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this
resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under
relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced
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inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the
disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent
resolutions of the Council;
3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations,
in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of
Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30
days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete
declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned
aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any
holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, subcomponents,
stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of
its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical,
biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are forpurposes
not related to weapon production or material;
4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by
Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with,
and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a
further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council
for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;
5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate,
unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including
underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of
transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded,
unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC
or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or the
IAEA’s choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that
UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or
outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members
outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA,
such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi
Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume
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inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to
update the Council 60 days thereafter;
(...)
8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed
against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of
any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;
9. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution,
which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that
notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further
that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC
and the IAEA;
10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the
IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information
related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including
on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending
sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews,
and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by
UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General
of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with
inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament
obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;
12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance
with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for
full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure
international peace and security;
13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that
it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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Annex 3
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
September 2002
(...)
V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends
with Weapons of Mass Destruction
“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.
When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic
missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain
a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very
intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability
to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with
all our power.”
President Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002
The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with our
allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing
a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction.With the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone
profound transformation.
Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our
relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of
terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides;
and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until
recently were inconceivable.
But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists.
None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was
arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of
these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto
available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they
will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment
more complex and dangerous.
In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states
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that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:
brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the
personal gain of the rulers;
display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously
violate international treaties to which they are party;  are determined to acquire
weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to
be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the
United States and everything for which it stands.
At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq’s designs
were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own
people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological
agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world’s principal purveyor
of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing
its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons as well. These states’ pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has
become a looming threat to all nations.
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United
States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of
strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former
adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including
the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis
on intelligence collection and analysis.
Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:
Proactive counterproliferation efforts. We must deter and defend against the
threat before it is unleashed.We must ensure that key capabilities—detection,
active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities—are integrated into
our defense transformation and our homeland security systems.
Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and
equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any
conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from
acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass
destruction. We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls,
and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD,
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and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials.We will continue
to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political
and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The
recent G-8 agreement to commit up to $20 billion to a global partnership against
proliferation marks a major step forward.
Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether
by terrorists or hostile states. Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people
will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to
acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends.
The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use
against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.
It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this
new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no
longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to
deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of
potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not
permit that option.We cannot let our enemies strike first.
In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a
generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense.
But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work
against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives
of their people, and the wealth of their nations.
In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of
last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our
enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states
these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their
neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the
United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive
behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of
overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.
Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy
whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose
so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is
statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue
WMD compels us to action.
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an
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attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces
that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists
often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing
to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack
us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they
rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—
weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.
The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population,
in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was
demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the
specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe
if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the
greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time
and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.
The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats,
nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where
the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive
technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will
always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support
preemptive options, we will:
build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely,
accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most
dangerous threats; and
continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct
rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.
The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the
United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear,
the force measured, and the cause just.
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Annex 4
PROGRAMMATION MILITAIRE 2003-2008 DE LA FRANCE
CHAPITRE 3
(...)
Le cadre général de notre politique de défense
Comprendre notre environnement de défense et de sécurité
Conformément aux analyses évoquées dans le Livre blanc de 1994, l’évolution
du contexte stratégique tout au long de la décennie 1990 a démontré que notre
pays bénéficiait désormais d’une profondeur stratégique à l’Est, se chiffrant en
milliers de kilomètres, situation qu’il n’avait jamais connue tout au long de son
histoire. Mais, contrairement à certains espoirs, crises et conflits n’ont guère cessé
à travers le monde, selon des logiques, dans des cadres et avec des acteurs souvent
inédits et inattendus, générant une fragmentation et une multiplicité des menaces,
souvent asymétriques, c’est à dire exercées par des acteurs étatiques ou non,
disposant d’un potentiel militaire inférieur et qui cherchent à contourner nos
défenses et à exploiter nos vulnérabilités par tous les moyens possibles, y compris
non militaires. Suivant les circonstances, ces menaces peuvent prendre la forme
du terrorisme, de conflits infra-étatiques aux logiques complexes, de la prolifération
balistique ou nucléaire, radiologique, biologique ou chimique (NRBC), des
agissements de la criminalité organisée ou de trafics aussi multiples que variés.
Des menaces qui touchent directement les Français
La période ouverte par les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, par leur violence
et le nombre des victimes, a consacré l’émergence d’un terrorisme de masse. Ces
attentats ont ouvert la voie à des conflits d’un type nouveau, sans champ de
bataille et sans armée clairement identifiée, où l’adversaire, prêt à utiliser des
armes de destruction massive, vise clairement les populations.
La France est une société développée, ouverte et à haut niveau technologique.
Elle est donc particulièrement vulnérable aux nouveaux types de menaces. Engagée
par ailleurs dans un ensemble de solidarités politiques, de communautés d’intérêts
et d’alliances, elle constitue une cible potentielle.
L’accroissement de nos vulnérabilités sur le territoire, en matière d’infrastructures
et de centres de décision, ou en ce qui concerne les populations, devra être pris en
compte dans toutes ses dimensions. C’est ainsi que le caractère urbanisé et
technologique de nos sociétés nous expose plus facilement aux attaques, par la
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concentration des populations, le fonctionnement en réseaux interconnectés (eau,
électricité, télécommunications), et le développement spectaculaire de l’usage des
moyens informatiques.
La distinction entre terrorisme interne et international s’estompe. Les réseaux
sont transnationaux, avec des implantations ou des soutiens à l’étranger mais
également dans nos pays occidentaux. Ils disposent de financements importants
provenant partiellement du crime organisé, d’une large autonomie d’action et
sont motivés par une hostilité profonde à l’égard des Etats occidentaux. Ils
exploitent les frustrations de certaines populations, reposant sur des situations de
crise régionales - historiques, économiques ou sociales -, ainsi que sur les difficultés
de certains éléments de communautés expatriées à s’intégrer dans nos pays.
Ces réseaux peuvent, comptant sur l’effet de surprise, voire de saturation,
déclencher simultanément plusieurs attaques massives sur un même espace ou
territoire. Les populations sont ainsi menacées tant à l’extérieur (Français à
l’étranger) qu’à l’intérieur, par des acteurs implantés indistinctement sur notre
territoire ou dans des zones très éloignées et difficilement identifiables.
L’abolition des distances, l’abaissement des frontières et le développement
du terrorisme en une forme de guerre contribuent à un effacement partiel de la
limite entre sécurité intérieure et extérieure.
Un monde durablement imprévisible
Les facteurs d’instabilité internationale vont continuer à se manifester pour
longtemps encore.
Les sociétés en transition dans les régions situées à la périphérie de l’Europe
resteront marquées par des tensions fortes, aggravées par les difficultés économiques
et d’importants flux migratoires (migrations). Les intérêts de sécurité des pays
européens s’en trouveront affectés. L’instabilité dans ces régions, comme dans
d’autres plus lointaines, continuera de se traduire par des réactions identitaires
violentes, teintées de nationalisme ou de fondamentalisme religieux.
Des États défaillants, résultant d’un processus de désintégration politique,
sociale et économique, dans l’incapacité de contrôler leur territoire et d’assurer
leurs fonctions régaliennes, tendent à devenir des havres où se développent les
activités illicites (trafics de stupéfiants, d’êtres humains, criminalité), générant
des déstabilisations internes ou dans les pays voisins, provoquant dans certains cas
des désastres humanitaires, voire exportant diverses formes de violence
particulièrement menaçantes.
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La fin des années 1990 a par ailleurs été marquée par un développement accéléré
des potentiels balistiques et d’armes de destruction massive dans certaines régions du
monde particulièrement sensibles. Dans le même temps, le processus de
désarmement s’est ralenti et la lutte contre la prolifération des armes de destruction
massive reste insuffisante.
Les stratégies ayant recours à des menaces asymétriques, menées par des acteurs
étatiques ou non étatiques, peuvent aussi bien viser le territoire national que les
forces en opérations. Les risques correspondants comprennent les agressions contre
les systèmes d’information, les diverses formes de prolifération, la menace terroriste
de niveau stratégique, le développement de la criminalité organisée.
La suprématie militaire occidentale rend l’affrontement direct peu probable.
Les adversaires potentiels s’attacheront dorénavant, afin de contourner nos défenses,
à développer toutes les capacités possibles de nuisance, hors de toute contrainte
du droit international. Ils seront prêts, par exemple, à exploiter les potentiels de
nos propres équipements civils ou à se servir d’armes de destruction massives
détournées pour frapper les populations au cœur même de nos sociétés. Ils
pourraient disposer un jour d’armes nucléaires, radiologiques, biologiques ou
chimiques (NRBC). La diffusion rapide des savoirs (Internet) ou des techniques
et la disponibilité des matériels (technologies duales notamment dans le domaine
des missiles, précurseurs chimiques) leur permettront d’avoir plus facilement accès
à ces capacités.
Un environnement stratégique en mutation
(...)
Les États-Unis modifient leurs choix stratégiques. En témoignent leurs
décisions de compléter leur arsenal de défense par un ensemble de moyens défensifs
(antimissiles) et offensifs, conventionnels et nucléaires. Après le 11 septembre
2001, ils ont annoncé l’accélération de la transformation de leurs forces. Il s’agit,
pour eux, face à des menaces moins prévisibles et qui peuvent les toucher
directement, de disposer d’une large gamme de capacités rapidement projetables,
d’accéder aux théâtres en toute circonstance et de s’assurer une maîtrise totale de
l’information depuis le territoire national américain, notamment avec l’appui de
leurs réseaux spatiaux.
Un des éléments essentiels de cette nouvelle donne américaine réside dans la
volonté de disposer de moyens d’agir seuls, le cas échéant, sans contrainte liée à
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des alliances ou des engagements multilatéraux. Cette stratégie n’exclut cependant
pas des actions en coalition.
À cette ambition mondiale répond un renforcement massif de l’effort de
défense qui bénéficie principalement à la recherche et au développement de
nouveaux systèmes de défense, accentuant le fossé technologique et militaire entre
l’Europe et les États-Unis.
(...)
Les fonctions stratégiques
Les grandes fonctions stratégiques dont découle notre modèle d’armée
(dissuasion, prévention, projection – action, protection) conservent toute leur
pertinence. Sur cette base, il convient, dans le contexte actuel et prévisible de
risques et de menaces, de porter une attention particulière aux missions de
protection et aux moyens qui permettent de prévenir ou d’empêcher une agression
dans le cadre de la prévention et de la projection.
La dissuasion nucléaire reste notre garantie fondamentale. Parallèlement, la
stratégie générale militaire se décline en actions de prévention, protection et
projection-action afin de pouvoir faire face, avec la flexibilité nécessaire à d’autres
types de menaces. Les forces armées doivent être à même de conduire les actions
militaires décidées pour garantir la sécurité de nos intérêts et de nos populations,
sur notre territoire national comme à l’étranger. Leur protection est un impératif.
Elle repose, entre autres, sur le développement d’une capacité anti-missiles de
théâtre.
À l’extérieur de nos frontières, dans le cadre de la prévention et de la projection
- action, nous devons donc être en mesure d’identifier et de prévenir les menaces
le plus tôt possible. Dans ce cadre, la possibilité d’une action préemptive pourrait
être considérée, dès lors qu’une situation de menace explicite et avérée serait
reconnue. Cette détermination et l’amélioration des capacités de frappes à distance
devraient constituer une menace dissuasive pour nos agresseurs potentiels, d’autant
que les réseaux terroristes transnationaux se développent et se préparent à l’action
le plus souvent à l’extérieur de notre territoire, dans des zones non contrôlées par
des États, voire avec le soutien d’États ennemis.
Sur le territoire national, dans le cadre de la protection, les capacités des
forces armées à remplir leurs missions de protection des approches aériennes et
maritimes doivent être renforcées. Par ailleurs, toutes les formations et les moyens
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militaires peuvent être requis d’apporter leur concours pour des missions de
surveillance et de sauvegarde, et pour participer aux opérations de gestion des
conséquences d’un attentat majeur.
Dissuasion
La dissuasion est au cœur des moyens garantissant à la France l’autonomie
stratégique qui est l’un des fondements de sa politique de défense. Elle représente
un facteur important de stabilité internationale et constitue la garantie
fondamentale contre toute menace sur nos intérêts vitaux qui pourrait provenir
de puissances militaires majeures, animées d’intentions hostiles et prêtes à recourir
à tous les moyens nécessaires pour les concrétiser. Elle doit permettre de faire
face, notamment, aux menaces que pourraient faire peser sur nos intérêts vitaux
des puissances régionales dotées d’armes de destruction massive du fait de la
prolifération balistique et du développement de nouvelles armes, nucléaires,
biologiques ou chimiques.
Elle reste caractérisée, dans notre stratégie, par un concept de non-emploi.
Elle implique de disposer de moyens diversifiés permettant d’assurer sa crédibilité
face aux évolutions des menaces, quelles que soient leur localisation et leur nature.
Elle repose d’une part sur des missiles balistiques emportés par des sous-marins
nucléaires et, d’autre part, sur des missiles aérobies emportés par des aéronefs. Le
développement des moyens de simulation préservera l’adaptation des forces
nucléaires à l’évolution technologique et donc la crédibilité et la pérennité de la
dissuasion. Cette dissuasion doit enfin pouvoir contribuer à la sécurité de l’Europe
en tenant compte de la solidarité croissante des pays de l’Union.
Prévention
La prévention constitue la première étape de mise en œuvre de notre stratégie
de défense, dont les choix sont confortés par l’apparition de menaces asymétriques.
Elle est aussi un instrument au service des objectifs de notre politique étrangère à
la recherche de la paix et de la stabilité internationale. Elle est une nécessité
permanente contre la réapparition de grandes menaces, directes ou indirectes, le
développement de situations de crise ou de conflits susceptibles de mettre en
cause notre sécurité et nos intérêts et ceux de nos partenaires de l’Union européenne
et de l’Alliance atlantique. Elle doit permettre, par le renseignement, de disposer
d’une capacité d’anticipation et d’une capacité autonome d’appréciation de la
situation.
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La prévention nécessite, donc, la poursuite des efforts en matière de
renseignements d’origine humaine ou technique et de ceux nécessaires pour nous
doter des systèmes permettant l’acquisition du renseignement au niveau stratégique
et sur les théâtres d’opération. Dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme, la
coordination interministérielle des analyses et des actions sera poursuivie.
La capacité de veille et d’alerte doit être coordonnée, d’abord au niveau
européen, en particulier par des échanges et soutiens réciproques accrus, et au
niveau international, pour mieux surveiller les nouveaux réseaux d’acteurs
transnationaux. Le renseignement est en outre indispensable pour faciliter
l’adaptation permanente des moyens et de l’organisation de notre défense et orienter
la préparation du futur.
La prévention doit pouvoir disposer des moyens d’information, de
commandement et de contrôle adaptés à la compréhension des situations et à la
préparation des actions. Les outils développés doivent permettre l’échange des
informations et des analyses avec nos partenaires.
La diplomatie de défense, à travers le développement des relations de défense
et de sécurité avec nos partenaires étrangers, qu’il s’agisse de dialogue stratégique,
d’échange d’informations, d’assistance ou de coopération militaire, participe
également de la prévention. Une approche coordonnée de notre diplomatie de
défense avec nos alliés européens sera favorisée.
La prévention s’appuie également sur le maintien d’un dispositif interarmées
de forces pré-positionnées, de façon permanente ou temporaire, qui facilite l’analyse
des situations, l’exploitation des renseignements et la réaction immédiate dans les
régions considérées.
Projection - Action
La projection et l’action ont structuré la conception du modèle d’armée. La
capacité à projeter des forces, aussi bien en Europe qu’à l’extérieur du continent
européen, et notre aptitude à engager rapidement et à soutenir dans la durée des
groupements de forces interarmées, capables d’imposer rapidement une supériorité
sur un théâtre, en sont les clés.
Il s’agit de pouvoir faire intervenir, à plusieurs milliers de kilomètres, avec
leur soutien et leur logistique associés, des groupements de forces interarmées,
sous commandement interarmées, dans un cadre national ou multinational.
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Pour ce faire, les leçons tirées des crises et engagements récents ont confirmé
le besoin de disposer d’une capacité autonome de projection initiale, terrestre,
aérienne et maritime, permettant de mettre rapidement en place les premiers
éléments. Ceux-ci doivent en général être d’une haute spécialisation et extrêmement
mobiles. La période de stabilisation nécessite ensuite le déploiement de troupes
plus polyvalentes et plus nombreuses et peut se chevaucher avec la période de
reconstruction qui nécessite l’engagement de personnels très spécialisés puisés
majoritairement dans la réserve. L’action de ces forces doit pouvoir être précédée,
complétée ou appuyée par des actions, y compris de frappes dans la profondeur.
Des efforts sont faits pour améliorer les capacités spécifiques permettant à la France
de tenir un rôle de nation - cadre au sein d’une coalition et de supprimer les
lacunes susceptibles de compromettre les engagements.
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Annex 5
US NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
February 2003
Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, D.C., New
York City, and Pennsylvania were acts of war against the United States of America
and its allies, and against the very idea of civilized society. No cause justifies
terrorism. The world must respond and fight this evil that is intent on threatening
and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life. Freedom and fear are at
war.
The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it
is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents. Those who employ terrorism, regardless of their specific secular
or religious objectives, strive to subvert the rule of law and effect change through
violence and fear. These terrorists also share the misguided belief that killing,
kidnapping, extorting, robbing, and wreaking havoc to terrorize people are
legitimate forms of political action.
The struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war
in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military
might. We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts
to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power—
diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and
military. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes—
some seen, some unseen. And we will always remain vigilant against new terrorist
threats. Our goal will be reached when Americans and other civilized people
around the world can lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks.There will
be no quick or easy end to this conflict.
(...)
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Goals And Objectives
Goal: Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations
(...) Objective: Identify terrorists and terrorist organizations.
(...) Objective: Locate terrorists and their organizations.
(...) Objective: Destroy terrorists and their organizations.
Goal: Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists
The National Strategy’s second front stresses denying terrorists the
sponsorship, support, and sanctuary that enable them to exist, gain strength,
train, plan, and execute their attacks. The United States has a long memory and is
committed to holding terrorists and those who harbor them accountable for past
crimes. The states that choose to harbor terrorists are like accomplices who provide
shelter for criminals. They will be held accountable for the actions of their “guests.”
The strategy to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary is three-fold. First, it
focuses on the responsibilities of all states to fulfill their obligations to combat
terrorism both within their borders and internationally.
Second, it helps target U.S. assistance to those states who are willing to combat
terrorism, but may not have the means. And finally, when states prove reluctant
or unwilling to meet their international obligations to deny support and sanctuary
to terrorists, the United States, in cooperation with friends and allies, or if necessary,
acting independently, will take appropriate steps to convince them to change
their policies. The goal of this front is to choke off the lifeblood of terrorist
groups—their access to territory, funds, equipment, training, technology,
and unimpeded transit. This approach will therefore weaken terrorist
organizations and their ability to conduct operations. Of particular importance is
working to prevent terrorists from acquiring the capability to use chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, or high-yield explosives.
Non-state actors play an important role in the international environment.
Nongovernmental organizations are important in combating international
terrorism and we will work with them to prevent terrorists from taking advantage
of their services.
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Objective: End the state sponsorship of terrorism.
The United States will assume a clear and pragmatic approach in prosecuting
the campaign against terrorism. This will include incentives for ending state
sponsorship. When a state chooses not to respond to such incentives, tough
decisions will be confronted. At all times within this new dynamic we will balance
a nation’s near-term actions against the long-term implications and consequences.
The United States currently lists seven state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Libya,
Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. We are firmly committed to removing
countries from the list once they have taken the necessary steps under our law
and policy. A checkered past does not foreclose future membership in the coalition
against terrorism. It is important for all countries to adopt a “zero tolerance”
policy for terrorist activity within their borders. In the new global environment it
is also important for states to understand how terrorists and their supporters may
use legitimate means of communication, commerce, and transportation for illegal
activities.
Each state that gets out of the business of sponsoring terrorism represents a
significant step forward and offers a tangible measure of success. America will
never seek to remove states from the sponsorship list by lowering the bar; instead,
these states should be encouraged—or compelled—to clear the bar.
We will not have a single, inflexible approach to handling the recognized
state sponsors of terrorism. Each case is unique, with different interests and legacy
issues involved. Each situation demands specifically tailored policies.
We will be open to overtures from states that want to put their sponsorship
of terrorism behind them, but we will not compromise on the essential principle
that there are no “good” or “just” terrorists. We will be relentless in discrediting
terrorism as a legitimate means of expressing discontent.
(...)
Persuading Reluctant States: In waging the campaign against terrorism, the
United States will also confront difficult cases involving countries that, although
capable, prove reluctant to comply with their responsibilities in the fight against
terror. Some countries will cooperate on some fronts but not others. This
unwillingness can spring from many sources, such as external threats, internal
schisms that enable one faction to use the state to extend tacit or active support to
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terrorists, or cultural or political differences that lead to disagreements over what
constitutes “terrorist” or criminal activity.
These cases will be the most delicate. The United States recognizes that some
governments might place themselves in the crosshairs—and not just figuratively—
by joining the war against terrorism. Therefore, constructive engagement, with
sustained diplomacy and targeted assistance will be used to persuade these regimes
to become more willing and, eventually able, to meet their international obligations
to combat terrorism.
Compelling Unwilling States: The unwilling states are those that sponsor or
actively provide sanctuary to terrorists. Those states that continue to sponsor
terrorist organizations will be held accountable for their actions.
(...)
Goal: Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit
The third component of the 4D strategy is made up of the collective efforts
to diminish conditions that terrorists can exploit. While we recognize that there
are many countries and people living with poverty, deprivation, social
disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and regional disputes, those
conditions do not justify the use of terror. However, many terrorist organizations
that have little in common with the poor and destitute masses exploit these
conditions to their advantage.
(...)
The United States does not propose to undertake this difficult challenge
alone. The United States has neither the resources nor the expertise to be in every
place in the world. Moreover, the struggle against terrorism is not solely an
American struggle. Our friends and allies face many of the same threats. It is
essential for America to work with its friends and allies in this campaign.
(...)
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Annex 6
Resolution 1483 (2003)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, on
22 May 2003
The Security Council,
(...)
Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the
United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing
the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable
international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command
(the “Authority”),
Noting further that other States that are not occupying powers are working
now or in the future may work under the Authority,
Welcoming further the willingness of Member States to contribute to stability
and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources
under the Authority,
Concerned that many Kuwaitis and Third-State Nationals still are not
accounted for since 2 August 1990,
Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Appeals to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the people
of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and
to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with
this resolution;
2. Calls upon all Member States in a position to do so to respond immediately
to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international
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organizations for Iraq and to help meet the humanitarian and other needs of the
Iraqi people by providing food, medical supplies, and resources necessary for
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s economic infrastructure;
(...)
10. Decides that, with the exception of prohibitions related to the sale or
supply to Iraq of arms and related materiel other than those arms and related
materiel required by the Authority to serve the purposes of this and other related
resolutions, all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq and the provision of financial
or economic resources to Iraq established by resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent
relevant resolutions, including resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992, shall
no longer apply;
(...)
15. Calls upon the international financial institutions to assist the people of
Iraq in the reconstruction and development of their economy and to facilitate
assistance by the broader donor community, and welcomes the readiness of creditors,
including those of the Paris Club, to seek a solution to Iraq’s sovereign debt
problems;
(...)
22. Noting the relevance of the establishment of an internationally recognized,
representative government of Iraq and the desirability of prompt completion of
the restructuring of Iraq’s debt as referred to in paragraph 15 above, further decides
that, until December 31, 2007, unless the Council decides otherwise, petroleum,
petroleum products, and natural gas originating in Iraq shall be immune, until
title passes to the initial purchaser from legal proceedings against them and not be
subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or execution, and that all States
shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal
systems to assure this protection, and that proceeds and obligations arising from
sales thereof, as well as the Development Fund for Iraq, shall enjoy privileges and
immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by the United Nations except that the
abovementioned privileges and immunities will not apply with respect to any
legal proceeding in which recourse to such proceeds or obligations is necessary to
satisfy liability for damages assessed in connection with an ecological accident,
including an oil spill, that occurs after the date of adoption of this resolution;
(...)
26. Calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations
to contribute to the implementation of this resolution;
(...)
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Annex 7
Resolution 1511 (2003)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4844th meeting, on
16 October 2003
The Security Council,
(...)
Underscoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq,
reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political
future and control their own natural resources, reiterating its resolve that the day
when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly, and recognizing the importance
of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraq’s
neighbours, and regional organizations, in taking forward this process expeditiously,
Recognizing that international support for restoration of conditions of stability
and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the
ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq,
and
welcoming Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483
(2003),
(...)
Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security,
(...)
13. Determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the
successful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above
and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process
and the implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and authorizes a multinational
force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring
necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable and programme as
well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim
administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure;
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14. Urges Member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations
mandate, including military forces, to the multinational force referred to in
paragraph 13 above;
(...)
19. Calls upon Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to Iraq,
arms for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists, and emphasizes
the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region,
particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard;
20. Appeals to Member States and the international financial institutions to
strengthen their efforts to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and
development of their economy, and urges those institutions to take immediate
steps to provide their full range of loans and other financial assistance to Iraq,
working with the Governing Council and appropriate Iraqi ministries;
21. Urges Member States and international and regional organizations to
support the Iraq reconstruction effort initiated at the 24 June 2003 United Nations
Technical Consultations, including through substantial pledges at the 23-24
October 2003 International Donors Conference in Madrid;
22. Calls upon Member States and concerned organizations to help meet the
needs of the Iraqi people by providing resources necessary for the rehabilitation
and reconstruction of Iraq’s economic infrastructure;
23. Emphasizes that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB)
referred to in paragraph 12 of resolution 1483 (2003) should be established as a
priority, and reiterates that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a
transparent manner as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 1483 (2003);
24. Reminds all Member States of their obligations under paragraphs 19 and
23 of resolution 1483 (2003) in particular the obligation to immediately cause
the transfer of funds, other financial assets and economic resources to the
Development Fund for Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people;
(...)
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Annex 8
A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
Brussels, 12 December 2003
Introduction
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of
the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability
unprecedented in European history.
(...)
The United States has played a critical role in European integration and
European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has
left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no
single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.
(...)
I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND
KEY THREATS
(...)
Key Threats
Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead,
Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.
Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to
undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing
strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are
well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited
violence to cause massive casualties.
The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to
violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the
pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation
of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our
own society.
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Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are
targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been
uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European
action is indispensable.
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest
threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control
arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are
now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of
a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological
sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years;
attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The
spread ofmissile technology adds a further element of instability and could put
Europe at increasing risk.
The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire
weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict
damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.
Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes
Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and
indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or
frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability.
They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten
minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to
extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised
crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical
way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the
older problems of regional conflict.
State Failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions
and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some
cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia
and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse
of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or
terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global
governance, and adds to regional instability.
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Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal
threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking
in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the
activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism. Such criminal activities
are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled
the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues
from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the
world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself.
In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the
heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs
trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal
networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women
victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which
will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.
Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum
violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the
weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be
confronted with a very radical threat indeed.
(...)
II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
(...)
Our traditional concept of self- defence – up to and including the Cold War
– was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of
defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of
proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more
dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we
have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a
crisis occurs.Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new
threats is purely military;  nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each
requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export
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controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the
underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a
mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states,
military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to
tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military
assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic
instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore
civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond
to such multi-faceted situations.
(...)
AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON EFFECTIVE
MULTILATERALISM
In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security
and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The
development of a stronger international society, well functioning international
institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.
We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The
fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter.
The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities
and to act effectively, is a European priority.
We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in
confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be
ready to act when their rules are broken.
(...)
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE
The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy
and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used
effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to
make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more
coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.
(...)
Conclusion
This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European
Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the
threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European
Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute
to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.
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Annex 9
EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION (Dezembro 2003)
(...)
CHAPTER II. THE EUROPEAN UNION CANNOT IGNORE THESE
DANGERS. IT MUST SEEK AN EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALIST
RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT.
(...)
15. Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and
export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organisations
form the first line of defence against proliferation. When these measures (including
political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or
global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be
envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role.
A) Effective multilateralism is the cornerstone of the European strategy for
combating proliferation of WMD.
16. The EU is committed to the multilateral treaty system, which provides
the legal and normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts. The EU policy is to
pursue the implementation and universalisation of the existing disarmament and
non-proliferation norms. To that end, we will pursue the universalisation of the
NPT, the IAEA Safeguard agreements and protocols additional to them, the CWC,
the BTWC, the HCOC, and the early entry into force of the CTBT. The EU
policy is to work towards the bans on biological and chemical weapons being
declared universally binding rules of international law. The EU policy is to pursue
an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU will assist third
countries in the fulfilment of their obligations under multilateral conventions
and regimes.
17. If the multilateral treaty regime is to remain credible it must be made
more effective. The EU will place particular emphasis on a policy of reinforcing
270 Luis Leitão Tomé
compliance with the multilateral treaty regime. Such a policy must be geared
towards enhancing the detectability of significant violations and strengthening
enforcement of the prohibitions and norms established by the multilateral treaty
regime, including by providing for criminalisation of violations committed under
the jurisdiction or control of a State. The role of the UN Security Council, as the
final arbiter on the consequence of non-compliance – as foreseen in multilateral
regimes – needs to be effectively strengthened.
(...)
B) Promotion of a stable international and regional environment is a
condition for the fight against proliferation of WMD
20. The EU is determined to play a part in addressing the problems of regional
instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many
weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a vacuum.
The best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries
should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be
found to the problems, which lead them to seek WMD. The more secure countries
feel, the more likely they are to abandon programmes: disarmament measures
can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race.
(...)
C) Close co-operation with key partners is crucial for the success of the global
fight against proliferation
25. A common approach and co-operation with key partners is essential in
order to effectively implement WMD non-proliferation regime.
26. Co-operation with the US and other key partners such as the Russian
Federation, Japan and Canada is necessary to ensure a successful outcome of the
global fight against proliferation.
(...)
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CHAPTER III. THE EUROPEAN UNION MUST MAKE USE OF ALL
ITS INSTRUMENTS TO PREVENT, DETER, HALT, AND IF POSSIBLE
ELIMINATE PROLIFERATION PROGRAMMES THAT CAUSE
CONCERN AT GLOBAL LEVEL.
29. The elements of the EU’s Strategy against proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction need to be integrated across the board. We have a wide range of
instruments available: multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national
and internationally-coordinated export controls; cooperative threat reduction
programmes; political and economic levers (including trade and development
policies); interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive
measures in accordance with the UN Charter. While all are necessary, none is
sufficient in itself.
We need to strengthen them across the board, and deploy those that are
most effective in each case.
The European Union has special strengths and experience to bring to this
collective effort. It is important that the EU’s objectives, as set out in this strategy,
be factored in its policy approach in each area, so as to maximise its effectiveness.
30. In implementing our strategy we have decided to focus in particular on
the specific measures contained in this chapter. It is a “living action plan” whose
implementation will be constantly monitored. It will be subjected to regular revision
and updating every six months.
A) Rendering multilateralism more effective by acting resolutely against
proliferators.
(...)
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Annex 10
Resolution 1546 (2004)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting, on
8 June 2004
The Security Council,
Welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq’s transition to a democratically
elected government, and looking forward to the end of the occupation and the
assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully sovereign and independent
Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004,
Recalling all of its previous relevant resolutions on Iraq,
Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of
Iraq,
Reaffirming also the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own
political future and control their own natural resources,
Recognizing the importance of international support, particularly that of
countries in the region, Iraq’s neighbours, and regional organizations, for the
people of Iraq in their efforts to achieve security and prosperity, and noting that
the successful implementation of this resolution will contribute to regional stability,
(...)
Recalling the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003, and affirming that the United Nations should
play a leading role in assisting the Iraqi people and government in the formation
of institutions for representative government,
Recognizing that international support for restoration of stability and security
is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all
concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming
Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003) of 22
May 2003 and resolution 1511 (2003),
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Recalling the report provided by the United States to the Security Council
on 16 April 2004 on the efforts and progress made by the multinational force,
Recognizing the request conveyed in the letter of 5 June 2004 from the Prime
Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq to the President of the Council,
which is annexed to this resolution, to retain the presence of the multinational
force,
Recognizing also the importance of the consent of the sovereign Government
of Iraq for the presence of the multinational force and of close coordination
between the multinational force and that government,
Welcoming the willingness of the multinational force to continue efforts to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in support of the
political transition, especially for upcoming elections, and to provide security for
the United Nations presence in Iraq, as described in the letter of 5 June 2004
from the United States Secretary of State to the President of the Council, which
is annexed to this resolution,
Noting the commitment of all forces promoting the maintenance of security
and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law, including
obligations under international humanitarian law, and to cooperate with relevant
international organizations,
Affirming the importance of international assistance in reconstruction and
development of the Iraqi economy,
Recognizing the benefits to Iraq of the immunities and privileges enjoyed by
Iraqi oil revenues and by the Development Fund for Iraq, and noting the
importance of providing for continued disbursements of this fund by the Interim
Government of Iraq and its successors upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional
Authority,
Determining that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security,
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Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Endorses the formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq, as
presented on 1 June 2004, which will assume full responsibility and authority by
30 June 2004 for governing Iraq while refraining from taking any actions affecting
Iraq’s destiny beyond the limited interim period until an elected Transitional
Government of Iraq assumes office as envisaged in paragraph four below;
2. Welcomes that, also by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the
Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its
full sovereignty;
(,,,)
9. Notes that the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at the request
of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq and therefore reaffirms the
authorization for the multinational force under unified command established
under resolution 1511 (2003), having regard to the letters annexed to this
resolution;
10. Decides that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in
Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter
alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational force and
setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that,
inter alia, the United Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as
outlined in paragraph seven above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and
without intimidation the timetable and programme for the political process and
benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities;
11. Welcomes, in this regard, the letters annexed to this resolution stating,
inter alia, that arrangements are being put in place to establish a security partnership
between the sovereign Government of Iraq and the multinational force and to
ensure coordination between the two, and notes also in this regard that Iraqi security
forces are responsible to appropriate Iraqi ministers, that the Government of Iraq
has authority to commit Iraqi security forces to the multinational force to engage
in operations with it, and that the security structures described in the letters will
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serve as the fora for the Government of Iraq and the multinational force to reach
agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including
policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between
Iraqi security forces and the multinational force, through close coordination and
consultation;
12. Decides further that the mandate for the multinational force shall be
reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or twelve months from the
date of this resolution, and that this mandate shall expire upon the completion of
the political process set out in paragraph four above, and declares that it will
terminate this mandate earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq;
13. Notes the intention, set out in the annexed letter from the United States
Secretary of State, to create a distinct entity under unified command of the
multinational force with a dedicated mission to provide security for the United
Nations presence in Iraq, recognizes that the implementation of measures to provide
security for staff members of the United Nations system working in Iraq would
require significant resources, and calls upon Member States and relevant
organizations to provide such resources, including contributions to that entity;
14. Recognizes that the multinational force will also assist in building the
capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions, through a programme of
recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring;
15. Requests Member States and international and regional organizations to
contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces, as agreed
with the Government of Iraq, to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people for
security and stability, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and to support
the efforts of UNAMI;
16. Emphasizes the importance of developing effective Iraqi police, border
enforcement, and the Facilities Protection Service, under the control of the Interior
Ministry of Iraq, and, in the case of the Facilities Protection Service, other Iraqi
ministries, for the maintenance of law, order, and security, including combating
terrorism, and requests Member States and international organizations to assist
the Government of Iraq in building the capability of these Iraqi institutions;
277The New World's Geopolitical Outline
17. Condemns all acts of terrorism in Iraq, reaffirms the obligations of Member
States under resolutions 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, 1267 (1999) of 15
October 1999, 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000, 1390 (2002) of 16 January
2002, 1455 (2003) of 17 January 2003, and 1526 (2004) of 30 January 2004,
and other relevant international obligations with respect, inter alia, to terrorist
activities in and from Iraq or against its citizens, and specifically reiterates its call
upon Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to and from Iraq, arms for
terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists, and re-emphasizes the
importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region,
particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard;
18. Recognizes that the Interim Government of Iraq will assume the primary
role in coordinating international assistance to Iraq;
19. Welcomes efforts by Member States and international organizations to
respond in support of requests by the Interim Government of Iraq to provide
technical and expert assistance while Iraq is rebuilding administrative capacity;
(...)
30. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three
months from the date of this resolution on UNAMI operations in Iraq, and on a
quarterly basis thereafter on the progress made towards national elections and
fulfilment of all UNAMI’s responsibilities;
31. Requests that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force,
report to the Council within three months from the date of this resolution on the
efforts and progress of this force, and on a quarterly basis thereafter;
32. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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